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**MINISTER'S MONITORING COMMITTEE  
ON CHANGE IN THE DEPARTMENT  
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE  
AND THE CANADIAN FORCES  
FINAL REPORT — 1999**

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### MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

As this phase of monitoring concludes, I would be remiss if I were not to express my sincere appreciation to my colleagues on the *Committee*, without whose valued collaboration many of the insights contained in this report and its predecessors would never have been possible. At the same time, I think that all of us on the *Committee* would want to acknowledge the exemplary efforts of our Secretariat and consultants, whose support and guidance ensured that our reports have been timely and of the highest quality.

In any assignment, some tasks are easier to perform than others. Not surprisingly, therefore, the pace of change in the CF/DND reform program has varied. Many changes to process-related items, such as pre-deployment training, chain of command and personnel evaluation systems, have been made with dispatch. Others that involve conceptual work, however, such as mobilization planning, visioning of the officer of the future and freedom of expression seem to lag behind. The *Monitoring Committee* has tried to focus attention on some of the deeper and more significant elements of the reform program; indeed, we have tried to imagine ourselves in the places of those working to implement reforms who may have neither the time nor the inclination to consider the significance and implications of the program as a whole.

We believe that the reform program is gaining momentum and, in our judgement, many of the actions called for in the various reports and inquiries we have monitored have substantially been met by the Department and the CF. Assessment of success, however, should not be based only on how many ministerial decisions have or have not been implemented. Rather, it should take into account the degree to which the institution has integrated reform into its culture and its way of carrying on its daily business. We have struggled with this issue in all of our deliberations, and concluded that many officials in the Department and the CF are struggling with it as well.

This form of self-analysis is the harbinger of true reform. At the same time, the capacity to envision the future carries with it tremendous responsibility. We therefore urge those engaged in this soul-searching exercise to stay the course, and to pursue it with a judicious mix of passion and discipline. We also urge those in positions of authority to continue to nurture and capture the work of those envisioning the future. After all, it is only through the complementary balance of dreamers and managers that institutions not only survive, but thrive.

John A. Fraser  
Chairman

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**PART ONE**

## **THE MINISTER'S REFORM PROGRAM: CANADA'S MILITARY AT A CROSSROADS**

### General Observations on the Reform Program | Conclusion

**T**his is the *Final Report* of the *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change*, which was established on October 14, 1997 "to monitor...change initiatives, the process for implementation of these changes, and to evaluate their effectiveness..." Three earlier reports have previously been submitted to the Minister of National Defence and made public, in March 1998, November 1998 and July 1999.

The *Committee's* mandate extends over some 339 decisions by the Minister to implement change in the CF and DND as a result of recommendations in six Reports:

- Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces (MND Report)
- Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and the Military Police Investigation Services (Dickson 1 Report)
- Report on Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence (Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services) (Dickson 2 Report)
- Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to

## Somalia (Somalia Report)

- Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR Report)
- Report of the Military Police Services Review Group (Belzile Report)\*

In its *Interim Reports* the *Committee* adopted the practice of reporting the status of implementation and making observations under eight thematic groupings:

- Openness and Disclosure
- Accountability
- Human Resources Management
- Leadership
- Military Justice
- Operations
- Reserves and Cadets
- Other Issues

We found this to be the most appropriate way of dealing with the inevitable overlapping among decisions and the fact that some decisions have greater significance than others for the overall objectives of the change program. This reporting structure has also facilitated the *Committee's* strategic approach to assessing the successes and shortcomings of the implementation process and thus to provide more useful observations to the Minister and to the DND/CF about progress within the program of reform.

The *Committee* has provided observations about the Department's implementation of various recommendations. In this *Final Report*, the *Monitoring Committee* does not feel the need to revisit many areas of the reform program commented on in *Interim Reports*. Our comments are now part of the substantial public record of the program, now several years old, and we are satisfied that the Department has taken them into account on several important matters, such as our urging a better definition of the concept of accountability and the need for improved internal communications. The Department has responded to most of the *Committee's* concerns, has explained why it is proceeding differently from what the *Committee* suggested in some areas, and has provided the *Committee* with its 'way ahead' to further the program. The *Committee* has no doubt that senior leadership in the Department and the CF is pursuing the reform program in good faith. We continue to note, as in previous reports, that the program is one of many changes faced by the Department, the most significant of which are the reductions to budget, personnel and headquarters taking place at a time when operational tempo is significant.

The *Monitoring Committee* wishes to take this opportunity to thank the Minister of National Defence for his continued support for our work and for the encouragement he has given us. We also acknowledge with thanks the cooperation we have received from members of the CF at all levels and at all locations we have visited, whether NDHQ, other establishments in Canada, or overseas, which has been invaluable to us in doing our job.

The organization of this report differs from that of our 1998 and 1999 *Interim Reports*, in that we take a step back to reflect upon the broader implications of the Minister's reform program. The *Committee* has seen extensive evidence of positive change in many pockets within DND and the CF. To be sure, the Department and the Forces have come a long way in implementing most of the initiatives directed by the Minister.

In spite of these positive changes, the *Committee* has observed some deficiencies in how the Department and the CF have tackled reform. We attribute this to what we perceive as the absence of an overall strategic agenda to ensure the cohesive implementation of a very broad-ranging set of changes. In our view, the reform program, to achieve its goals, requires an overarching philosophical shift in the way business is done. The *Committee* wants there to be no doubt that the Department and the CF have changed as a result of the Minister's reform program. At the same time, we must emphasize that the need for change is ongoing.

We have received, on a regular basis, a comprehensive status report from the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS). That document provides the details and timing of over 300 specific changes achieved in response to the Minister's decisions. Part Two of our report reproduces key elements of that status report under the general themes we have chosen for our discussion.

In this report, we reflect upon what has been accomplished, and the philosophical underpinnings of an organization preparing itself to enter the 21st century. Part One presents the *Committee's* views on some of the implications of these changes, and points to areas where shifts in approach and philosophy may be needed. Part Two of our report contains information drawn from the most recent VCDS status report on changes accomplished, followed by the *Monitoring Committee's* final observations under each theme, similar to the format of the 1998 and 1999 *Interim Reports*.

## **General Observations on the Reform Program**

### **Achievements and Shortcomings**

We are pleased to be able to report on how much progress has been made during our mandate with respect to institutional change in the CF and DND. The accomplishments are many, and have been made over almost all the subject areas covered by the reports from the Somalia Inquiry, the Dickson studies on military justice and former Minister Doug Young's report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the CF:

- The military justice system has been overhauled to be more in line with current legislation and institutional requirements. This process involved a massive regulatory amendment package.
- Summary trials, which are essential to the maintenance of discipline and order in the military, have been maintained, but adhere to much more stringent standards of accountability and due process.
- Under direction of the CF Provost Marshal, military policing and investigative services are vastly improved and increasingly professional.
- An organizational ombudsman has been appointed and given ministerial directives to guide his operation.
- A Military Police Complaints Commission has been appointed, highlighting the Department's efforts to buttress its public accountability.
- A concept of accountability has been developed and promulgated that stresses the value of identifying both failures and successes so that the CF and DND can learn from their



experiences and continuously improve.

- A Grievance Review Board will begin operations in the year 2000, marking a renewal in the DND/CF complaint resolution system.
- A new public affairs policy has been implemented in an attempt to improve the ability of CF members and departmental employees to communicate with the public and the media.
- The CF and DND are grappling with the concepts of ethics and ethos and how they fit into contemporary social, behavioural and military patterns.
- Harassment and racism prevention training has been implemented for all personnel.
- Personnel appraisals, including those for executive level positions, have been overhauled, featuring a better differentiation between a member's performance and potential.
- Training, courses and professional development have been affected by numerous initiatives.
- Myriad recommendations made by the Somalia Inquiry concerning operational doctrine and procedures, such as pre-deployment training, mission acceptance and training in law of armed conflict have been addressed, or were adopted as standard practice before the Somalia Inquiry reported its findings.
- Processes related to promotion and selection boards, screening for deployment, and other human resource management issues have been amended to meet ministerial direction.
- Quality of Life initiatives have been implemented, including the opening of the Centre for the Support of Injured and Retired Members and their Families. The Department is taking a more co-ordinated approach to the care of its members and employees, and has received additional funding for increases in pay, benefits and housing.
- A CF Professional Journal will commence publication in 2000, offering a professional forum for the debate of defence and security matters adhering to rigorous academic standards.

(The one major subject area where the *Committee* is unable to report satisfactory progress is the restructuring of the Reserves, about which more will be said below.)

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DND and the CF deserve to be commended for these achievements which, it should be noted, have been made at a time of serious difficulties for the defence team arising from a heightened pace and range of operational activities and the strains and stresses of financial and personnel shortages.

Yet, even in the face of this record, the *Committee* has concerns about the full and lasting success of the change program. These do not arise from doubts about the serious commitment to implementing the program within the CF or DND. We have seen extensive evidence of this commitment both from leadership and from the staffs responsible for various aspects of the implementation. Our concerns arise from our conviction that the challenge of achieving institutional reform of the kind intended with any success is so great that it requires extraordinary measures of vision, leadership and determination.

As the Minister and others have noted, this program involves profound cultural change. And that means finding ways of embedding within the institution and constantly reinforcing such new or re-discovered values as accountability, self-examination and self-improvement, fairness and openness, alongside the existing values of professionalism, loyalty, courage, and service to

country. To do this, changes in structure, procedures, regulations and education arrangements (like those already made or under way) are necessary. But these measures by themselves will not be sufficient to ensure that the new values will become internalized to the point of being as instinctive as, say, loyalty or service to country. And until this degree of cultural shift is attained, there remains a risk that the achievements of the change program will be diminished, or that the substance of the changes will lack staying power.

The *Committee* has these concerns not only because we know that the theory of successful cultural change prescribes these features of internalization and constant reinforcement. We have also seen troubling signs that while the change program is widely accepted as good and deserving of support, it is still felt by some, even among the CF/DND leadership, to be secondary to their core concerns, and to represent a job to be done rather than new values to be lived. In our discussions with some officers, for example, we have heard the 'new culture' described mostly in terms of learning to manage with fewer resources, out-sourcing and developing managerial as well as military skills. We have noted that the connection between the idea of a self-improving 'learning' institution in the new document on accountability, and the need to change the content of courses, was not immediately recognized by those responsible for officer education. We have not been able to find any established process for capturing the product of the Special Adviser on Officer Professional Development before he completes his work in 2000, so it can be incorporated quickly into the definition of the qualities needed in future officers. We have anecdotal evidence that the Office of the Ombudsman may still be thought of as an external critic rather than part of the CF/DND team trying to build a self-improving organization. And we continue to be troubled by the lack of urgency in bringing into operation such important new instruments of the new culture as the revised grievance system, new regulations on freedom of expression and other provisions of the amended *National Defence Act*.

We make these observations not to complain that all is not yet right, or to draw attention away from the real progress made by the Department and the CF. As we have already noted, the challenge facing DND and the CF is great, and the *Committee* understands that everything can not be achieved at once. We cite them rather as signs that the idea of cultural change is not yet internalized enough to trigger instinctively feelings of determination, persistence and urgency to get the job done. Moreover, the concepts of 'accountability' and 'answerability' within a learning organization, as articulated in the new *Organization and Accountability* document and an imperative precondition for reform, must be supported by structures that can advance 'corrective action' within the organization. Ideas without execution, in other words, are impotent.

The *Committee* therefore supports initiatives such as the creation of the Office of the Special Advisor to the CDS on Officer Professional Development. We eagerly anticipate the Special Advisor's mission statement and action plan, which should appear in 2000. At the same time, we are concerned that an adequate mechanism is not in place for the assessment of his initiatives and their introduction into the professional development system. The Special Advisor may make proposals about fundamental changes in the attributes of officers in the future. The *Committee* urges the Department to consider how any 'corrective action' which may be recommended by the Special Advisor would be implemented. We have suggested that the Special Advisor's position has the potential to be one of the principal engines of change required of a 'learning organization', but remain unsure of how potentially radical proposals for change will be considered and acted upon. What will be the process to link the Special

Advisor (and other change agents) and the authorities responsible for implementing change (notably ADM (HR-Mil))?

The above comments about the challenge of affecting cultural change and about the need for mechanisms to be put in place to capture, assess and implement change initiatives reflect our concern, expressed in our *Interim Reports*, that DND/CF has not been sufficiently 'strategic' in managing the reform program. The *Committee* has identified this pattern as a case of putting the activity 'cart' before the conceptual 'horse', which has led to implementation of a good many recommendations, but has not produced a clear vision of what the reform program is to achieve.

Why has this happened? The Department's approach to reform seems to have resulted from the way in which change was directed by the Government. The Department and the CF were given the task of implementing hundreds of recommendations deriving from various sources which appeared over a span of two years. The implementation of individual recommendations was accepted as a series of tactical jobs. NDHQ dealt with each as a specific objective, developing an action plan, schedule and an achievable goal: to implement the recommendation and 'tick the box'. Public communication of the reform program in various DND/CF publications reflects that approach: charts, percentages and bar graphs represent the completion status of recommendations; the percentage recorded as complete therefore has become the gauge of reform. Taken as a whole, however, the many ministerial decisions represented an opportunity and a challenge to identify and describe the strategic vision behind them and to formulate a coherent implementation plan to realize that intention. Put simply, the defence team has applied **tactical** solutions to what it considers to be **tactical** problems. What the *Committee* has stressed over its tenure is that the reform program is a **strategic** challenge that requires **strategic** solutions.

Two of the most salient examples of how a tactical approach to reform, no matter how vigorously pursued, lacks the breadth of vision to capture the profound consequences of the original direction are reserve restructure and pursuit of the degreed officer corps.

The *Monitoring Committee* has been especially critical in its 1998 and 1999 *Interim Reports* of the implementation of reforms related to the restructuring of the Reserves (LFRR). Most of the ministerial decisions which were to have shaped that restructure have not been implemented. Indeed, many of the fundamental tenets of the restructure, which involves primarily the Militia, appear to have been abandoned. The *Committee* has commented at length on these matters. We must observe now that little has happened since our last report to convince us that there is not a disconnection between government policy and departmental/CF activity. A review of how the current impasse in restructure has occurred will help to illuminate the *Committee's* previous observations on this subject.

In the early 1990s, Canadian policy-makers were not alone among western democracies in their uncertainty about how the end of the Cold War would affect military assumptions, strategy, doctrine and force structure. The simple strategic certainty of the Cold War, which, for Canada, demanded preparation for a massive campaign in central Europe as a member of NATO against forces of the Warsaw Pact, was over. The spirited defence spending that was generated by NATO's push to end the Cold War in the 1980s was also put to rest. The persistent decreases in the defence budget, and associated cuts in personnel, which have characterized the 1990s have forced Canadian defence ministers, the Department and the CF



to reconsider the way in which business is done. In the face of debates about the role of militaries in a multi-polar world, the changing nature of peacekeeping and the legitimacy of using force to impose international will on rogue states, the military has pondered such critical issues as the effects of modern technology on the battlefield, its force structure and even its *raison d'être*.

The Reserves, which had been subjected to various experiments and changes in fortune throughout the Cold War, including National Survival Training in the 1950s and 1960s and the Total Force concept in the 1980s, were now to be 'fixed', and turned into an effective 'component' of the CFs force structure. Evidence of the inefficiencies of the Reserve Force, particularly the Militia, was highlighted in the Auditor General's report of 1992, raised in the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and in other arenas in the run-up to the Defence White Paper of 1994. That document called for a rejuvenated Reserve Force, visiting the possibility of "assigning more service support roles — such as medical, logistics, communications and transport functions — to the Reserves." The White Paper also stated that "... while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready 'no cost' plans for 'national mobilization'." A new mobilization concept was introduced in the White Paper, structured by four stages of graduated commitments in response to various operational requirements. The possibility of recasting reserve roles to include combat service support capabilities — a necessary component of any military operation — has since aroused spirited discussion on the true role of the Reserves, Canada's ability to field forces in a major conflict, and the extent to which Reserve Forces should be integrated into the Regular Force to fill short term operational requirements rather than be trained, equipped and structured to serve as a base for national mobilization should the need arise.

This is a necessary discussion, which was carried forward by the Special Commission on the Restructuring of Reserves (SCRR) in 1995. The SCRR Commissioners expressed their general approval of the concept of mobilization offered in the White Paper, but noted that it "failed to recognize that the fundamental role of the Reserve Force is to provide the mobilization base for war. Such a role should be paramount in planning, and a mobilization plan should be completed with dispatch... The Commissioners conclude that the peacetime Militia must be organized and trained to provide augmentation for the regulars and to be capable of expansion to meet mobilization needs. The mobilization plan for the Army, therefore, should be based on the formation of a corps." The SCRR did not address the possibility of assigning increased service support duties for the Militia.

SCRR recommendations accepted by the Minister of National Defence were based on these basic premises held by the Commissioners. Since the Commissioners released their report, the Militia was to have benefited by an increase in personnel of 7,000, which would have boosted their ranks to at least 18,500 soldiers. That has not happened. In addition, although the initial Chief of the Land Staff directive on LFRR directed that "mobilization capability is the fundamental reason for the existence of the Land Force Reserves", it is not mobilization, but augmentation, that has gripped planning concepts over the past two years. No national mobilization plan exists. A lack of clarity over the Militia's missions and roles has persisted, and this has affected considerations of force structure, personnel policies and enabling legislation. This has cast a shadow over the process. Militia strength has fallen far below the mandated 18,500 (and even below the 14,500 given as a guideline to the SCRR Commissioners), training has been cut, various SCRR recommendations have been abandoned and a lack of communication between the Regular and Reserve Force communities persists.

Consultations between the Army and the Reserve community, also directed by the Minister, have broken down. This has caused an impasse in restructuring deliberations, and the Minister has since deferred decisions on restructuring proposals being prepared by the Army.

A 'tactical' approach to Reserve restructure has resulted in a situation where consensus is lacking on the basic conceptual underpinnings of the Militia's mission and role as a national institution within the defence community. The *Committee* is pleased to note that work has been done recently in the Department to revisit these concepts. Such strategic thinking is required to set Reserve restructure on the right course to ensure its survival as a valuable national resource. To that end, the Chair of this *Committee* has been asked by the Minister to provide advice on the Reserve Restructure Process.

The *Committee* has also identified a need for more strategic guidance in the area of officer education. The Minister of National Defence, in his *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, decided that, in future, all CF officers will possess a university degree, except for those commissioned from the ranks. By following on this path, the CF has triggered what will inevitably be a sea change not only in what is required of future officers for commissioning, but also what will be required of officers as they progress through the ranks. In this environment, graduate degrees will no doubt become a benchmark qualification for senior officers — yet the CF still has no graduate education policy.

This development has significance for the reform program for two reasons: the *Committee* has observed that, while the CF has embarked on creating plans to achieve a degreed officer corps, there remains a lack of demonstrated commitment on the part of the CF that an educated officer has a military or operational value. There is only one way to reinforce such a commitment: persistent sponsorship of all officers, including specialist, support and operational MOCs, to pursue all types of degrees, including those in the liberal arts, much more than has previously been the case. Given the high priority placed on interoperability with the United States that pervades current CF operational objectives, 'interoperability' of leadership must be pursued as a means to that end. The US armed forces are no doubt ahead of the CF in terms of education — we can ill afford to let the situation deteriorate further.

To that end, senior leadership must actively encourage and support education as integral to the operational integrity of the CF. A degreed officer corps is still regarded by many as a tasking that must be 'implemented', but only gradually, and only as it fits into other, more important activities. We have noted previously that the primacy of operations has left little time for many officers to pursue education in a meaningful way. We continue to argue that, if CF personnel strength is cut further, it will be impossible to create a truly modern, interoperable and strategically-oriented military in Canada. Operational tempo already severely constrains the allotment of sufficient time to the education of officers, especially those in the combat arms and operationally-oriented trades. Senior CF and departmental leadership must make this point clear in their dealings with the public. Furthermore, they must do more than say the right things about the value of education; they must ensure that it is not considered to be 'training', and they must ensure that career management and progression concepts and practices incorporate education as a matter of course.

Furthermore, graduate education must become the norm for more senior officers. In particular, officers in the 'fighting' element of the military's occupational classification system

must be more strongly encouraged and supported to pursue advanced degrees, because these officers tend to occupy senior leadership positions. Policies must support that objective. Only then will the CF's culture begin to include education as a military virtue and operational necessity, rather than an activity that can be accommodated if time and resources permit. The *Committee* is well aware that the task of becoming a competent operator already takes a career to achieve; what we argue is that education must become an inherent part of that career. By focussing on the input of education into the development of the officer corps — the degree — perhaps what has been missed is the value of development through education, actively promoted and supported by policy (as characterized by a university degree).

The *Committee* has made several recommendations and observations in previous reports regarding both education and professional development of officers at all rank levels in the CF. We repeat those here, because we have not been dissuaded that they are crucial to the success of the reform program, and therefore urge the Department and the CF to consider them further:

"Although there has been much progress in improving officer education, the following is also true:

1. There are still leaders in the CF who believe that leadership training and an undergraduate education at RMC, or a civilian university, amount to the same thing which is not so.
2. The army, navy, and air force have lacked, and continue to lack, a coordinated undergraduate education policy. [The *Committee* understands that this has been addressed by ADM (HR-Mil) since its 1999 *Interim Report*.]
3. The CF still has no established forces-wide policy re: graduate education with respect to time release or sponsorship.
4. The undergraduate curriculum at RMC is still heavily affected by a "job training" approach as opposed to education in the liberal arts sense of the word.
5. There is appallingly little sponsorship of military members in non-engineering subject areas.
6. Despite the push for increased liberal arts military education in the United States armed forces, in Latin America, and elsewhere, the Canadian military is still acting under the assumption that subjects such as geomatics engineering are true military education fare but history or anthropology are not."

Of professional development of senior officers, we reported the following:

"For the consideration of the public and CF leadership, we offer some suggestions for reform:

1. The AMSC for colonels should continue in the three-month timeframe, concentrating on operations.
2. The current AMSC and NSSC courses content should be merged into a single nine-to-ten-month course. Candidates for this course should be selected on a competitive basis, and selection should be treated as a prerequisite for promotion to general/flag rank, as opposed to the current situation where promotion to this rank is not affected by performance in the course. The course must rigorously adhere to high academic and professional standards in methods of teaching, course content and tenor of intellectual discourse.

3. Candidates chosen for this course should be treated as an elite group who have earned the privilege of attending the College and the opportunity to be promoted accordingly.
4. The CF should make liberal provisions for students' stay at the College, including family leave or accommodation, travel allowances and students' accommodation. Furthermore, candidates should be seconded from their positions, and not required to continue performing their duties while on course.
5. Those who are responsible for administering, organizing and teaching at the College should be a mix of top-notch civilian academics or military professionals with strong academic credentials."

The *Committee* believes strongly that such measures are necessary to foster the type of leadership that can carry the CF into the 21st century. Furthermore, these steps lend themselves to the change objective of developing decisive leaders, enunciated in *A Strategy for 2020*. They also lend themselves to the CF University concept, notional at present, which requires clear and precise direction from leadership as to its purpose, structure and academic requirements. Activity geared toward the degreed officer corps has thus far been of a tactical nature. It is imperative that it now becomes strategic or, as we commented in our 1999 *Interim Report*,

The *Monitoring Committee* therefore urges DND and the CF to give as much priority as possible to these strategic planning initiatives and to accelerate them so that clear and focused guidance will become available for all elements of the education and development system at an early date. The purpose and goals of the reform program must be articulated and communicated broadly, and its transition secured by repeated assurances by the leadership of their commitment to it and their willingness to explain what it is for and how it is to be achieved.

The *Committee* does have concerns that, because the Department and the CF have deemed most of the reform program to be complete, there may be little incentive for them to re-visit the original ministerial decisions from a strategic point of view. It is not, however, too late for such a reassessment.

## Conclusion

### Ethos and the Canadian Military Profession

With that in mind, the *Monitoring Committee* suggests that the CF and DND should sharpen the strategic focus and increase the sense of commitment and urgency about the institutional reform program by:

- Developing as soon as possible a clear vision of the desired institutional culture and of the qualities and characteristics of officers who will serve in it. This should be seen as a cultural dimension to the kind of strategic thinking in *A Strategy for 2020*.
- Finding a way of capturing the results of work in progress in the Office of the Special Adviser on Officer Professional Development and other units engaged in envisioning the future. This should be done even before their projects are completed for use in the visioning of the desired culture and in military personnel management and the education



system.

- Having the top leadership attach a high priority to spreading the message about their vision of the desired future and the urgency of working toward it.

Such an approach would highlight the essence of the reform program, which is best described as the articulation of a military ethos, or the spirit embodied in the characteristics of the profession's culture. The military profession must engage in a forces-wide discourse on the subject of military ethos. This is not an activity to be dealt with as tangential to operational tempo or capital budget allocations. To the contrary, ethos is the heart of the military profession and operational effectiveness. If one fact has been predominant throughout the course of our monitoring activities, it is that the definition, articulation and promulgation of a renewed military ethos must never be considered less than a core military activity.

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\* Readers should note that a detailed description of departmental activity related to all ministerial decisions can be found

on D-Net, the Department's Internet site at <http://www.dnd.ca>

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## PART TWO

**T**his is Part Two of our *Final Report*. It provides a snapshot of the implementation status of all recommendations under examination by the *Committee*. Some information on DND/CF activities was taken from updated reports on the DND Web site as of December 10, 1999, as issued by the Office of the VCDS. That material appears in shaded text, and does not necessarily reflect the *Monitoring Committee's* judgement. While some minor typographical errors have been corrected, the *Committee* has not altered the meaning of the original text, which represents the views of the Department and the Canadian Forces regarding the status of the reform program.

Observations that follow each status section reflect the *Monitoring Committee's* views on some of the more significant outstanding ministerial decisions. These are meant to supplement comments provided in the 1998 and 1999 *Interim Reports*.

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## CHAPTER 1

# OPENNESS AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES

A Culture of Openness | Public and Parliamentary Debate

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**A Culture of Openness** (MND 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62; Som 39.3)

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### Decisions

In March and October 1997, the Minister made several decisions intended to increase the ability and willingness of the Department to be more transparent in dealing with the public. These decisions involved the promulgation of revised communications policies, and greater public exposure for the Canadian Forces (CF). The Minister's initiatives included a commitment to process Access to Information (ATI) requests more expeditiously, to improve the Department's Internet site and to issue a document that establishes a standard for effective and open public communications. He emphasized that the culture of openness must be encouraged by example from the top level of the organization, namely, the Deputy Minister (DM) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 57:</b> Put in place a communications and public affairs policy to ensure these principles are embedded in the day-to-day operations of the Department and the Canadian Forces through initiatives such as community- and media-outreach programs.	Develop Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces Communication Public Affairs Policy.	Completed



<p><b>MND 58:</b> Increase the public visibility of the Canadian Forces by improving the quality of communications material, revamping the Department's Internet site and establishing a comprehensive and coordinated public information and education program.</p>	<p>Review all non-Public Affairs activities (including publications, exhibitions, and recruiting) to establish a comprehensive and coordinated public information and education program. DGPA has completed the initial commitment; however, we will be continually updating/improving the quality of our communications material, as well as improving our internet site and our public information and education program. For all intents and purposes, this recommendation has been fully implemented.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>MND 59:</b> Provide a clear and accurate picture of the Canadian Forces that will serve as the basis for a recruitment campaign emphasizing the unique challenges that a life in the military can offer.</p>	<p>The new advertising campaign in place also serves as PR for the CF.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
	<p>Seventeen Military Trade Lifestyle Videos (TLVs) and Occupational Lifestyle Videos (OLVs) have been produced.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
	<p>Basic Officer Training Course (BOTC) Video for use as introductory information package has been completed.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
	<p>Communications strategy is complete, and the advertising contract awarded. However, the communications strategy is a continuous process updated on a yearly basis.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>MND 60:</b> Process access to information requests more expeditiously. To meet the added workload, staff was increased by 30 percent during the 1995-96 fiscal year; personnel resources devoted to this activity increased by a further 8 percent in 1996-97 and will rise by another 12 percent in 1997-98.</p>	<p>Monitor results.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<b>MND 61:</b> Make available a reading room to provide access to electronic holdings of documents released in response to access to information requests and ensure that the Department's Internet site includes a listing of the documents that have been released.	Post information regarding completed Access to Information requests on DND/CF Homepage.	Completed
	ADM(Fin CS) Inform Internet users who wish to view or purchase records how to do so.	Completed
	Establish two "reading rooms" equipped with workstations and the means to obtain and pay for hard copies of information released under AIA.	Completed
<b>MND 62:</b> Review military regulations and issue by year's end a document clarifying the procedures that assure transparent and effective communications with the public.	Review and amend Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&Os) & Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) as appropriate. CFAOs have been superseded by public affairs policy. A working group was established to address QR&Os 19.36, 19.37 and 19.375. A draft has been created and promulgated, and is currently being reviewed by the DND/CF Legal Advisor. Amended QR&O are expected to be ready by autumn 1999.	Expected completion date: 30/09/1999
<b>Somalia 39.3:</b> The Department of National Defence take the following steps to promote openness and transparency: 1. require the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff to: a. instil by example and through directives the importance of	The Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff have expended considerable effort to improve departmental compliance with the Access to Information Act (AIA) since the fall of 1995, including: issuing a directive in November 1995 to senior management re-emphasizing the	Completed

openness in responding to requests made under the Access to Information Act; b. ensure that military and civilian personnel in the Department of National Defence are better trained to respond to Access to Information Act requests, particularly with regard to legal obligations and procedures; and c. ensure that staff fully understand the requirement to report, as a significant incident under existing regulations, any suspected document alteration or improper response to Access to Information Act requests; 2. begin consultations with the Information Commissioner, within three months of the submission of this report to the Governor in Council, to determine the most effective way of improving departmental responses to Access to Information Act requests; and 3. ensure that public affairs policy and practices reflect the principles of openness, responsiveness, transparency and accountability expressed throughout this report.

imperative that DND comply fully with all provisions of the AIA; enhancing the form, content, distribution, and follow-up to DND's Access to Information Weekly Performance and Status Report; reminding senior management at every opportunity of the importance of AIA compliance; issuing a message on 26 July 1996, to all DND personnel providing policy direction on the requirement to provide all records in their existing form and clarifying the criteria of transitory documents; and communicating regularly with the Information Commissioner to resolve contentious issues and to respond to specific AIA requests. In March 1997, in his Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces, the Minister of National Defence set out proposals to improve departmental responsiveness to Access to Information Act requests as well as enhance public access to DND/CF information. Measures include: a concerted effort to process Access to Information requests more expeditiously by augmenting staff to better meet the added workload (staff was increased by 30% during FY 95/96, personnel resources devoted to this activity increased by a further 8% in 96/97, and will rise by another 12% in 1997-98); enhanced transparency by establishing two sites in the National Capital Region where the public can access digitized records released under previous Access to Information Act requests; and listing on the DND web-site a summary of Access to Information Act requests completed by DND. In March 1997, the Information Commissioner provided DND with

	<p>a report on Access to Information processes and practices within DND. In June, the Deputy Minister responded to this report, accepting virtually all of the 93 recommendations it contained. The Deputy Minister's response detailed steps that have already been taken, as well as planned future actions. Both the Information Commissioner's report and the Deputy Minister's response are available on request. The Minister's report to the Prime Minister also committed DND/CF to issue by year's end a document clarifying the procedures that will assure more transparent and effective communications with the public. The Department will also put in place a public affairs policy to ensure the principles of increased transparency, responsiveness, accessibility, and accuracy are embedded in day-to-day communications. CF Administrative Order 4-13, "Reporting of Significant Incidents," will also be amplified to ensure that staff fully understand the requirement to report, as a significant incident under existing regulations, any suspected document alteration or improper response to Access to Information Act requests.</p>	
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## Public and Parliamentary Debate (MND 63, 64, 65)

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### Decisions

In March 1997, the Minister announced his intention to ensure that the Department and the Canadian Forces are responsive to the need for Parliamentarians to keep informed of defence-related matters. To that end, the Department was to take steps to enhance the role of

Parliament and its committees in their consideration of security issues. The Minister also directed the CDS to prepare an annual report on the state of the Canadian Forces, which the Minister would submit to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCNDVA).

In an effort to promote further public and scholarly debate of defence-related issues, the Minister decided to create a departmentally-funded military journal with its own editorial board, to be based at the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston. The journal, once established, would publish articles by military and civilian specialists on Canadian security and defence.

### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 63:</b> DGPA Create a Department-funded military journal with its own editorial board, based at the Royal Military College. The journal will publish articles by military and civilian specialists on Canadian security and defence.	The Journal Planning Committee has completed its proposal for the Journal, which includes editorial policy, structure, and policies on content, format, style and production cycle.	Completed
	An editor has been selected, given an offer of employment and is expected to be in place by 30 Sep 99. Positions for one LCol and one Cpl have been approved.	Expected completion date: 01/12/1999
	Staff proposal through MPD Council.	Completed
	Commence production.	Not Started
<b>MND 64:</b> Continue initiatives designed to enhance the role of Parliament and its committees in their consideration of security issues and, in particular, ensure that the Department and the Forces are responsive to the need for Parliamentarians to be well informed in a timely manner.	Revamp internal work processes to improve responsiveness and quality: — Improve response times to written correspondence and verbal requests from Parliamentarians — Enhance information release — Responses to House Order Paper Questions and Questions Taken on Notice in the Senate — Tracking of Parliamentary Business — Liaison	Completed

	with Parliamentary Committees — Provision of reports and briefings to Parliament — Liaison with Parliamentary Associations — Parliamentary Contacts — Committee Appearances.	
<b>MND 65:</b> Have the Chief of the Defence Staff prepare an annual state of the Canadian Forces report which the Minister of National Defence will submit to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.	The CDS First Annual Report to the Minister of National Defence was tabled in Parliament on 8 October 1998.	Completed
	VCDS Determine report contents.	Completed

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### Observations

An editor for the new Canadian Military Journal has been selected, and is currently preparing for publication of the first issue in March 2000. The editorial policy has also been approved by the Defence Management Committee. The Editorial Advisory Board is now in place, and an Academic Peer Review Committee will be selected soon.

Throughout its mandate, the *Committee* has urged the Department and the CF to expedite the creation of this journal. It is a necessary forum for the debate of defence, security and military issues during this period of very turbulent and soul-searching period for the Canadian military profession. In order to ensure its success, senior leadership must continue to give the Canadian Military Journal its unqualified and enthusiastic support. Although the target dates for publication of the first journal have been consistently pushed forward, the *Committee* is satisfied now that this journal has enormous potential. We trust that any restrictions on freedom of expression related to the submission of articles by CF members or civilian employees of the Department will be removed before publication of the first issue.

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## CHAPTER 2

# ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES

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Matters](#) |  
[Improved Operation of NDHQ](#) | [Mandatory Review of the \*National Defence Act\*](#)

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### Strengthening of Accountability (MND 50, 51; Som 15.3, 16.3)

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#### Decisions

The Minister released, in March 1997, a document entitled *Authority, Responsibility and Accountability* to help all personnel understand how the work of the Department of National Defence is conducted and the roles they play within its authority and accountability structure.

In October 1997, the Minister cited the promulgation of this document as a response to the recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry that "formal criteria (be adopted) for accountability of leaders in the CF", and agreed with their further recommendation that the values, principles and processes of accountability be incorporated in education and training programs.

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 50:</b> Clarify accountability to the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff among senior staff along lines of primary responsibility.	Determine DM/CDS accountability and issue guidance document.	Completed



<b>MND 51:</b> Issue a guidance document entitled Authority, Responsibility and Accountability to help our military and civilian personnel better understand how the work of National Defence is conducted and the role they play.	The annual task to review, update and promulgate material describing ARA must become the task of the NDHQ LI/OPI/SME. CFETS and ECS Schools then amend training accordingly.	Expected completion date: 30/09/2000
	The new SME for the Nature and Functioning of an Integrated National Defence HQ is ADM (Pol). CANFORGEN 091/99 promulgates "Organization and Responsibility".	Completed
<b>Somalia 15.3:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria for the accountability of leaders within the Canadian Forces derived from the principles of accountability set out in Chapter 16 of this Report, and organized under the headings of accountability, responsibility, supervision, delegation, sanction and knowledge.	A guidance document entitled Authority, Responsibility and Accountability, to address accountability at the strategic level, has been developed and is in the process of being promulgated within DND and the CF. In terms of individual accountability, the principles of accountability and responsibility contained in Chapter 16 of the Commission of Inquiry Report are consistent with current CF standards. However, more emphasis will be placed on accountability in training at all levels of the Canadian Forces. NOTE: THIS SERIAL HAS BEEN MERGED WITH MND REPORT SERIAL 31 (PRE-COMMAND TRAINING) AND WILL BE PROGRESSED BY CFRETS UNDER AEGIS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RENEWAL.	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999

## Somalia 10.9

<p>The Chief of the Defence Staff incorporate the values, principles and processes of accountability into continuing education of officer cadets at the Royal Military College and in staff training, command and staff training, and senior command courses. In particular, such education and training should establish clearly the accountability requirements in the command process and the issuance of orders, and the importance of upper ranks setting a personal example with respect to morality and respect for the rule of law.</p>	<p>Values, principles and processes of accountability are an inherent and continuing part of education, training and development in all four developmental periods for CF officers. However, additional and focussed emphasis will be placed on these areas, and additional material will be incorporated into the reviews of the curricula of the Royal Military College, Canadian Forces College, Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) and National Security Studies Course (NSSC). The AMSC and the NSSC are being designed to provide senior officers with specific education and training to better prepare them for senior responsibilities. Accountability and command responsibility awareness will be further enhanced as part of pre-command training for all new commanders. The contents of the document <i>Authority, Responsibility and Accountability</i> are being incorporated into appropriate training at all levels. NOTE: THIS SERIAL HAS BEEN MERGED WITH MNDs SERIAL 11, 12 AND 31 UNDER THE AEGIS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RENEWAL, BEING UNDERTAKEN BY CFRETS.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/09/2000</p>
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**Observations**

DND and the CF have approved and have issued in September 1999 a document of guidance entitled *Organization and Accountability* which replaces the document *Authority, Responsibility and Accountability* issued in March 1997. The *Monitoring Committee* had earlier drawn attention to the lack in the previous document of an adequate statement of the principles of accountability and of the processes whereby an accountability regime should operate. The issue was important because a clear articulation of the meaning and purposes of accountability is essential to a proper realignment of the education and training system which in turn is essential to the success of the change program.

The new document contains in Part IV a much expanded explanation of accountability including its positive value as a tool whereby an organization can identify its mistakes and successes, correct the mistakes and learn how to do things better. A shorter, easier-to-read version is to be ready for very wide distribution in the CF and DND by the end of 1999.

The *Monitoring Committee* is impressed with the treatment of accountability in Part IV of the new document and commends DND and the CF for producing it, and for preparing the short version for wide distribution. The *Committee* suggests that the educational authorities in the CF should be directed to include this subject matter in all appropriate courses and seminars without delay.

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## Improved Complaint Resolution (MND 8; Som 16.6-16.11)

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### Decisions

The Somalia Inquiry made a number of recommendations to deal with any cases of intimidation and harassment related to the Somalia deployment and the appearance of witnesses at the inquiry. These included amendments to the *Queen's Regulations and Orders* (QR&O) to provide for special Career Review Boards (CRB), that the boards include members from outside the military, that the boards' decisions be subject to parliamentary or judicial review, that mechanisms for redress be available where findings of reprisals or adverse career implications warrant and that career progression of these individuals be monitored and reported for five years.

While endorsing the intent of the Inquiry to enhance the principles of independence, impartiality, transparency, objectivity and protection from retribution, the Department did not consider additional procedures, committees, reports and amendments to QR&O necessary in view of mechanisms already in place or under way.

The Minister announced in October 1997 that, although he did not accept the appointment of an Inspector-General as recommended by the Somalia Inquiry, the following initiatives would be taken to achieve the purpose of protecting the interests of CF members who make complaints or report wrongdoing:

- Appointment of "a DND/CF organizational Ombudsman... with access to the Minister, the CDS and the DM, independent of the chain of command, accessible to all members of the CF and DND without fear of retribution, and capable of addressing either individual or systemic problems."
- Improvements to the internal grievance procedure to reduce the number of levels, speed up decision-making, and provide a more effective grievance process.
- Amendment of the *National Defence Act* to establish an independent grievance review board to make recommendations to the CDS on the final disposition of grievances.  
(This modified the decision of the previous Minister that the board would be "the final

arbiter" in the grievance process.)

- Introduction of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to assist in the resolution of issues before they become a formal complaint or a grievance.

### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 8:</b> Set up an office of Ombudsman outside the chain-of-command under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister before the end of the year. The Ombudsman will provide information, advice and guidance to all personnel, military or civilian, in need of help or who believe they have been treated improperly.	Determine organization and establishment of the office of Ombudsman (including Terms of Reference).	Completed
	Designate Ombudsman and staff and establish National Office.	Completed
	The MND issued Ministerial Directives to the Ombudsman on 16 Jun 99. The Ombudsman is now operational and is dealing with cases.	Completed
<b>Somalia 16.6:</b> The Queen's Regulations and Orders be amended to provide for a special and more effective form of military career review procedure to deal with cases of intimidation and harassment related to the Somalia deployment and this Commission of Inquiry.	QR&Os have been amended with passage of Bill C25 in Dec 98. Also inherent in implementing this recommendation have been the following associated developments: Appointment of Ombudsman: completed Jun 98. Set up of Ombudsman Office: the MND issued Ministerial Directives to the Ombudsman on 16 Jun 99. The Ombudsman is now operational, and dealing with cases. Concept development for a CF Grievance Board: completed Dec 98. Appointment of Chairman of CF Grievance Review Board: Staffing requirement completed Nov 98, however awaiting Order-in Council appointment. Writing and publication of new CF Grievance Manual: ongoing. Stand-up/implementation of revised CF grievance process as per the end	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999

	<p>Jul 99 timeline was contingent on the timely Order-In-Council appointments of Grievance Board Chairman and members. Due to Cabinet shuffle summer 99, it is now anticipated that the appointment will be formalized by the end of Sep 99. As much preparatory work as possible is being done to assist the Chairperson (org chart, budget etc) in order to get the streamlined CF Grievance system functional and ready for implementation as expeditiously as possible.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 16.7:</b> Such special career review boards be entirely independent and impartial committees and contain representation from outside the military, including judges or other respected members of the larger community, to ensure transparency and objectivity in this process.</p>	<p>The establishment of an independent CF Grievance Review Board and the appointment of an Ombudsman renders redundant the requirement for special career review boards for individuals making application to these agencies. As set up, the Ombudsman and CRB will be able to both direct redress of complaints, while at the same time ensure that individuals are in no way prejudiced in their careers for bringing forward complaints/applications for redress. In effect, the new Grievance process, as a matter of course, secures individuals against unfair treatment should they make application to the Ombudsman or Grievance Review Board.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 16.8:</b> Decisions of these special career review boards be subject to a further effective review by a special committee of the House of Commons or the Senate or a judge of the Federal Court.</p>	<p>The establishment of an independent CF Grievance Review Board and the appointment of an Ombudsman renders redundant the requirement for special career review boards for individuals making application to these agencies. As set up, the Ombudsman and CRB will be able to both direct redress of complaints,</p>	Completed



	<p>while at the same time ensure that individuals are in no way prejudiced in their careers for bringing forward complaints/applications for redress. In effect, the new Grievance process, as a matter of course, secures individuals against unfair treatment should they make application to the Ombudsman or Grievance Review Board.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 16.9:</b> In the event that a finding is made that reprisals have occurred and career advancement has been adversely affected, a mechanism for redress be available.</p>	<p>The establishment of an independent CF Grievance Review Board and the appointment of an Ombudsman renders redundant the requirement for special career review boards for individuals making application to these agencies. As set up, the Ombudsman and CRB will be able to both direct redress of complaints, while at the same time ensure that individuals are in no way prejudiced in their careers for bringing forward complaints/applications for redress. In effect, the new Grievance process, as a matter of course, secures individuals against unfair treatment should they make application to the Ombudsman or Grievance Review Board.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 16.10:</b> For the next five years, an annual report reviewing the career progression of all those who have testified before or otherwise assisted the Inquiry be prepared by the Chief of the Defence Staff for consideration by a special committee of the House of Commons or the Senate.</p>	<p>This recommendation is under review in light of the institution of the Ombudsman's Office and the CF Grievance Review Board which will ensure fair treatment of CF members, including those who testified before the Somalia Commission of Inquiry.</p>	Not Accepted



<p><b>Somalia 16.11:</b> A specific process be established, under the purview of the proposed Inspector General, designed to protect soldiers who, in the future, bring reports of wrongdoing to the attention of their superiors.</p>	<p>As mentioned in the comments to COIR 16.1 and 16.6 through 16.10, the following initiatives will ensure that the objectives of this recommendation are achieved: the appointment of the Ombudsman independent of the chain of command, accessible to all members of the CF and DND without fear of retribution, and capable of addressing either individual or systemic problems; and improvements to the internal grievance process with the establishment of the CF Grievance Review Board.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
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### Observations

The Chair and the Vice-Chair of the CF Grievance Review Board were designated in mid-October 1999, and the *Committee* has been informed that the Board will become operational on March 1, 2000. Other features of the streamlined grievance system will be implemented at the same time.

The Office of the Ombudsman, whose mandate was approved by the Minister of National Defence in June 1999, issued a brief report on its first 100 days of operation in September. The report suggested a high level of activity; some 600 complaints had been received, of which 300 had been dealt with and 170 represented active files. The Ombudsman stated that his goal of ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all DND/CF members was consistent with the goal of the leaders and managers within the DND/CF, and he asked that his shared vision be internalized by the organization as soon as possible.

The *Monitoring Committee* has consistently stated its belief that the new grievance system and the Office of the Ombudsman, operating within the context of a self-correcting culture, would strengthen the command system by letting it demonstrate its willingness to effect change when the case is made that change is needed.

The *Committee* therefore welcomes the news that the Chair and Vice-Chair have been designated and the Grievance Board and the rest of the streamlined grievance system will become operational on March 1, 2000. We have to note, however, that the start-up will be 15 months after the approval by Parliament of the necessary amendments to the *National Defence Act* and seven months after the planned date to begin operations. We do not think this sends the right signal about determination and a sense of urgency to get on with the change program.

The *Committee* is pleased to have received assurances from very senior CF leaders that they share the vision about the important contribution the Office of the Ombudsman can and

should make to a stronger and more effective CF and DND, and we encourage them and the Ombudsman to work together to make this shared vision work.

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## Free Expression of Opinion (Som 16.12)

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### Decisions

The Minister accepted the recommendation of the Somalia Inquiry that Articles 19.36 and 19.37 of *Queen's Regulations and Orders* should be amended to ensure that the freedom of expression of members of the CF will be respected to the fullest extent possible.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 16.12:</b> The Queen's Regulations and Orders Article 19 and other official guidelines and directives be amended to demonstrate openness and receptivity to legitimate criticism and differing points of view, so that members of the military enjoy a right of free expression to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the need to maintain good order, discipline, and national security.	Articles 19.36 and 19.37 of Queen's Regulations and Orders, dealing with the disclosure of information or opinion to the public by CF members, are being reviewed. This work is being conducted to ensure that the freedom of expression of members of the CF is respected. The aim of this review is to develop regulations which will allow members to express their opinion to the fullest extent possible. Canada's Public Service and the CF traditionally emphasize the characteristics of impartiality, neutrality, fairness and integrity. Employment in the Public Service involves acceptance of certain restraints with respect to the public expressing personal opinions. Similar constraints apply to members of the CF. As of 20 Apr 99, DND legal advisors have tasked their working group to provide revised instruments	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999

	dealing with expressions of opinion by CF members. The working group has proceeded on a two track approach: they are working on a new QR&O on Public Comment to replace QR&Os 19.36 and 19.37. This will be supplemented with one or more DAODs to provide increased detail with the goal to maximize the CF members' capacity to speak out, while striking a balance with the needs of the CF.	
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### Observations

DND has informed the *Monitoring Committee* that a draft policy document on free expression of opinion by the CF members has been prepared. Consultations are now under way with the Privy Council Office (PCO) in recognition of the implications for civilian departments of government of having new policies on the subject in DND/CF. When these are completed, revised QR&O chapters 19.36 and 19.37 can be issued.

The *Committee* notes that progress on this subject (which we have labelled a Catch-22 problem) has been slow. The *Committee* also recognizes that difficult policy questions are involved, but urges DND/CF and the PCO to move expeditiously to resolve them. Leaving CF members unclear as to their rights and obligations in the area of freedom of expression is unfair to them and it leaves the DND/CF vulnerable to incidents arising out of the uncertainty.

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## Strengthen Capacity of Parliament to Oversee Defence Matters (Som 16.4)

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### Decisions

The Somalia Commission recommended a detailed annual report to Parliament on matters of major interest and concern to the operations of the National Defence portfolio. The Minister did not accept this recommendation, but noted that its objectives were being made by other means.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>Somalia 16.4:</b> To strengthen the capacity of Parliament to supervise and oversee defence matters, the National Defence Act be amended to require a detailed annual report to Parliament regarding matters of major interest and concern to the operations of the National Defence portfolio and articulating performance evaluation standards. Areas to be addressed should include, but not be limited to: 1. a description of operational problems; 2. detailed disciplinary accounts; 3. administrative shortcomings; 4. fiscal and resource concerns; and 5. post-mission assessments.</p>	<p>The Department of National Defence currently provides Parliament with a number of detailed reports concerning "the operations of the National Defence portfolio". Principal in this regard is Part III of the Estimates, an annual report which contains a detailed overview of Departmental spending plans and a measurement of performance across all Environments and activities. The Part III Estimates also include detailed supplemental information in areas requested by Parliament (such as personnel, capital equipment, search and rescue activities, Reserves and Cadets and peacekeeping, for example). Starting this Fall, the Department will submit the first of a new report to Parliament entitled the Departmental Performance Report. This report will provide a clear indication of CF and DND accomplishments over the previous fiscal year and offer Parliamentarians a better insight into how resources have been utilized and what results have been achieved. Should Parliament perceive gaps in the information being provided, subsequent reports will be modified accordingly. Beginning next Spring, DND will also submit to Parliament a new Departmental Plans and Priorities Report. This report will provide an outline of DND's overall strategy and specific plans to accomplish the missions and objectives laid out in the Defence White Paper and other government policy directives. Finally, the Department routinely submits a number of other annual and biannual reports to Parliament,</p>	<p>Not Accepted</p>

	including the Access to Information and Privacy Act Annual Report, the Sustainable Development Strategy Report, the CF Superannuation Act Report and so on. In addition to the reports noted above, reporting to Canadians will be enhanced through the following additional (and public) reports: beginning next Spring, the MND will provide the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs with an annual report prepared by the Chief of the Defence Staff on the state of the CF (including all accomplishments and concerns in areas such as operations, personnel, discipline, force structure, administration etc); an annual report prepared by the Judge Advocate General on the administration of justice across the CF; an annual report prepared by the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal on Military Police operations and the overall state of policing within the CF; and annual reports by the independent CF Grievance Board, the DND/CF Ombudsman and the proposed Military Police Complaints Commission.	
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### **Improved Operation of NDHQ (MND 49, 52, 53, 54, 55; Som 16.2)**

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#### **Decisions**

The Minister announced a series of decisions in March 1997 to improve the operation of the integrated National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). These were to clarify that military advice for the Minister and Cabinet is provided only by the CDS and his military staff, that lines of authority and accountability in NDHQ as well as the functions of the DM and the CDS are clear, and that training in the functioning of an integrated NDHQ is provided in management



and senior officer courses.

In addition, the Minister announced in October 1997 that the recommendation of the Somalia Commission for a review of the adequacy of practices of record-keeping and document retention and disposal was being pursued with the National Archives of Canada, and that further work was proceeding on electronic document records management.

### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 49:</b> Ensure that military advice conveyed to the Minister and the Cabinet is, in future, clearly identified as such in all appropriate documents.	Review and amend process as required.	Completed
<b>MND 52:</b> End the practice of having both the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff sign memoranda, except for documents dealing with issues for which they each clearly have equal responsibility.	Issue appropriate direction to NDHQ staff.	Completed
<b>MND 53:</b> Make appropriate changes to existing regulations that were enacted under the National Defence Act to ensure complete harmony with other legislation on the management of public organizations.	Analyse current regulations in light of recently clarified lines of responsibility in NDHQ.	Expected completion date: —/11/1997
	Implement changes as necessary.	Not Started
<b>MND 54:</b> Ensure that the nature and functioning of an integrated national headquarters are taught in all management courses and fully explained through internal communications.	Implementation Phase Part 1: Work remains ongoing between OPI and Subject Matter Experts to incorporate knowledge/info of NDHQ functioning into internal DND communications and various course/trg syllabi such as for CO designates and pre-command trg, as required by MND Ser 31.	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999

	Definition Phase Part 2: The Pre-Command Training package on functioning of Integrated NDHQ portion of the CDS Guidance to CO (Pre Command Trg) is complete.	Completed
	Definition Phase Part 1. Trg requirement confirmed and OPI/Subject Matter Expert (SME) appointed. Responsibility for MND Serial 54 is as follows: POC is VCDS; OPI is DGSP; SME is DFPPC now that CRS has produced their chapters for Books 1 and 2 of the Pre-Command Training Package (see MND Ser 31). These chapters define and explain the nature and functioning of the of the integrated NDHQ.	Completed
	Implementation Phase Part 2: a. Promulgate all curriculum changes and conduct annual reviews of course/trg packages used by staff colleges, CF Mgmt School, OPDP, etc. b. Ensure that CF internal comms keep CF members informed of the nature and functioning of NDHQ as an integrated national HQ	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999
<b>MND 55:</b> Include in courses for senior military officers a component specifically designed to teach them how to operate effectively in an integrated civil-military headquarters.	Confirm training requirement for senior DND executives through the DA Strategic Review process.	Completed
	Incorporate required training. Current courses and required training are delivered using a syllabus approach. The development of a training plan IAW CFITES is not planned to start until Apr 00, and be finished by Mar 01.	Expected completion date: 30/03/2001

<p><b>Somalia 16.2:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister of National Defence institute a comprehensive audit and review of: 1. the duties, roles and responsibilities of all military officers and civilian officials to define better and more clearly their tasks, functions and responsibilities; 2. the adequacy of existing procedures and practices of reporting, record keeping, and document retention and disposal, including the adequacy of penalties for failures to comply; and 3. the duties and responsibilities of military officers and departmental officials at National Defence Headquarters in advising government about intended or contemplated military activities or operations.</p>	<p>This serial has been merged with MND Sers 11,12,18,19,20,31,55 grouped under the omnibus activity Professional Development Renewal being undertaken by CFRETS and DRET.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/06/2000</p>
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### **Mandatory Review of the *National Defence Act* (Som 16.5)**

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#### **Decisions**

The Minister accepted the recommendation of the Somalia Commission that the *NDA* should be amended to require a Parliamentary review of the adequacy of the *Act* every five years.

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#### **DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
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<b>Somalia 16.5:</b> The National Defence Act be amended to require a mandatory parliamentary review of the adequacy of the act every five years.	In the context of amendments to the NDA, a mandatory review after 5 years will be proposed. Parliament will then have the opportunity to decide whether subsequent reviews are warranted.	Completed
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## CHAPTER 3

# HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES

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Despite a significant reduction in resources through restructuring, combined with realignment and delegation of new responsibilities and relocation, HR-Mil staffs have made progress in the monitored areas of personnel selection, screening and appraisal. Staffs generally have followed through with the original plans to implement ministerial decisions. The *Committee* does note, however, that there have been some delays in the promulgation of implementing directives. It has also been observed that data base deficiencies have constrained the performance of computer-based tools.

## DISCIPLINE

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**General** (Som 18.4, 18.5, 18.8)

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**Decisions**

To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Minister confirmed that the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) would formally evaluate the policies, procedures and practices that guide and influence the administration of discipline in the CF (Som 18.8). While the recommendations in Som 18.4 and 18.5 pertaining to ADM (HR-Mil) and the Inspector General were not accepted, the objectives would be achieved through other means.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>Somalia 18.4:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish the head of Canadian Forces personnel (currently the Assistant Deputy Minister Personnel) as the focal point for discipline at the senior staff level in National Defence Headquarters, with advice and support from the Director General of Military Legal Services and the Director of Military Police. To this end, the head of personnel should establish and review policy on discipline, monitor all Canadian Forces plans and programs to ensure that discipline is considered, and assess the impact of discipline on plans, programs, activities and operations, both as they are planned and regularly as they are implemented.</p>	<p>As noted in the MND report to the Prime Minister, discipline is the life-blood of the CF, spelling the difference between military success and failure. However, the Commissioners' proposal to appoint a senior National Defence Headquarters staff officer (ADM (PER)) to serve as focal point for discipline is inappropriate organizationally and inconsistent with the Commissions' expression of the responsibilities of the chain of command. The measures outlined in the MND report and that of the Special Advisory Group headed by Chief Justice (Ret'd) Brian Dickson, including annual reports from the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Judge Advocate General, and CF Provost Marshal will ensure an appropriate focus on discipline at all levels of the CF, without abrogating the responsibilities and accountabilities of the chain of command for the performance of all personnel assigned to their formations or units.</p>	<p>Not Accepted</p>
<p><b>Somalia 18.5:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff emphasize the importance of discipline by reviewing frequent and</p>	<p>The importance that is placed on discipline has been clearly stated in the MND report, Leadership and Management of the Canadian</p>	<p>Not Accepted</p>

<p>regular reports of the Inspector General, and by requiring the head of personnel to report at least monthly at a Daily Executive Meeting on the state of discipline throughout the Canadian Forces, both inside and outside the chain of command, and by personally overseeing any necessary follow-up.</p>	<p>Forces. While the Daily Executive Meeting does not provide an appropriate venue for the discussion of specific issues of discipline, this issue will be dealt with by Armed Forces Council on a regular basis. It will also be dealt with publicly within the context of the annual report prepared by the Chief of Defence Staff vis-à-vis the state of the CF, as well as the reports prepared by the Judge Advocate General and the Canadian Forces Provost Marshall.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 18.8:</b> To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief of the Defence Staff undertake regularly a formal evaluation of the policies, procedures and practices that guide and influence the administration of discipline in the Canadian Forces.</p>	<p>The Special Advisory Group raised a similar concern about the lack of systematic reporting on the administration of military justice. It recommended that the National Defence Act be amended to require the Judge Advocate General (JAG) to review and report annually to the Minister of National Defence on the overall effectiveness of the military justice system throughout the CF. The JAG's report to the MND, in combination with reports issued by the Chief of the Defence Staff, the DND/CF organizational Ombudsman, the Military Police Complaints Commission, the independent CF Grievance Board and the CF Provost Marshal, will ensure the administration of discipline in the CF is thorough and fair.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

### Observations

To date, the JAG has not tabled an annual report, which was part of the action to be taken to address recommendation **Som 18.8**. The *Committee* does note, however, that publication on the Internet of information on courts martial and appeals, as well as statistics on summary trials, has begun to add transparency to the administration of discipline. As stated in our comments that relate to Military Justice, the *Committee* believes that there is more to be done in this area. The *Committee* structure described in the 1999 *Interim Report* has been

implemented.

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## Training and Education (Som 18.2)

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### Decisions

In October 1997, the Minister announced that the importance, function and application of discipline would be taught in all officer leadership training, including Royal Military College (RMC), staff and command college courses, and senior command courses.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 18.2:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the importance, function and application of discipline be taught in all officer leadership training, including Royal Military College, staff and command college courses, and senior command courses.	Discipline is taught and is integral to all four developmental periods for officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) of the CF under their respective Officer Professional Development and NCM Professional Development Programs. Therefore, the objectives addressed in this recommendation are already in force. Nevertheless, additional and focused emphasis on discipline will be considered during ongoing reviews of the Royal Military College and Canadian Forces College curricula, including the CFC development of the Advanced Military Studies Course (CFC). In addition, other military institutions which focus on leadership training will also review their curricula to ensure that all dimensions of military leadership are addressed and emphasized. NOTE: THIS SERIAL HAS BEEN MERGED WITH MND SERIALS 11,12 AND 31 AND WILL BE	Expected completion date: 31/06/2000

	PROGRESSED UNDER THE AEGIS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RENEWAL UNDERTAKEN BY CFRETS.	
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**Observations**

Activity in the key areas of training and education is continuing and will require further monitoring.

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**Operations** (Som 18.6, 18.7)

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**Decisions**

The Minister directed the CDS to establish in doctrine and in practice that discipline be identified as a determining factor in assessing the operational readiness of any unit and formation, and that, during operations, all officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) monitor discipline closely.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 18.6:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and practice that discipline be identified as a determining factor in assessing the operational readiness of any unit or formation.	In determining the operational readiness of units and formations, a number of factors are currently assessed, including the condition of personnel. An evaluation of the state of personnel includes an assessment of discipline. The essence of this evaluation with respect to discipline is specifically addressed in the performance objectives set out in NDHQ Instruction 5/96 entitled "Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations."	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 18.7:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and practice that during operations, all officers and non-commissioned officers must monitor discipline closely; and that the head of personnel oversee and, at the end of each mission, report on discipline.</p>	<p>Articles 402 and 501 of the Queens Regulations and Orders specifically direct both officers and non-commissioned members, as part of their general responsibilities, whether deployed on operations or not, to "report to the proper authority any infringement of the statutes, regulations, rules, orders, and instructions governing the conduct of any person subject to the Code of Service Discipline." The requirement for commanders to report on discipline is also included in Chapter 3, Section 6 of the DCDS Instructions to Commanders of CF Deployed Operations. Key aspects of this information will be reported in the Chief of the Defence Staff's annual report on the state of the CF. Approval Mar 98.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
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## PERSONNEL APPRAISAL

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**General** (MND 25, 26; Som 18.1, 20.4)

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### Decisions

The Minister announced in March 1997 that a new personnel appraisal system would be implemented that year, and would, *inter alia*:

- establish a clear separation of the evaluations of actual job performance and potential for promotion; and
- impose a closer control over the quality of personnel appraisals and their timely submission.

In his October 1997 response to the Somalia Inquiry, the Minister also directed the CDS to institute an official policy identifying self-discipline as a precondition for promotion to leadership positions. He also stated that good discipline would be an explicit criterion in promotion and assessment decisions.

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**DND Status Report**

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Status</b>
<b>MND 25:</b> Establish a clear separation of the evaluations of actual job performance and potential for promotion. This will ensure that a fair report will be given to good performers who have either little potential for, or no interest in, promotion.	Finalize documentation for new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) including policies, procedures and instruction manuals.	Completed
	Complete Development of CFPAS performance evaluation report software. New CFPAS commences for assessment period 98/99.	Completed
	Implement CFPAS. Programme is being put into effect, however, will not be considered to have been fully implemented until the first round of CFPAS PERs are completed and new Merit/ Assessment Boards have convened and the outcomes evaluated.	Expected completion date: 31/01/2000
<b>MND 26:</b> Impose a closer control of the quality of personnel appraisals and their timely submission.	Enforce appraisal submission timelines and monitor high score control.	Completed
	Implement full process to review consistency and availability of personnel appraisals.	Completed
<b>Somalia 18.1:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff institute an official policy on screening aspirants for all leadership positions, beginning	Official policy related to screening individuals for leadership positions in the CF has always been based on leadership and potential within a formal merit system. The merit	Completed

<p>corporals: 1. identifying self-discipline as a precondition of both commissioned and non-commissioned officership; and 2. providing for the evaluation of the individual in terms of self-discipline, including the ability to control aggressive and impulsive behaviour.</p>	<p>system includes, among many other attributes, the evaluation of self-discipline and conduct, the latter including all aspects of behaviour. As of 1 April 1998, a new CF Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) has been implemented. Accompanying this are changes to the merit board and command selection board processes. At the same time, improvements to pre-command training are being undertaken which will further enhance the selection of personnel for leadership assignments. (These activities are closely tied into MND Report recommendations #25 and 30.)</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 20.4:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that good discipline is made an explicit criterion in all promotion and appointment decisions.</p>	<p>Discipline constitutes a significant scoring criterion for current promotion considerations and is accounted for under the assessment category of Leadership. The conduct of merit boards is guided by the Canadian Forces Merit Board Guidance Manual which requires merit boards to consider a variety of assessment factors for promotion including, but not limited to, leadership, experience, employability and qualifications. Assessment of leadership is based on reliability, initiative and discipline. After its introduction on 1 April 1998, the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System will place even more emphasis on core qualities, such as discipline, for purposes of promotion and command selection.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

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**PER Content** (MND 9; Som 15.1, 15.2, 18.3, 20.2)

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**Decisions**

In addition to the Minister's direction that a formal statement of values and beliefs be integrated into performance assessment activities, the Somalia Inquiry made a number of recommendations which were accepted by the Minister. These included: the adoption of formal criteria, along the lines of those in the Inquiry Report, for orienting the assessment of leaders; the assessment of self-discipline and the application of discipline; and the recording of poor conduct or performance on the PER.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 9:</b> Produce by June 1st a formal statement of values and beliefs to be integrated into all recruiting and training programs, professional development activities and performance assessments of members of the Canadian Forces at all levels.	On 16 Dec 96, the CDS and DM approved a document titled "Statement of Defence Ethics." On basis of comments received, Chief of Review Services produced a revised "Statement of Defence Ethics" and in Jul 98 requested comments on it from the three environmental Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, the revised document was presented and discussed at the Ethics Advisory Board meeting held 26 Oct 98. The board subsequently approved a "Statement of Defence Ethics (Revised)" which was formally promulgated in a letter on 26 Mar 99 signed by the CDS and DM.	Completed

	<p>Since the issuance of the Statement of Defence ethics in 1997, the CF Recruiting, Education and Training System has been incorporating the listed principles and obligations into the writing and revision of CF training manuals, course syllabi, professional development and performance assessment activities. By Feb 99 this work had been approximately 50% complete. With the revised statement, some adjustment will be required, however, this is expected to be minor since the pedagogy of "defence ethics" in the CF is holistic, the principles and obligations cited being inherent in the profession of arms. For example, the Army's keystone doctrine manual — CFP 300 "Canada's Army," published in April 1998, dedicates an entire chapter to the requirements of military professionalism and the military ethos, and clearly achieves the intent of MND Recommendation No 9. As CF training manuals and professional development packages continue to be written/revised they will incorporate the ethical principles, values and beliefs required of all CF members.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/06/2001</p>
<p><b>Somalia 15.1:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria, along the lines of the core qualities of military leadership, other necessary attributes, and indicative performance factors set out in Chapter 15 of this Report, as the basis for describing the leadership necessary in the Canadian Forces, and for orienting the selection, training, development and assessment of leaders.</p>	<p>The formal CF ethos statement, Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces, published in March 1997, contains many of the same criteria found in Chapter 15 of the Commission of Inquiry Report. This formal statement of ethos and values will be included in all recruiting and training programs, professional development activities, and performance assessments of members of the CF at all levels as part of the new CF Personnel</p>	<p>Completed</p>

	<p>Appraisal System (CFPAS). The undergraduate program at the Royal Military College will be reviewed to increase the emphasis on developing values, ethics and leadership skills, as will the curriculum of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. With respect to the training of senior leaders, a three-month course was instituted in Fall 1998 to prepare officers at the colonel/captain (navy) level for senior leadership responsibilities. In Jan 1999, a more strategically-oriented, six-month course was also instituted for officers about to be, or recently promoted to, general/flag rank. The first mentioned course emphasises jointness, senior leadership and ethics, while the second mentioned emphasises executive leadership, strategic operations and resource management. To ensure only the best are selected for command and senior leadership positions, a new formal selection process is in place, along with strengthened assessments of future leaders, to ensure they have the appropriate experience, education and training.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 15.2:</b> The core qualities and other necessary attributes set out in Chapter 15 of this Report be applied in the selection of officers for promotion to and within general officer ranks. These core qualities are integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness and self-discipline. Other necessary attributes are dedication, knowledge, intellect, perseverance, decisiveness, judgement, and physical robustness.</p>	<p>The new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) which came into effect in April 1998 assess officers (as well as non-commissioned members (NCMs)) on these core attributes. CFPAS further requires supervisors to assess members for reliability, accountability, conduct (on and off duty) and initiative.</p>	Completed



<p><b>Somalia 18.3:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff modify the performance evaluation process to ensure that each individual's standard of self-discipline is assessed in the annual performance evaluation report form, along with the individual's performance in applying discipline when exercising authority.</p>	<p>Self-discipline and the application of discipline when exercising authority is assessed in the new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System which came into effect on 1 April 1998.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 20.2:</b> To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, and to avoid minimization or concealment of personnel problems, the Chief of the Defence Staff modify the Performance Evaluation Report system to ensure that a frank assessment is rendered of Canadian Forces members and that poor conduct or performance is noted for future reference by superiors (whether or not the matter triggers formal disciplinary or administrative action).</p>	<p>Merit boards are routinely provided with all records of reproof, recorded warnings and counseling and probation reports on individual members to determine merit standing. After 1 April 1998, the new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System will also require that all supervisors assess their subordinates for conduct on and off duty to ensure members abide by all CF and civilian laws, policies, rules, regulations and orders. This assessment will form part of the member's permanent evaluation record reviewed annually by merit boards for promotion purposes and regularly by career managers for posting, course selection and other career administrative functions.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

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### Observations

Issues related to personnel appraisal have been addressed in previous *Committee* reports. Analysis of promotion board experience with the CFPAS PER has not yet been completed, but reactions are understood to be quite positive. In addition, the latest CF Personnel Survey includes a section on performance appraisal which will capture the opinions and experiences of CFPAS users. The result should assist in further refining the instruments.

A common performance assessment report for military and civilian members of the Executive Group has been developed and should be in place by April 2000. In addition to ratings on leadership and potential competencies, the form provides for assessment as to achievement of corporate objectives under the Performance Management Program (Pay at Risk). Formal guidelines for the completion of the report were not available as of December 1999, but are

expected to reflect earlier direction provided by the CDS.

In addressing the content of personnel evaluation reports, the *Committee* noted in its 1999 *Interim Report* that the Somalia Commission's recommendation regarding self-discipline had not been met.

To indicate the importance which the Commission placed on the subject, it is noted that self-discipline is discussed in the chapters on leadership and discipline in the Somalia Report, is identified as a core quality of military leadership and appears in six recommendations covering the selection, training, development, assessment and promotion of leaders.

The army recognizes this quality as an essential element of both the military and the army ethos, as does the JAG in his strategy for discipline training and education. The *Committee* recommends that self-discipline be considered for inclusion as a criterion in the formal CF appraisal process.

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## SELECTION

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### Promotion (MND 24, 27, 28)

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#### Decisions

The Minister announced in March 1997 that, as part of the new personnel appraisal system, the CF would:

- a. clarify the experience, educational and training requirements for promotion to various rank levels for the different MOCs;
- b. reinstate the practice of including participants representing other MOCs and environments on promotion boards; and
- c. establish formal merit boards for promotion to major-general/rear-admiral and lieutenant-general/vice-admiral and include on the board a high-ranking public servant from outside DND.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
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<b>MND 24:</b> Clarify by August 30th, 1997 the experience, educational and training requirements for promotion to various rank levels for the different military occupational classifications.	Review existing documentation to align authority, responsibility and other promotion criteria for all ranks. (Note: This Serial has been merged with MND Serial 12 and will be implemented as part of the revised officer development process.)	Expected completion date: 31/12/2000
<b>MND 27:</b> Immediately reinstate the practice of including participants representing other military occupational classifications and services on promotion boards in order to enhance objectivity.	Implement changes in time for 1997 Merit Boards.	Completed
<b>MND 28:</b> Establish, commencing this year, formal merit boards for promotion to the rank of major-general/rear-admiral and lieutenant-general/vice-admiral. These boards will each, for the first time, include a high-ranking public servant from outside the Department of National Defence.	Implement General Officers Merit Boards.	Completed

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### Command and Senior Appointments (MND 30; Som 20.1, 20.3, 20.5)

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#### Decisions

The Minister stated that a formal selection process would be applied across the CF to ensure that only the best candidates are selected for command and senior leadership positions.

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 30:</b> Apply across the Canadian Forces a formal selection process to ensure that only the best are selected for command and senior leadership positions.	System of Command selection boards has been implemented. Only remaining administrative detail to finalize is the publication of DAOD.	Completed
	Establish process to select officers to command other CF units and serve in key leadership positions.	Completed
<b>Somalia 20.1:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff enforce adherence to the following principles in the Canadian Forces promotion and appointment system: 1. that merit be a predominant factor in all promotion decisions; and 2. that the operational needs of the Service always have priority over individual career considerations and administrative convenience.	Merit is the predominant factor when individuals are considered for promotion. Secondly, the operational needs of the CF do have priority over individual career considerations and administrative convenience.	Completed
<b>Somalia 20.3:</b> The proposed Inspector General conduct periodic reviews of appointments to key leadership positions in the Canadian Forces to ensure that the proper criteria are being applied and that such appointments are as competitive as possible.	Formal merit boards have been implemented for promotion to the rank of major-general/rear-admiral and lieutenant-general/vice-admiral. These boards include a high ranking-public servant from outside DND. Formal command selection boards have been established across the CF for key appointments to command positions. These changes will ensure CF leaders are properly assessed and have the experience, educational and training requirements needed for promotion to the various rank levels and for appointment to key military positions. In addition, these changes will ensure that proper criteria are being applied and that such appointments are as competitive as possible.	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 20.5:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop formal criteria for appointment to key command positions, including unit and sub-unit commands, deviation from which would require the formal approval of the Chief of the Defence Staff.</p>	<p>Formal boards have been instituted to select officers and senior non-commissioned members (NCMs) for command selection and key appointments. Chiefs of the Maritime, Land and Air Staffs are responsible for establishing the selection criteria and for approving all command and key appointments under their command. The criteria for command and key appointment selection is based on leadership, professional attributes and factors that are germane to the specific environment thus ensuring the selection of the most suitable and capable officers and NCMs for command and key appointments. Merit boards have also been established, to consider brigadier-generals/commodores and major-generals/rear-admirals for promotion and senior appointments.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
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## Succession Planning (MND 29, 56)

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### Decisions

The Minister announced in March 1997 that the CF would begin to implement a policy whereby generals and flag officers with 27 years or more of service would have a fixed-period contract of approximately three years, at the end of which they would be offered either another contract, with or without promotion, or they would retire.

In addition, to enhance the effectiveness of the defence team, he stated that officers with potential for promotion to senior ranks would be provided with appropriate exposure to the integrated national headquarters early in their career.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 29:</b> Begin to implement this year a policy whereby, in the future, all generals and flag officers with 27 years or more of service will have a fixed-period contract of approximately three years. At the end of that contract, they will either be offered another contract of specified duration, with or without promotion, or retire from the Canadian Forces.	Develop long-term annual succession plans to enhance the identification of General/Flag Officer training, appointments and promotions to meet CF/DND needs.	Completed
<b>MND 56:</b> Provide officers with the potential for promotion to senior ranks with appropriate exposure to the integrated national headquarters early in their career.	Formulate junior and senior officer succession plans to provide selected officers exposure to integrated national headquarters early in their career.	Completed

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### Terms of Service (MND 23)

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#### Decisions

In order to identify CF members whose performance is inadequate, the Minister stated that the CF would review more closely the performance of all members at the end of their first engagement — six years for NCMs, nine years for officers — and decide on contract renewal.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
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<b>MND 23:</b> Review more closely the performance of all military members at the end of their first engagement — six years for non-commissioned members, nine years for officers — and make a determination whether or not to renew their contracts.	<b>DEFINITION PHASE:</b> Conduct review of Military Occupations (MOCs) to determine appropriate Terms of Service (TOS) conversion rates. (75% COMPLETED).	Expected completion date: 01/04/2000
	<b>IMPLEMENTATION PHASE:</b> Annual TOS Selection Boards are complete. The Annual Military Occupation Review (AMOR) process and approval authority for Intermediate Engagement has been devolved to ECSs and CFRETS. Remaining activity is the DAOD instructions which are 75% complete.	Expected completion date: 01/04/2000

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### Composite Units (Som 20.6)

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#### Decisions

The Minister agreed with the recommendation that composite combat arms units such as the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) have formalized selection criteria and that COs have maximum freedom in selecting personnel for the unit and in employing them appropriately.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 20.6:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that, for any future	Changes already implemented will ensure this recommendation is achieved. Specifically: Chiefs of	Completed

<p>composite combat arms unit (such as the Canadian Airborne Regiment): 1. formalized criteria for selection to the unit are established; 2. the Commanding Officer have maximum freedom in selecting personnel for that unit; and 3. the Commanding Officer have maximum freedom to employ personnel as the Commanding Officer deems appropriate.</p>	<p>Maritime, Land and Air staffs have been given clear direction on the preparedness of their operationally assigned units in chapters 7 and 10 of the CF Operations Manual. Career managers also work very closely with unit commanding officers to ensure the homogeneity and effectiveness of assigned personnel; and commanding officers have always enjoyed the latitude to employ personnel assigned to their command as required to satisfy the unit's assigned mission and tasks.</p>	
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## Screening of Applicants (Som 20.10)

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### Decisions

The Minister accepted the recommendation that DND and the CF clarify their position on the extent of their obligations under applicable privacy and human rights laws in screening applicants and members of the CF for behavioural suitability, including racist group affiliation.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>Somalia 20.10:</b> The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces clarify their position on the extent of their obligations under applicable privacy and human rights laws in screening applicants and members of the Canadian Forces for behavioural suitability, including racist group affiliation.</p>	<p>The revised recruitment screening procedures implemented in 1995 now require that recruits sign a statement of understanding acknowledging the CF policy of zero tolerance on discrimination and harassment.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

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**Observations**

Personality screening tests are being investigated for possible use in the CF Selection System although it has not yet been determined whether their use is warranted. A trial of the structures interview process is planned for the summer of 2000.

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**Screening for Deployments (Som 20.7)**

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**Decisions**

The Minister accepted the recommendation that *Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) 20-50 and 20-46*, which deal with the screening of CF personnel for overseas deployments, be amended to:

- place priority on discipline as a criterion for selecting personnel for overseas deployment;
- make consideration of the behavioural suitability indicators mandatory; and
- make it clear that although the behavioural suitability indicators listed in *CFAO 20-50*, as well as the option of referring cases for assessment by behavioural specialists, can assist COs in screening personnel for deployment, they in no way displace or qualify COs' responsibility or accountability for screening personnel under their command.

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**DND Status Report**

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Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 20.7:</b> Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 20-50 and 20-46, which deal with the screening of Canadian Forces personnel for overseas deployments, be amended to: 1. place priority on discipline as a criterion for selecting personnel for	Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 20-50 & 20-46, which deal with the screening of CF personnel for overseas deployment, are currently being amended. In the interim, the major policy points were disseminated through a CF-wide message in May 1994. The	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999

<p>overseas deployment, 2. make consideration of the behavioural suitability indicators mandatory; and 3. make it clear that although the behavioural suitability indicators listed in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 20-50, as well as the option of referring cases for assessment by behavioural specialists, can assist commanding officers in screening personnel for deployment, they in no way displace or qualify commanding officers' responsibility or accountability for screening personnel under their command.</p>	<p>amendments, to be incorporated in a new Defence Administrative Orders and Directives by summer 1998, will direct that the member's social and behavioral suitability be assessed by the Commanding Officer (CO) to ensure that there are no indications of a propensity for behaviour that would violate Canadian societal or CF professional norms to which personnel on duty outside Canada are expected to adhere. Specifically, changes initiated will: place more priority on discipline as a criterion for selecting personnel for overseas deployment; and in addition to career action taken or in progress, ensure COs take into account: — a behavioural history indicating a lack of self-control as evidenced by alcohol or drug abuse that has not been successfully resolved; — a record of conviction for disciplinary or any other offence for which a pardon has not been granted; — misconduct resulting in administrative action against the member; — a history of inappropriate aggressive behaviour; — antisocial behaviour such as racist conduct as defined in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 19-43, or a history of harassment as defined in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 19-39; — an impulsive or belligerent disposition; — a history of unstable personal relationships; and — below-average effort and performance in the member's occupation. make it clear, in an amendment to Canadian Forces Administrative Order 20-50 Annex A, COs are responsible and accountable for screening personnel under their command.</p>
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## DIVERSITY

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### Education and Training (Som 20.12)

### Harassment; Diversity Training

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#### Decisions

The Minister accepted the recommendation that DND/CF establish regular liaison with anti-racist groups to obtain assistance in the conduct of appropriate cultural sensitivity training and to assist supervisors and commanders in identifying signs of racism and involvement with hate groups.

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 20.12:</b> The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces establish regular liaison with anti-racist groups to obtain assistance in the conduct of appropriate cultural sensitivity training and to assist supervisors and commanders in identifying signs of racism and involvement with hate groups.	When the CF introduced the policy of zero tolerance for racism and harassment in 1993, it implemented a program called the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP). Anti-racist groups were involved in developing the curriculum and such groups continue to be involved today. The SHARP program incorporates cultural sensitivity and anti-racism training. DND maintains contact with various diversity groups, such as the Canadian Police Race Relations, Canadian Centre for Race Relations, Assembly of First Nations and Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs. DND invites these groups to attend the Defence Diversity Council, holds regular meetings and consultations with them, maintains contact through various defence advisory groups, and	Completed



	<p>mutually exchanges research results. The SHARP training course began in the summer of 1996 and attendance is compulsory for all CF and DND members. To date, more than 40% of CF personnel have received training through this program. This program clearly outlines what behaviour is and is not acceptable. The Basic Officer Training Course and the Basic Recruit Training Course have been revised to include greater emphasis on cultural sensitivity. Other appropriate courses have been, or will be, examined to ensure that they adequately address these issues. This, in conjunction with a firm statement of ethos created by the military in co-operation with representatives of the Canadian public, will ensure that the CF remains in step with the values and attitudes of the public it serves.</p>	
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### Observations

Training programs such as the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP), Cadet Harassment and Abuse Prevention (CHAP) and the Army Diversity Training Program (DTP) continue to be refined with the assistance of community and other organizations.

Although a review of the reports of CHAP training conducted during the summer was not complete as of December 1999, there are indications that the program was well-received and had a positive effect, with fewer allegations of impropriety being reported.

As of September 15, 1999, approximately half of the Land Force had received diversity training. While reactions were mixed, feedback indicates that the program is successful in raising awareness and highlighting areas where additional coverage may be required.

The *Committee* is pleased to note the extensive consultation with national and provincial aboriginal groups during the development of the Canadian Forces Aboriginal Entry Program and the Sergeant Tommy Prince Army Training Initiative, both of which will include cultural awareness training for participating military staff and units.

At the time of writing, results of the harassment survey mentioned in the 1998 *Interim Report* have not yet been released. However, the Public Service Employee Survey for DND indicates



that this is an area requiring continuing attention.

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## Prohibited Racist and Extremist Conduct (Som 20.8)

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### Decisions

The Minister accepted the recommendation that the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) develop and issue clear and comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct. Such guidelines are to define and list examples of racist behaviour or symbolism and include a list describing extremist groups to which CF members may not belong or lend their support.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 20.8:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and issue clear and comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct. The guidelines should define and list examples of racist behaviour and symbolism and should include a list and description of extremist groups to which Canadian Forces members may not belong or lend their support.	The CF has had comprehensive guidelines regarding racism since 1993. The Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) Course introduced in 1993 incorporates cultural sensitivity and anti-racism issues. Attendance at this course is compulsory for all CF and DND members. To date, 40% of CF personnel have attended. SHARP was developed with the help of anti-racist groups. In July 1997, the Chief of the Defence Staff issued updated guidelines to commanders regarding the CF policy of zero tolerance for racism and harassment.	Completed

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## Racism/Racist Conduct (Som 20.9)

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### Decisions

The Minister accepted the recommendation of the Somalia Inquiry that the CF continue to monitor racist group involvement and affiliation among CF members.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 20.9:</b> The Canadian Forces continue to monitor racist group involvement and affiliation among Canadian Forces members.	Commanding Officers are working with military police to continually monitor and deal with suspected incidents of racist conduct by CF members. National Defence Headquarters monitors not only incidents but also the dispositions of such cases in order to assess the nature and extent of racist conduct in the CF as well as the effectiveness of counter-racism initiatives.	Completed

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### General Observations on Diversity

Over the course of its mandate, the *Monitoring Committee* has determined that issues of race can not be separated from those of diversity. Within DND, the Defence Diversity Council (DDC) continues to oversee these issues. The *Committee* is pleased to note the strengthening of the advisory group structure for women, visible minorities, Aboriginal Canadians and the disabled, and their national support networks. As an important link to OGDs and NGOs, these groups are a valuable resource to be consulted whenever possible.

As of December 1999, the Employment Equity (EE) Regulations for the CF were undergoing final review prior to bringing the CF under the *Employment Equity Act*. The CF Employment Equity Plan *Building Teamwork in a Diverse Canadian Forces* is a comprehensive blueprint for implementation over a five-year period. It identifies barriers, establishes priorities and

provides for feedback mechanisms to assess its effectiveness and assist in establishing future direction. ECSs and Group Principals are required to develop their own plans.

The CF EE Plan is an ambitious one that extends into many facets of administration — applicant screening, training, education, performance appraisal, selection for advancement. It acknowledges that limited resources may cause delays. Continued vigilance will be required to ensure that priorities and timelines are met.

The implementation of diversity programs is complicated by the dual military/civilian workforce in the Department. For example, while SHARP training was integrated, there are separate harassment policies for CF members and DND civilians, as well as a CF order on racist conduct applicable only to CF members. Efforts are under way to introduce common harassment policies and procedures. Whether such common instruments and practices are achievable or even desirable remains open to question.

Although there have been few reported incidents of overt racism during the *Committee's* mandate, there is anecdotal evidence of a persistent discriminatory attitude toward members from the designated groups in some quarters. Through the initiatives now under way, DND and the CF should now be better prepared to face these challenges.

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## Sharing of Information (Som 20.11)

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### Decisions

The Minister accepted the recommendation that DND/CF review their security policies and practices to ensure that, within the limits of applicable privacy and human rights legislation, relevant information concerning involvement by CF members or applicants with racist organizations and hate groups is shared efficiently and effectively among all responsible agencies, including the chain of command.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status

Somalia 20.11.

<p>The Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada review their security policies and practices to ensure that, within the limits of applicable privacy and human rights legislation, relevant information concerning involvement by Canadian Forces members or applicants with racist organizations and hate groups is shared efficiently and effectively among all responsible agencies, including the chain of command.</p>	<p>The policy and practices have been reviewed and updated. Canadian Forces Administration Order 19-43, entitled "Racist Conduct," was issued on 8 November 1996 and describes updated policies and procedures for dealing with racist conduct by CF members. Racist activities by CF members or applicants are investigated by the National Investigation Services (NIS) and shared by/with other police agencies through the Police Liaison Services. A CF-wide Deputy Provost Marshall Databank is used to track specific cases. Appropriate cases are referred to the immediate chain of command (recognizing confidentiality and personal rights) for administrative and disciplinary action. Commanding Officers report any racist conduct by a 'Report of Racist Activity' for monitoring purposes. The National Counter Intelligence Unit, in cooperation with the NIS, monitors and gathers information on racist groups which may have a connection to military members. Implemented. Completed CFPM.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
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## CHAPTER 4

# LEADERSHIP ISSUES

[Leadership Standards](#) | [Officer Education](#) |  
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**P**rogress in this area continues, but some major initiatives are expected to appear in the new year. To that end, the reconstituted *Monitoring Committee* will continue to follow progress in this area until the Fall of 2000.

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### Leadership Standards (Som 15.1-15.4; MND 21)

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#### Decisions

In October 1997, the Minister made several statements in response to the Somalia Inquiry's concerns about standards of leadership in the CF. First and foremost, he decided that the selection, training, development and assessment of officers would be based on formalized criteria as laid out in chapter four of this report [1998 *Interim Report*]. These core qualities would also apply to the promotion of officers to and within the general officer rank. Furthermore, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) was tasked with devising formal criteria for accountability of CF leaders based on principles discussed elsewhere in this report [1998 *Interim Report*]. The Minister decided that principles and criteria laid out by the Somalia Inquiry would determine the selection, screening, promotion and supervision of personnel, training (basic and continuing), the enforcement of disciplinary standards, determination of the chain of command, operational readiness and mission planning.

Development of leadership standards for Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs) also remains a top priority for the Minister. Improvement of training would be based on recommendations which were to be developed by the Non-Commissioned Members Professional Development Council by the end of 1997.

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#### DND Status Report



Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>Somalia 15.1:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria, along the lines of the core qualities of military leadership, other necessary attributes, and indicative performance factors set out in Chapter 15 of this Report, as the basis for describing the leadership necessary in the Canadian Forces, and for orienting the selection, training, development and assessment of leaders.</p>	<p>The formal CF ethos statement, Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces, published in March 1997, contains many of the same criteria found in Chapter 15 of the Commission of Inquiry Report. This formal statement of ethos and values will be included in all recruiting and training programs, professional development activities, and performance assessments of members of the CF at all levels as part of the new CF Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS). The undergraduate program at the Royal Military College will be reviewed to increase the emphasis on developing values, ethics and leadership skills, as will the curriculum of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. With respect to the training of senior leaders, a three-month course was instituted in Fall 1998 to prepare officers at the colonel/captain (navy) level for senior leadership responsibilities. In Jan 1999, a more strategically-oriented, six-month course was also instituted for officers about to be, or recently promoted to, general/flag rank. The first mentioned course emphasises jointness, senior leadership and ethics, while the second mentioned emphasises executive leadership, strategic operations and resource management. To ensure only the best are selected for command and senior leadership positions, a new formal selection process is in place, along with strengthened assessments of future leaders, to ensure they have the appropriate experience, education and training.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 15.2:</b> The core qualities and other necessary attributes set out in Chapter 15 of this Report be applied in the selection of officers for promotion to and within general officer ranks. These core qualities are integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness and self-discipline. Other necessary attributes are dedication, knowledge, intellect, perseverance, decisiveness, judgement, and physical robustness.</p>	<p>The new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) which came into effect in April 1998 assess officers (as well as non-commissioned members (NCMs)) on these core attributes. CFPAS further requires supervisors to assess members for reliability, accountability, conduct (on and off duty) and initiative.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 15.3:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria for the accountability of leaders within the Canadian Forces derived from the principles of accountability set out in Chapter 16 of this Report, and organized under the headings of accountability, responsibility, supervision, delegation, sanction and knowledge.</p>	<p>A guidance document entitled Authority, Responsibility and Accountability, to address accountability at the strategic level, has been developed and is in the process of being promulgated within DND and the CF. In terms of individual accountability, the principles of accountability and responsibility contained in Chapter 16 of the Commission of Inquiry Report are consistent with current CF standards. However, more emphasis will be placed on accountability in training at all levels of the Canadian Forces. NOTE: THIS SERIAL HAS BEEN MERGED WITH MND REPORT SERIAL 31 (PRE-COMMAND TRAINING) AND WILL BE PROGRESSED BY CFRETS UNDER AEGIS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RENEWAL.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/12/1999</p>

**Somalia 15.47**

The Canadian Forces make a concerted effort to improve the quality of leadership at all levels by ensuring adoption of and adherence to the principles embodied in the findings and recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry regarding the selection, screening, promotion and supervision of personnel; the provision of appropriate basic and continuing training; the demonstration of self-discipline and enforcement of discipline for all ranks; the chain of command, operational readiness and mission planning; and the principles and methods of accountability expressed throughout this Report.

These principles have been, and continue to be, fundamental to the assessment of leadership in the CF. Implementation of the recommendations in the MND Report, Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces, will further strengthen activities related to the selection, training, development and assessment of leaders including self-discipline and the enforcement of discipline. For example, to ensure leaders are properly assessed, the experience, educational and training requirements for promotion to various rank levels for the different military occupational classifications will be clarified. A formal selection process is also in place to ensure that only the best are selected for command and senior leadership positions. The Officer Professional Development System is also being refined to produce a comprehensive, integrated and sequential process that consists of education, training, job experience and self-development activities. The Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development System will further address and improve the quality of leadership at all levels. Aside from the current slate of leadership training and development courses, a new three-month course was instituted in Sep 1998 to prepare officers at the colonel/captain (navy) level for senior leadership responsibilities. In addition, a more strategically-oriented, six-month course has been created for officers about to be, or recently promoted to, general/flag rank, the first course currently underway as of Jan 99. The Col/Capt(N) course, emphasizes jointness, senior

Expected  
completion  
date:  
30/09/1999

	leadership and ethics, while the Generals/ Flag Officers course emphasises executive leadership, strategic operations and resource management.	
<b>MND 21:</b> Respond later this year to the recommendations to be submitted by the newly-created Non-Commissioned Members' Professional Development Council chaired by the Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer on the training needs of non-commissioned members across the Canadian Forces.	Conduct survey to determine training needs.	Completed
	Definition phase completed. Implementation phase underway, including drafting of specific recommendations regarding NCM training.	Expected completion date: 30/10/1999
	A phased in training programme (ie the lower levels are being developed first) will commence Jan 2000. Implementation will occur in conjunction with the ECs implementation of their portion of the Environmental Specification.	Expected completion date: 01/09/2000

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### Observations

The *Committee* notes that progress has been made in this area, but is not in a position to provide a final assessment because a number of activities related to professional development and renewal have not yet been completed. Accordingly, it is recommended that monitoring of this area continue in the new year.

The *Monitoring Committee* is, however, very supportive of the work being carried on within the Army Doctrine and Training System related to the professional development of non-commissioned members. This work is proceeding on the premise that every CF member commissioned and otherwise is either a leader or a leader-in-training and therefore deserves recognition of that fact from the system.

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### Officer Education (MND 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)

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### Decisions

The Minister stated in March 1997 that, in almost all cases (except Commission from the

Ranks), a university degree would be required for commissioned officers. He also announced a thorough review of the undergraduate program at RMC, and an increase in the number of military professors. He also decided to strengthen cooperation between RMC and other civilian institutions of advanced education and to re-establish the institutional connection between Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) students in civilian universities and the military. In addition, the overall institutional integrity of the College would be strengthened by a more active and informed Board of Governors (BOG).

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 10:</b> Change policies beginning in 1997 to make a university degree a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, with the only exceptions to be made for those commissioned from the ranks.	Contracted studies/analysis undertaken for Regular and Reserve Forces. Reg Force study completed Sep 98. Reserve study complete, with a proposed four year trial. Serving PRes officers would be encouraged to obtain a degree, with tuition reimbursement based on one tuition year costs for each year served beyond graduation. New entries would require a degree for promotion. AFC will be asked to decide if MND 10 applies to PRes, and if it so, at what rank is a degree a prerequisite for promotion. AFC will be briefed 27 Sep 99, and PMB for the funds on 26 Oct 99. If approved, a draft DAOD will be issued Nov 99, and a CANFORGEN will follow in the interim depending on the PMB decision.	Completed
	AFC has endorsed the creation of a new commissioning plan for new entry officers as well as endorsed an increase in resources for academic upgrading of serving Reg Force officers. A follow on project will address the Reserve component. The intent is to provide academic upgrading to approx 1200 officers/year. PMB (Jun 99)	Expected Completion Date: 31/12/1999



	has approved funding as part of ADm(HR Mil)Omnibus package. A PERMIS patch was put in place on 30 Jul 99 to track reimbursement for part time students. Admin Instructions for Part-time students is in the final staffing process.	
	DAOD on Education upgrading for Reg Force drafted and submitted to DMPD. Adjust officer recruiting criteria to reflect requirement for a "degree'd" officer corps. CANFORGEN has been issued.	Completed
<b>MND 12:</b> Begin immediately a thorough review of the undergraduate program at the Royal Military College. This review will ensure for each graduate a broad-based education, well grounded in the sciences and humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics and the leadership skills needed to prepare officers for responsibilities and service to country.	Actioned by the RMC Board of Governors (BOG) in the form of the Report of the RMC BOG Study Group dated 30 Apr 98. This Report was forwarded to the MND by Chair RMC BOG on 22 Jun 98. It contains 34 recommendations, 20 of which have been completed. MND was briefed on the contents of the Report by LGen Dallaire on 28 Aug 98. MND is currently considering the way ahead. <b>Additional remarks:</b> MND Serials 16 and 24 will be incorporated where feasible/applicable into serial 12.	Expected completion date: 30/09/2000
	Determine criteria/resources required to conduct independent review of the RMC curriculum.	Completed
	Conduct independent review of curriculum.	Completed
<b>MND 13:</b> Increase the number of military professors at the Royal Military College. This will enhance the contact officer cadets have with	Explore other options for increasing the exposure of the Cadet Wing to experienced military personnel.	Completed



experienced military officers throughout the academic year and serve to highlight the value that is placed on continuing education and higher learning.	Convert 30% selected civilian teaching positions at RMC/CMR to military positions.	Expected completion date: 01/06/2005
	Undertake action to upgrade educational qualifications of selected military officers.	Expected completion date: 30/12/2004
<b>MND 14:</b> Strengthen the current cooperative programs between the Royal Military College and civilian institutions of higher learning to ensure greater interaction between officer cadets and their civilian counterparts. Distance learning and video technologies will be employed to facilitate the interchange.	Expand continuing studies programs from RMC at both the graduate and undergraduate levels through enhanced links with local academic institutions in most garrisons. This activity is considered complete, however, it is, in fact, an activity which will always be ongoing to ensure that programs are continually improved by enhancing links with local academic institutions.	Completed
<b>MND 15:</b> Ensure that the Board of Governors being established with an appropriate geographic and gender balance provides enhanced guidance to the Royal Military College.	Update Terms of Reference for RMC Board of Governors.	Completed
	Board of Governors is now fully operational, and is executing its mandate in a highly effective manner.	Completed
<b>MND 16:</b> Re-establish the compulsory affiliation of students enrolled in civilian universities under the Regular Officer Training Plan with military establishments in the area of their universities, in order to provide them with regular training and military contact throughout the academic year.	Analyse training needs to confirm training requirements has been incorporated into RMC Undergraduate program (ELM), MND issue 12.	Expected completion date: 30/07/2001
	Implement required changes.	Not started
	Adapt educational material used for RMC cadets for civilian university students. This has been incorporated into MND serial 12. Review of the Undergraduate	Expected completion date: 30/07/2001

	<p>program of RMC(ELM). This is scheduled to be in place for summer 2001.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> Recommendation 16 is being merged with recommendation 12 and will be incorporated as part of the implementation programme of the RMC Board of Governors Report of 30 April 1998.</p>	
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### Observations

This subject, in which the *Committee* takes a special interest, is addressed in Part One of this report. The reconstituted *Committee* will continue to monitor the Department's approach to officer education.

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### Officer Professional Development (MND 11, 17-20)

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#### Decisions

The Minister stated in March 1997 that the Officer Professional Development Program would be improved and upgraded to reflect the fact that the vast majority of future officers will possess university degrees. The Minister also decided to strengthen the professionalism of senior officers through review, revision and expansion of the curricula of the Land Force Command and Staff College and of the Canadian Forces Staff College. Emphasis would be placed on the principles of military professionalism, ethics, decision-making, the nature of military operations from traditional peacekeeping through all-out war, leadership and management. At the mid-level rank (colonel and navy captain), a new three-month course would be launched, emphasizing jointness, senior leadership and ethics. In 1999, a six-month program emphasizing executive leadership, resource management and strategic operations would be initiated.

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 11:</b> Undertake this year a review of the Officer Professional Development Program and teaching methodologies to ensure their relevance given that in future almost all officers will have university degrees.	As of Apr 99, 70% of current OPDP maps to Officer General Specifications(OGS), 100% realignment to be completed by Sep 00. Credit towards BMASc will be given for OPDPs 7 and 6. Discussions continue re credit for OPDP 2. OPDP modules 3 and 5 are being combined into a single new module: Human Resources and Financial Management. An RMC History course designed to meet OPDP 7 curriculum requirements is being prepared in digital delivery format. <b>Additional remarks:</b> Finish date requires confirmation.	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999
	Review pedagogical methods of instruction to ensure consistency with modern educational practices.	Expected completion date: 30/12/1999
	Study applicability of OPDP courses to the NCMPDS.	Not started
<b>MND 17:</b> Revise and expand the curriculum of the Land Command and Staff College to strengthen the knowledge of operations at the tactical level and broaden the understanding of the military profession, including army heritage and ethos, and ethics and decision-making. The first course will begin in the summer of 1997.	Review/update CLFCSC curriculum to cater to issues highlighted in recommendation.	Completed
	Introduce new training program.	Completed
<b>MND 18:</b> Review the curriculum of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College to ensure proper emphasis on operations in the spectrum of conflict between	Review education/academic qualifications of directing staff.	Completed
	Introduce revised curriculum.	Completed

traditional peacekeeping and all-out war, ethics in the 21st century, leadership and management. The quality of academic instruction will also be examined.	Amend CSC curriculum.	Completed
	Review of CFCSC curriculum.	Completed
<b>MND 19:</b> Begin in 1998 a three-month course to prepare officers at the colonel/captain (navy) level for senior leadership responsibilities; it will emphasize "jointness", senior leadership and ethics.	Design curriculum, to include material on joint operations and functioning of the integrated national headquarters and ethics.	Completed
	Implemented. First course successfully completed Sep-Dec 98.	Completed
<b>MND 20:</b> Begin in 1999 a more strategically-oriented, six-month course to be attended by officers about to be, or recently promoted to general rank or its naval equivalent; it will emphasize executive leadership, strategic operations and resource management.	Curriculum has been designed and being taught on first course beginning Jan 99. Refinements to be made as required.	Completed
	First course successfully completed 01 Jan-30 Jun 99.	Completed

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### Observations

This subject has also been addressed in Part One of this report. The reconstituted *Committee* will continue to monitor the Department's approach to professional development. We note the progress described in the status report but await promulgation of the terms of reference for the Special Advisor to the CDS on Leadership and Professional Development in the new year before offering further comments.

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### Values and Ethics (MND 9, 22, 31)

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#### Decisions

The Minister announced in March 1997 that a new formal statement of values and beliefs would form the core of all recruiting and training programs as well as professional development and performance assessments of CF members. He also stated that members

designated for pre-command training would be taught the basics of military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, employment equity and ethics. To ensure that new recruits are aware of the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values they, as Canadians in uniform, represent, basic training would be extended from eight to ten weeks to cover these areas.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 9:</b> Produce by June 1st a formal statement of values and beliefs to be integrated into all recruiting and training programs, professional development activities and performance assessments of members of the Canadian Forces at all levels.	On 16 Dec 96, the CDS and DM approved a document titled "Statement of Defence Ethics." On basis of comments received, Chief of Review Services produced a revised "Statement of Defence Ethics" and in Jul 98 requested comments on it from the three environmental Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, the revised document was presented and discussed at the Ethics Advisory Board meeting held 26 Oct 98. The board subsequently approved a "Statement of Defence Ethics (Revised)" which was formally promulgated in a letter on 26 Mar 99 signed by the CDS and DM.	Completed
	Since the issuance of the Statement of Defence ethics in 1997, the CF Recruiting, Education and Training System has been incorporating the listed principles and obligations into the writing and revision of CF training manuals, course syllabi, professional development and performance assessment activities. By Feb 99 this work had been approximately 50% complete. With the revised statement, some adjustment will be required, however, this is expected to be minor since the pedagogy of "defence ethics" in the CF is	Expected completion date: 30/06/2001

	holistic, the principles and obligations cited being inherent in the profession of arms. For example, the Army's keystone doctrine manual — CFP 300 "Canada's Army," published in April 1998, dedicates an entire chapter to the requirements of military professionalism and the military ethos, and clearly achieves the intent of MND Recommendation No 9. As CF training manuals and professional development packages continue to be written/revised they will incorporate the ethical principles, values and beliefs required of all CF members.	
<b>MND 22:</b> Extend basic training from eight to ten weeks beginning in January 1998 to ensure that new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent.	Conduct Training Plan Writing Board.	Completed
	Complete preparation of Lesson Plans (to include additional periods on ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values).	Completed
	Conduct first 10-week basic recruit training course. Spirit of this recommendation has also been applied to the basic officer training course as well, with BOTC 1 and BOTC 2 extended from 12 to 14 weeks.	Completed
<b>MND 31:</b> Formalize pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of potential candidates is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, employment equity and ethics.	Distribute to COs designate and post to Internet.	Not started
	Implementation phase to start April 99 with distribution of trg packages to COs designate.	Expected completion date: 31/01/2000
	Definition phase mostly complete. Training packages are being written, with the added subjects of	Expected completion date:



	Leadership; Customs and Traditions; Authority, Responsibility and Accountability; Legal Aspects of CF Operations; Law of Armed Conflict; Rules of Engagement; Environment and Sustainable Development; Stress Management; Conflict Resolutions; Civilian Issues; and the Functions of an Integrated National Headquarters. Book 1 will go to CDS/VCDS for approval Jan 2000.	31/01/2000
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### Observations

The *Committee* concurs with the Department's status report and awaits the completion of further work early in the new year on values and ethics and their integration into training programs.

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# CHAPTER 5 MILITARY JUSTICE ISSUES

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### General Observations

The *Monitoring Committee* stated its special interest in military justice issues in both its 1998 and 1999 *Interim Reports*. Several unresolved matters were noted most recently this past spring, and we are pleased to report that most of our outstanding concerns have been addressed as our monitoring begins to wind down.

First, the *Committee* notes with satisfaction the proclamation into force of the amended *National Defence Act* on September 1, 1999 and is pleased to observe that the regulations were also in force by September 1st. These events signal that a great many of the recommended changes emanating from the *Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in Somalia*, the *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigations Services* and the *Report of the Military Police Services Review Group* have been implemented. These changes herald a new era for DND and the CF, one with a stronger and more accountable military justice system.

Overall, the regulations promulgated under the new *National Defence Act* meet the intent embodied in the recommendations of the various groups that have provided reports to the Minister. How these regulations work in practice is going to be important, and only time will be the test.

In our most recent *Interim Report* there were several issues listed as unresolved. It is only fair to provide our final observations on those matters.

The *Committee* has stressed the importance of the Occupational Analysis exercise and eventual plans for training in the context of increased professionalization of the military policing function. This is still a very new area, and the *Committee* is reluctant to attempt to provide comments that would only be seen as premature. The training process can not see immediate results — sufficient time is needed before results can be measured and assessed. Thus, we are pleased that the CFPM is taking action, and feel that it would be inappropriate to draw any conclusion regarding implementation of the recommendation until ample experience has been gained and results can be observed.

Another issue outstanding as of our last report was the creation of the Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) as provided for in the statutory amendments for the purpose of civilian oversight. We are very pleased to see the appointment of the Commission's Chair and its readiness to take complaints commencing December 1, 1999.

The MPCC has similar legislative underpinnings to those of the RCMP's Public Complaints Commission. The *Monitoring Committee* believes that this will be the proper forum to address complaints against military police or allegations of interference into investigations by the chain of command. This directly addresses the recommendation to establish an independent external watchdog, and we believe that this, in concert with the *Professional Code of Conduct*, which is now entrenched in law, will enhance the professionalism of the military police. The structure is now in place, and we commend the CF and DND for having achieved this important goal. The *Committee* urges that the tools now available be used appropriately.

The 1998 and 1999 *Interim Reports* pointed out the importance of implementing reforms designed to improve the summary trials process.

The certification program for summary trials is important to ensure that the CO and delegated officer understand the process and can fulfill their duties. The *Committee* is pleased to note that certification has begun. The *Committee* notes as well that this is a tedious process — mandatory training programs take time. It does appear, nonetheless, that the certification process is on target for its planned completion date of April 1, 2000. Perhaps, after that date, it will be possible to assess the degree of success achieved. The *Committee* urges that this date be respected.

Another outstanding issue was the JAG's response to Chief Justice Dickson's recommendation that statistics on summary trials be kept and "publicized on a regular basis throughout the CF." The *Committee* observes that, while some statistics are now being publicized, they are of limited use without the inclusion of the nature of the offence and particulars related to the offence, specifically, sentencing. Without this basic information on precedents readily available, the goal of uniformity in sentencing can not be advanced.

The Office of the JAG advised the *Monitoring Committee* in September 1999 that it is "undertaking to study this issue further and take a decision within six months." Among issues under consideration by the JAG is the privacy implications of releasing information on the type of offence involved and the identity of the offender. The *Committee* sees no reason for publicizing information relating to the identity of an individual and urges the Office of the JAG to move expeditiously on this matter with respect to publicizing consistent data on the nature of offences and related sentences.

Finally, the *Committee* wishes to comment on the importance of independence, a theme expounded by late Chief Justice Dickson. The Office of the JAG has informed the *Monitoring Committee* that a special committee has been established to study the impact of PERs on the independence of the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) and the Director of Defence Counsel Services (DDCS). One issue to be studied is the impact on career progression should PERs not be given to the DMP or DDCS. We note that the findings of this study will play an important role in maintaining the independence of these crucial positions.

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**Belzile Report**


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**DND Status Report**


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Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Belzile Report 1:</b> We recommend that the CRS review the roles of CFPM and Commanding Officer of the NIS, with a view that these be assumed by separate individuals, with the CO of the NIS reporting to the CFPM.	CRS will examine the roles of the CFPM and CO NIS during an audit in 1999.	Expected completion date: 31/05/2000
<b>Belzile Report 2:</b> We recommend that base/wing military police remain under the command and control of the operational chain of command.	Agree. This is the current command and control arrangement.	Completed
<b>Belzile Report 3:</b> We recommend that, if necessary, a Memorandum of Understanding be executed between the CFPM and CFRETS which provides for mutually acceptable means whereby the CFPM could ensure that the training provided by CFSIS responds adequately to the training standards that military police must meet.	Agree. An MOU will be executed between CFPM and CFRETS. <b>Additional remarks:</b> CFPM and CFRETS are holding a Training Steering Committee meeting in September 1999 that will address this issue. Expected date of completion is 31/10/1999.	Expected completion date: 31/10/1999
<b>Belzile Report 4:</b> We recommend that the CFPM be afforded the ability to comment on the technical skills of military police members in their personnel evaluation reports, and that those comments be considered by the	Agree. This recommendation is currently being coordinated with ADM (HR-Mil) staff. <b>Additional remarks:</b> This issue remains in the coordination stage, with ADM HR (Mil) staff. Expected date of completion	Expected completion date: 31/10/1999

appropriate authorities in the career management of military police members.	31/10/1999.	
<b>Belzile Report 5:</b> We recommend that the Military Police Investigation Policy be amended to say that a "sensitive offence" would include one which could bring discredit to the Department of National Defence.	Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended to reflect the term "discredit."	Completed
<b>Belzile Report 6:</b> We recommend that discretion to waive NIS investigations to the base/wing military police be exercised more aggressively than it has in the past, and that whenever practicable this discretion be exercised at the regional NIS level, after consultation with the appropriate base/wing security officer.	Agree with the principle. The exercise of the discretion will increase over time as training and experience levels rise. <b>Additional remarks:</b> This matter has been addressed in the new MP Investigation Policy disseminated to all MP elements and Commanding Officers on 7 May 1999. However, the training and experiential aspects of discretion can only be realized over time. The completion date, therefore, should indicate Year 2000 to allow this discretion to be learned and implemented appropriately by CFNIS incumbents.	Expected completion date: 31/07/2000
<b>Belzile Report 7:</b> We recommend that the NIS involve base/wing MPs in their investigations as much as possible.	Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.	Completed
<b>Belzile Report 8:</b> We recommend that the threshold for property offences triggering NIS involvement be increased to \$20,000, with the proviso that discretion still be used for any property offences.	The thrust of this recommendation is positive and will be implemented. Data indicates that a limit of \$10,000 for property offences, other than fraud, would reflect the seriousness of those offences and allow an equitable division of work between the CFNIS and local MP authorities. In respect of fraud cases, which are frequently complex, occur over longer periods of time, and in	Completed



	several locations, the limits in those cases will remain at \$5,000.	
<b>Belzile Report 9:</b> We recommend that, should the need arise, foreign military personnel be investigated upon the same criteria as affect CF personnel, taking into account any applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements.	Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.	Completed
<b>Belzile Report 10:</b> We recommend that the Military Police Investigation Policy be amended such that the NIS is no longer required to investigate an offence merely because a senior officer is a victim.	Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.	Completed
<b>Belzile Report 11:</b> We recommend that the Military Police Investigation Policy be amended so as to afford the NIS some discretion in waiving to the base/wing military police investigations involving senior officers as subjects, where, taking all relevant considerations into account, the matter could be appropriately dealt with by the local MP.	The current policy permits this discretion, and in the appropriate cases, it will be exercised. The exercise of discretion will increase over time as training and experience levels rise.	Completed
<b>Belzile Report 12:</b> We recommend that, whenever the NIS is required to investigate an alleged offence committed by military police personnel, the investigation should be conducted by NIS investigators who do not or are not likely to have a current working relationship with the subject MPs.	Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.	Completed



<p><b>Belzile Report 13:</b> We recommend that the offences of uttering threats and assaulting peace officers be waived back to the local military MPs whenever this is justified by the application of the discretionary criteria.</p>	<p>Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 14:</b> We recommend that the Investigation Policy relating to the NIS responsibility to inform commanders be applied in such a way as to ensure that commanders are advised on a regular basis as to the progress of ongoing investigations.</p>	<p>Agree. The current policy is accurate in principle, but will be expanded to include further direction as to the process whereby information can properly be provided to commanders and when.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 15:</b> We recommend that shadow files be handled by the base/wing MPs, while ensuring that the information be copied to the NIS for their information.</p>	<p>Agree, but to be left to the discretion of the CFPM.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 16:</b> We recommend that the need to have an NIS officer present when another officer is being interviewed as the subject in an NIS investigation be assessed by the NIS on a case-by-case basis.</p>	<p>Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 17:</b> We recommend that the CFPM ensure that the military police technical chain communicates promptly effectively to all military police, particularly those charged with base security and investigations, all changes in the law relevant to their investigative mandate.</p>	<p>Agree. In conjunction with the JAG, communication measures will be implemented.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Belzile Report 18:</b> We recommend that where it is conducting investigations in the context of a deployed operations, the NIS should take all necessary steps to advise promptly the chain of command of the progress of the investigation.</p>	<p>Agree. The current policy is accurate in principle, but will be expanded to include further direction as to the process whereby information can properly be provided to commanders and when, taking into account the imperatives of the operational context.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 19:</b> We recommend that the word "approval", found in paragraph 29 of the Military Police Investigation Policy, be removed and replaced with "opinion".</p>	<p>Agree. The MP Investigation Policy will be amended.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 20:</b> We would suggest that some uniformity among the three services be introduced, without necessarily creating a separate and distinct dress for the military police. We would also suggest that measures be considered to ensure that the dress, while retaining the distinctive features of each service, is nevertheless appropriate for the unique duties of the military police.</p>	<p>A Steering Committee was formed in Sep 98 to review the requirement for a patrol dress for MPs. This initiative is ongoing.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/—/2000</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 21:</b> We strongly support the implementation of the SAMPIS project.</p>	<p>Agree. Phase I of the SAMPIS Project was approved by PMB on 10 Dec 98.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/—/2003</p>
<p><b>Belzile Report 22:</b> We suggest that the release of information to the press at the national level regarding investigations conducted by the NIS be co-ordinated with the applicable regional Public Affairs cell.</p>	<p>Agree. CFPM media policy will reflect the suggestion. <b>Additional remarks:</b> CFPM is currently reviewing a draft media policy that takes this recommendation into account. Expected completion date for this policy is 30/09/1999.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/1999</p>

<p><b>Belzile Report 23:</b> We suggest that paragraph 14 of the draft Military Police Professional Code of Conduct be amended to reflect the fact that the Military Police Credential Board is required to have decision-making powers.</p>	<p>Agree. The draft Military Police Code of Professional Conduct will be amended and will be implemented as part of the regulatory changes resulting from Bill C-25.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> The MP Code of Professional Conduct is part of the implementation of Bill C-25. JAG staff has advised this measure should be implemented by end-Sep 99.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/1999</p>
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## Dickson 1 Report

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>Dickson 1-1:</b> We recommend that a distinct military justice system be maintained for the Canadian Forces, consistent with the supremacy of the Rule of Law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and subject to innovations and changes recommended in this report.</p>	<p>Will be considered as a guiding principle in the context of amendments to the NDA.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Dickson 1-2:</b> We recommend that the existing Code of Service Discipline continue to be administered primarily by the chain of command, both in times of conflict or peace, in Canada or abroad, subject to innovations and changes recommended in this report.</p>	<p>Will be considered as a guiding principle in the context of amendments to the NDA.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Dickson 1-3:</b> We recommend that it be declared, as a fundamental principle of Canada's military justice system, that every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline is entitled to its equal and uniform application without regard to rank.</p>	<p>Emphasize the accepted principle of equal and uniform treatment through incorporation in a suitable policy or legal document.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Dickson 1-4:</b> We recommend that the existing Code of Service Discipline be re-enacted as a separate federal statute.</p>	<p>The Code of Service Discipline will be given more visibility and separation in the NDA, but will not be enacted as a separate statute.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Dickson 1-5:</b> We recommend that the principal responsibilities of the Judge Advocate General be set out in the National Defence Act, and that, without limiting the generality of those responsibilities, the following provisions be included: a. the Judge Advocate General's duties as legal adviser to the Minister of National Defence, the Department and the Canadian Forces; b. the Judge Advocate General's duty to provide oversight and supervision to the administration of the military justice system across the Canadian Forces; c. the Judge Advocate General's duties in respect of its separate defence, prosecution, and judicial functions; d. the Judge Advocate General's duty to report annually to the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff on the overall effectiveness of the military justice system in the Canadian Forces.</p>	<p>Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act to clarify responsibilities of Judge Advocate General.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<b>Dickson 1-6:</b> We recommend that the Judge Advocate General annual report to the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff be released to the public.	Release the JAG's annual report to the public.	Completed
	Resolve issues related to report format, content and method of release.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-7:</b> We recommend that, whenever a Canadian Forces member is entitled to legal advice under the Code of Service Discipline, the Judge Advocate General provide such advice in a manner that is independent of the Judge Advocate General's prosecution and judicial functions.	Determine the most efficient method of providing defence counsel services, with due regard to the requirements of the Code of Service Discipline.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-8:</b> We recommend the appointment of an independent Director of Prosecutions responsible to the Judge Advocate General.	Develop policy and structure governing an independent Director of Military Prosecutions.	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-9a:</b> MP resources associated with the provision of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence be placed under command of Director General Intelligence (DG Int).	Complete transfer to DG Int.	Completed
	Prepare a Master Implementation Plan to consolidate Military Police resources used in support of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence under command of DG Int.	Completed
	Develop a concept of operations to facilitate the posting of Counter-Intelligence personnel to new locations.	Completed

<b>Dickson 1-9b:</b> Command and control of military police required in the operational support of commanders remain under their respective commands; and that all other MP resources be under the command and control of Director General Security and Military Police (DG SAMP).	Transfer resources to CFPM.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-10a:</b> We recommend that the role of Director General Security and Military Police (DG SAMP) be affirmed and enhanced as follows: DG SAMP to have primary responsibility for all military police selection and recruiting standards.	Implement changes to give CFPM influence over areas of technical and selection standards and MP policies.	Completed
	Update documents to formally assign responsibilities and accountabilities to CFPM.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-10b:</b> DG SAMP to have primary responsibility for all military police training standards.	Complete Review of all MP training. <b>Additional remarks:</b> Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99. Additionally, the Training Steering Committee will sit in Sep 99. The results of that meeting will also impact on this issue.	Expected completion date: 31/10/1999
	Update investigative training.	Completed



	<p>Implement new training program and complete review of all MP training. Final report cannot be given until the Military Police Occupational Analysis (OA) is concluded. This OA began 15 Aug 98 and is scheduled to be finished 28 May 99. A final report will be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99. Additionally, the Training Steering Committee is scheduled to sit in Sep 99, and decisions taken in that forum will also impact on this issue.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/10/1999</p>
	Review investigative training.	Completed
<p><b>Dickson 1-10c:</b> DG SAMP to have direct responsibility for cooperation with the RCMP and other police forces in the development of the National Investigation Service.</p>	Enhance liaison with the RCMP and other police agencies.	Completed
<p><b>Dickson 1-10d:</b> DG SAMP to have direct responsibility for review of all military police functions in the Canadian Forces.</p>	Finalize plans to review all military police functions.	Completed

<b>Dickson 1-10e:</b> DG SAMP to report directly to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.	Transfer CFPM to Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.	Completed
	Complete administrative requirements to effect change.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-11:</b> We recommend that the responsibilities assigned to Director General Security and Military Police be established in the new position of Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.	Amend Terms of Reference as necessary.	Completed
	Produce Ministerial Organization Order to formally recognize CFPM as the senior police advisor for the CF and Commander of the National Investigation Service.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-12a:</b> We recommend that a comprehensive training process be introduced to improve the investigative capabilities of military police, including the following provisions: The training of military police personnel should be reassessed at all levels with a view to improving investigative skills.	Implement new training plans. <b>Additional remarks:</b> Linked with serial 10a and 10b Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.	Expected completion date: 31/10/1999
	Implement new training plans and determine investigative training and course requirements. Final report cannot be given until the Military Police Occupational Analysis (OA) is concluded, however, interim action has been taken towards its implementation. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be	Expected completion date: 31/10/1999

	<p>taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> Linked with serial 10a and 10b Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p>	
	Identify standards and update documents.	Completed
<p><b>Dickson 1-12b:</b></p> <p>The employment of military police personnel should allow them to acquire and maintain acceptable standards of expertise to investigate serious matters.</p>	<p>Conduct study to determine changes in employment profiles required to allow military police to acquire and maintain acceptable standards of expertise. Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA, scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99, will impact on this recommendation,</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/10/1999</p>

	and therefore it will remain ongoing until that impact is known.	
<p><b>Dickson 1-12c:</b> Investigators, officers and non-commissioned members, should receive investigation and management training commensurate with their experience and responsibilities.</p>	<p>Identify, document and implement appropriate training cycle. Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> Focus is initially on those pers transferred to the NIS, and key instructors at CFSIS. Once the above is completed, then investigative training for other MPs will be implemented. Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA, scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99, will impact on this recommendation, and therefore it will remain ongoing until that impact is known. All remaining recommendations that are currently ongoing will be addressed during the military police occupational analysis which will be taking place during Fall 98/Winter 99.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/10/1999</p>

<b>Dickson 1-12d:</b> Investigators in the military police should be given the opportunity to gain practical investigative experience and expertise through an exchange and/or secondment programme with other police forces.	Identify opportunities for exchanges and/or secondments.	Completed
	Complete draft MOUs with other police forces.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-13:</b> We recommend that the present Special Investigation Unit of the military police be merged with the National Investigation Service (NIS) to provide specialized and professional investigative services to the Canadian Forces on a national and international basis.	Draft Master Implementation Plan.	Completed
	Obtain approval-in-principle to facilitate personnel transfers.	Completed
	Produce Ministerial Organization Order.	Completed
	Stand-up National Investigation Service.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-14a:</b> We recommend that the National Investigation Service of the military police be reorganized and tasked on the following basis: The NIS would operate under direct command and control of the Director General Security and Military Police.	Implement in conjunction with Serial 13 above.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-14b:</b> The NIS would operate independently of the chain of command.	Implement in conjunction with Serial 13 above.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-14c:</b> The NIS investigative services would be initiated with respect to all service offences of a serious or sensitive nature, or offences requiring complex or specialized investigations.	Obtain policy approval.	Completed
	Prepare draft National Investigation Service investigative policy to detail scope, mandate and definition of tasking.	Completed

<b>Dickson 1-14d:</b> The NIS investigators would have the authority to lay charges as a consequence of their investigations.	Prepare draft regulations.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-14e:</b> The NIS would operate in cooperation with base/wing units of the military police and with other supporting units for logistical and administrative support.	Implement in conjunction with serial 13 above.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-14f:</b> Review and oversight of NIS operations would be the responsibility of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff facilitated by an annual report from the Director General Security and Military Police.	Implement in conjunction with serial 13.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-15:</b> We recommend that all security clearance services required by the Canadian Forces be provided separately from service offence investigations and, if necessary, they be contracted to appropriate agencies such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.	Complete study on transfer of the Inquiry portion of the security clearance process to another agency (eg. CSIS).	Completed
	Implement new process.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-16:</b> We recommend that detention of up to thirty days be retained as a possible punishment for offences in respect of which a member has elected to be tried by summary trial.	Issue draft regulations for summary trial.	Completed
	Implement recommendations 16, 17, 19, 21, 22 as part of new su al regulations.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-17:</b> We recommend that, whenever an election is given to an accused to be tried by court martial rather than summary trial, the accused be afforded a right to consult with legal counsel to ensure that the election is made on the basis of full and complete information and that	Implement recommendations 16, 17, 19, 21, 22 as part of new su al regulations.	Completed
	Issue draft regulations for summary trial.	Completed




the election be set out in writing.		
<b>Dickson 1-18:</b> We recommend that, upon a Canadian Forces member being sentenced to detention following a summary trial, the member's rank and salary be reduced to that of a private during the period of detention, but that both the rank and salary be reinstated to original levels upon completion of the sentence.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-19:</b> We recommend that, whenever reduction in rank is awarded as a punishment following a summary trial, the reduction be limited to one rank below that of the accused at the commencement of the trial.	Implement recommendations 16, 17, 19, 21, 22 as part of new su al regulations.	Completed
	Issue draft regulations for summary trial.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-20:</b> We recommend removal of the requirement for punishment warrants in respect of certain punishments that a commanding officer may impose at a summary trial.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-21:</b> We recommend that the powers of punishment of a delegated officer be increased to include a fine of up to twenty-five percent of the monthly pay of the accused.	Implement recommendations 16, 17, 19, 21, 22 as part of new su al regulations.	Completed
	Issue draft regulations for summary trial.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-22:</b> We recommend that the punishment of confinement to ship or barracks be limited to master corporals and below.	Issue draft regulations for summary trial.	Completed
	Implement recommendations 16, 17, 19, 21, 22 as part of new su al regulations.	Completed

<b>Dickson 1-23:</b> We recommend that increased training and education be introduced for all commanding and delegated officers to ensure that they are knowledgeable about their roles in the military justice system and competent to perform them. But for exceptional circumstances, those officers should not be permitted to preside at a summary trial unless certified to do so by the Judge Advocate General.	Certification training package consisting of a 20-hour reading package based on Manual of Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level and a 2 day course conducted by legal officers has been developed. Participants will be tested on completion of reading package prior to course loading and at end of the 2 day training course.	Completed
	Certification Training commenced 9 Sep 99. A total of 91 serials are scheduled between 9 Sep 99 and 5 Dec 99 to train 1694 presiding officers.	Expected completion date: 05/12/1999
<b>Dickson 1-24:</b> We recommend that sufficient legal training and simple work instruments be provided to all officers and non-commissioned members who may be called upon to perform the role of assisting officer so that they will be in a position to provide adequate assistance to the accused.	Issue documentation with new summary trial regulations.	Completed
	Consolidate and simplify applicable regulations and orders.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-25:</b> We recommend that an officer be prohibited from presiding at a summary trial of a person charged with a service offence if the officer has been involved in the investigation or the laying of the charge.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	JAG Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-26:</b> We recommend that uniform records of summary trials be prepared and publicized on a regular basis throughout the Canadian Forces.	Issue document with the new summary trial regulations in Fall 97.	Completed
	Develop new "record of disciplinary proceedings".	Completed

<b>Dickson 1-27:</b> We recommend that the Office of the Chief Military Trial Judge be organized as an independent unit of the Canadian Forces and that the role and responsibilities of the Chief Military Trial Judge be set out in the National Defence Act.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
	Clarify roles and responsibilities.	Completed
	Establish separate unit for the Chief Military Trial Judge and amend regulations as necessary.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-28:</b> We recommend that the sentencing function at a court martial be performed by the judge presiding at the court martial.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act to expand the role of the Military trial Judge to include sentencing.	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-29:</b> We recommend that non-commissioned members of the rank of warrant officer and above be eligible to serve on Disciplinary and General Courts Martial, provided that the non-commissioned member is equal or senior in rank to the accused.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-30:</b> We recommend that the National Defence Act be amended to remove the death penalty from the scale of punishments.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-31:</b> We recommend that the National Defence Act be amended to remove the three-year limitation period in respect of service offences and to provide that an accused tried by courts martial has the benefit of any limitation period applicable to a civil offence incorporated in the Code of Service Discipline.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed

<b>Dickson 1-32:</b> We recommend that the National Defence Act be amended to prescribe a one-year limitation period for any offence tried by way of summary trial.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	JAG Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-33:</b> We recommend that, in all cases where an accused has elected to be tried by summary trial, the accused, if convicted, have the right to request that the appropriateness of the conviction and/or sentence be reviewed by the next level of command.	Implement new process.	Completed
	Develop a review structure and regulatory approach.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-34:</b> We recommend that the National Defence Act be amended to repeal the sections that provide for a review of the proceedings of a court martial by the Judge Advocate General where the appeal period has expired, and no appeal has been made.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	JAG Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act.	Completed
<b>Dickson 1-35:</b> We recommend that an independent office of complaint review and system oversight, such as a military ombudsman, be established within the Canadian Forces, and that it report directly to the Minister of National Defence.	Include Military Police Complaints Commission and Canadian Forces Grievance Board in draft legislation.	Completed

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## Dickson 2 Report

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## DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Dickson 2-1:</b> We recommend that the authority conferred upon the Minister of National Defence by ss. 159(2) and 159(3) of the National Defence Act in respect of pre-trial custody be abolished and be given instead to military trial judges.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	JAG Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-2:</b> We recommend that the power of the Minister of National Defence to designate an officer not below the rank of colonel as an approving authority pursuant to ss. 163(3) of the National Defence Act be repealed.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-3:</b> We recommend that the authority of the Minister of National Defence to appoint or prescribe superior commanders provided for in ss. 164 (1) of the National Defence Act be abolished and that it be given instead to the Chief of the Defence Staff.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-4:</b> We recommend that the authority to convene General and Disciplinary Courts Martial conferred on the Minister of National Defence by s. 165 of the National Defence Act be abolished and that it be vested in the Chief Military Trial Judge to be exercised upon request by the independent Director of Prosecutions.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-5:</b> We recommend that the authority of the Minister of National Defence to appoint military trial judges for fixed terms be retained.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed

<b>Dickson 2-6:</b> We recommend that the independent Director of Prosecutions be authorized to decide whether or not civilians who are subject to the Code of Service Discipline should be tried by a Special General Court Martial and that the Minister of National Defence's powers in this regard be abolished.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-7:</b> We recommend that the Minister of National Defence's authority pursuant to section 101.09 of the QR&Os to order a joint trial, or to appoint an officer for the purpose of making such an order, should be revoked. Such authority should be vested in the independent Director or Prosecutions. The right of an accused to apply to a military judge, or to a judge assigned by the Chief Military Trial Judge, to be tried separately, should be provided for in the National Defence Act.	Develop necessary amendments to the QR&Os.	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-8:</b> We recommend that ss. 202.26(e) of the National Defence Act be repealed and that the authority to appeal a finding that a person is not a "dangerous mentally disordered accused" be transferred to the independent Director of Prosecutions.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	JAG Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-9:</b> We recommend that ss. 140(g) of the National Defence Act relating to the imposition of hard labour as punishment be repealed.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed



<b>Dickson 2-10:</b> We recommend that the requirement set out in ss. 206(2) of the National Defence Act for ministerial approval of the punishment of dismissal and dismissal with disgrace be abolished.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-11:</b> We recommend that the powers of clemency given to the Minister of National Defence by the National Defence Act be transferred to the Governor in Council and that these be modelled, as much as possible, on the similar powers contained in the Criminal Code of Canada.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-12:</b> We recommend that the decision to proceed or not with a new trial be vested in the independent Director of Prosecutions, and that the Minister of National Defence's authority in this regard be abolished.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-13:</b> We recommend that the authority of the Minister of National Defence to exercise the suspending power provided for in section 215 of the National Defence Act be abolished and that this power be expressly vested in all service tribunals.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	JAG Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-14:</b> We recommend that the authority of the Minister of National Defence pursuant to section 230.1 and ss. 245(2) of the National Defence Act to exercise a right of appeal from appellate courts be abolished and be exercised instead by the independent Director or Prosecutions.	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed

<b>Dickson 2-15:</b> We recommend that the authority of the Minister of National Defence to adjudicate on grievances arising from summary trial findings, prescribed pursuant to section 29 of the National Defence Act, be repealed.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed
<b>Dickson 2-16:</b> We recommend that appropriate structures be put in place promptly to ensure that the Minister of National Defence has available, within the Department of National Defence, independent legal advice from the Attorney General of Canada.	Develop arrangements to provide for enhanced legal services by the Department of Justice to the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces.	Completed
<b>Dickson 2 — 17a:</b> We recommend that an independent review of the implementation of the changes recommended in this Report and in our March 1997 Report be undertaken before the end of 1999; and,	Provide information and assistance as required to Monitoring Committee. <b>Additional remarks:</b> Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Honourable Willard Estey, former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, was established by the Department on 14 Oct 97. The Honourable John Fraser was appointed as new chairman effective 7 Apr 98.	Expected completion date: - /12/1999
<b>Dickson 2 — 17b:</b> We recommend that an independent review of the legislation that governs the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces be undertaken every five years following the enactment of the legislative changes required to implement the recommendations contained in this Report and in our March 1997 Report.	Develop necessary amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA).	Completed
	Include in draft legislation.	Completed

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## MND Report

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### DND Status Report

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Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 4:</b> Immediately begin implementation of all of the Special Advisory Group's recommendations requiring only the updating of regulations and other administrative documents.	Specific details outlined in Annex B.	Completed
	Develop action plans.	Completed
<b>MND 5:</b> Table amendments to the National Defence Act in the next Parliament to allow for the full implementation of the rest of the Special Advisory Group's report.	Develop required amendments to the NDA for consideration by Cabinet.	Completed
<b>MND 6:</b> Seek amendments to the National Defence Act to create an independent review board as final arbiter in the grievance process and to streamline grievance procedures.	Draft amendments to National Defence Act.	Completed
	Determine requirements.	Completed
	Implement amendments when Bill C-25 is proclaimed.	Completed
<b>MND 7:</b> Ensure that all improvements in the grievance process not requiring amendments to the National Defence Act are implemented immediately.	The working group report concluded that any streamlining measure required NDA amendment. Therefore, with AFC approval on 22 Apr 98, the recommendations in the working group report were included in C-25 which received Royal Assent on 10 Dec.	Completed

	Implementation plan completed in Dec 98. CF Grievance Manual is 90% written, and will be completed by Dec 99. DAOD will be completed by Dec 99. Target date for full implementation of new CF Grievance process is Dec 99.	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999
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## Somalia Report

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 40.1:</b> The National Defence Act be amended to provide for a restructured military justice system, establishing three classes of misconduct: 1. Minor disciplinary: Any misconduct considered minor enough not to warrant detention, dismissal or imprisonment should be considered minor disciplinary misconduct. Examples might include a failure to salute and quarreling with another Canadian Forces member. Minor disciplinary misconduct would not include service offences now listed in the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O) 108.31(2); Examples	It is intended that the offence jurisdiction of summary trials be limited to more minor offences, including a small number of minor criminal offences, that are considered necessary to maintain unit discipline. It is also proposed that summary trial powers of punishment be reduced, in keeping with the role of such trials as a vehicle to deal with more minor disciplinary cases. For example, detention may be reduced from 90 to 30 days. If implemented, this work, while somewhat different in thrust from the Commission recommendation, would effectively result in offences being categorized into minor and major based on the	Completed

might include being drunk while on sentry duty during a time of war, insubordination and showing cowardice before the enemy. Major disciplinary misconduct would not include crimes under the Criminal Code or other federal statutes; and 3. Criminal misconduct: Any misconduct that would constitute a crime and is to be the subject of a charge under the Criminal Code or other federal statute or foreign law, and triable only by court martial or a civil court. 2. Major disciplinary: Any misconduct considered serious enough to warrant detention, dismissal or imprisonment should be considered major disciplinary misconduct triable only by a court martial. This would include infractions such as some of those listed in QR&O 108.31(2).

nature of the offence and the perceived seriousness of the actual misconduct. This approach approximates the categorization contained in COIR 40.01, with the following significant differences: a modified form of detention with fewer long-term consequences would be available as a form of punishment at summary trial; and summary trial jurisdiction over a small number of criminal offences (8) required to maintain unit discipline would be retained.

#### **Somalia 40.2:**

To prevent abuse of the commanding officer's discretion to determine into which class the misconduct falls, there be formalized safeguards provided for in the National Defence Act and regulations, including the possibility of independent military investigations into the misconduct, the authority of an independent military prosecutor to lay a charge for criminal misconduct arising out of the same incident, and the oversight performed by an independent Inspector General.

It is recognized that: commanding officers' discretion with respect to investigation and charging is too broad, may be susceptible to misuse, and could cause potential conflicts of interest; and there is a need for more effective safeguards to ensure more principled use of that discretion, including the need for an independent prosecutor, and to remove from commanding officers the ability to dismiss charges so charges can proceed, if warranted, after careful investigation and consideration by competent police and legal personnel. The issue of commanding officers' discretion was also reviewed by the Special Advisory Group (SAG). It was considered important for unit authorities to continue to participate in an investigative and charge laying role. However, the SAG recommended that commanding officers' ability to lay charges be

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	<p>counterbalanced by ensuring that all serious and sensitive matters were referred to and investigated by the independent National Investigation Service having primary charge laying authority. The SAG also recommended the establishment of the office of a military prosecutor independent of the chain of command. These latter recommendations are being implemented. Work is underway to: develop policy and structure governing a Director of Military Prosecutions; draft National Investigation Services investigative policy to detail scope, mandate, and definition of responsibilities; and require that the decisions to investigate and lay charges in all but minor cases be taken on legal advice. Note: With respect to the references to the portion of the Commission recommendation dealing with the independent Inspector General, see 40.36 below.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 40.4:</b> The Queen's Regulations and Orders be amended to circumscribe the discretion of a commanding officer with respect to the manner of conducting summary investigations to ensure that these investigations are conducted according to the guidelines in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 21-9, dealing with general instructions for boards of inquiry and summary investigations.</p>	<p>This recommendation is being taken into account as a part of the current work to revise Canadian Forces Administrative Order 21-9. The revisions to this administrative order will provide guidance to officers who order investigations in respect of the type of investigative process to use in particular cases, and will ensure that all investigations are conducted according to the procedures contained in the administrative order.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/12/1999</p>



**Somalia 40.5:**

The guidelines in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 21-9 be amended to provide that

1. Summary investigations be restricted to investigation of minor disciplinary misconduct or administrative matters; 2. those conducting summary investigations have some minimum training standard in investigations, rules of evidence, and the recognition of potential criminality; 3. Those conducting summary investigations have a specific duty to report matters of potential criminality directly to Military Police; and 4. Those conducting summary investigations be free from any conflict of interest.

Regulations will be amended to clearly indicate that, if the primary purpose of a summary investigation is to uncover evidence of the commission of a service offence, then the matter is to be dealt with by the Military Police, not a summary investigation. In addition, the instruction will direct that, if evidence of the commission of an offence is uncovered during a summary investigation, legal advice is to be sought before proceeding any further and, if appropriate, the matter is to be returned to the convening authority for referral to the Military Police. Chapter 5 of the Manual on Military Justice at the Summary Trial level outlines the purpose of administrative investigations and provides guidance to CF on when an NIS, military police, unit investigation or administrative investigation is appropriate. Further guidance is also provided on when an administrative investigation should be halted and the matter should be referred for a criminal/disciplinary investigation.

Expected completion date:  
31/12/1999

**Somalia 40.6:**

Military Police be independent of the chain of command when investigating major disciplinary and criminal misconduct.

The newly formed CF National Investigation Service (CF NIS), which is responsible for investigating serious and sensitive criminal or service offences when requested and for initiating investigations or assuming control of other investigations as deemed necessary, stood up on 1 September 1997. The unit is independent of the operational chain of command and operates under the direct control of the CF Provost Marshal. New investigative standard operating procedures have been implemented. A Military Police Complaints Commission is being

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	considered, to receive and investigate complaints concerning the conduct of Military Police, as well as allegations of interference by the chain of command.	
<b>Somalia 40.7:</b> Military Police be trained more thoroughly in police investigative techniques.	<p>The CF Provost Marshal is reviewing all Military Police (MP) specification requirements and all MP training standards to provide a more structured approach to MP training in general and investigations in particular. Further, an exchange and secondment program has been developed to enable the military police to gain practical investigative experience with other police forces. A final report cannot be given until the Military Police Occupational Analysis (OA) is concluded, however, interim action has been taken towards its implementation. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> Plan completed — Exchange and secondment program has been implemented — Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA, scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99, will impact on this recommendation, and therefore it will remain ongoing until that impact is known.</p>	Expected completion date: 31/10/1999

<p><b>Somalia 40.8:</b> All Military Police, regardless of their specific assignment, be authorized to investigate suspected misconduct of their own accord unless another Military Police investigation is under way.</p>	<p>Military Police are authorized to conduct investigations of minor misconduct. Investigations into major disciplinary or criminal misconduct will be conducted by the CF National Investigation Service.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.9:</b> Control of the conduct of Military Police investigations of major disciplinary and criminal misconduct be removed from the possible influence of the commanding officer or the commanding officer's superiors. Military Police attached to units or elements of the Canadian Forces should refer major disciplinary and criminal misconduct to the Director of Military Police through dedicated Military Police channels.</p>	<p>As of 1 September 1997, all alleged offences of a serious or sensitive nature have been referred to the CF National Investigation Service for investigation no matter where these alleged offences have occurred. Since the CF National Investigation Service is under the command and control of the CF Provost Marshal, commanding officers will not interfere or influence investigations. Investigations will be independent of the operational chain of command. The new Military Police policy directive is very specific in terms of who will investigate certain alleged offences. If a member of the Military Police believes, however, that a Commanding Officer or other individual has interfered in the investigative process, he or she will be able to make a complaint to the proposed Military Police Complaints Commission.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.10:</b> The Director of Military Police oversee all Military Police investigations of major disciplinary and criminal misconduct and report on these matters to the Solicitor General of Canada. There is no need for the CF Provost Marshal to report to the Solicitor General of Canada.</p>	<p>The CF Provost Marshal, the senior Military Police (MP) officer, oversees all serious and sensitive MP investigations and reports directly to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. The CF Provost Marshal is responsible for overseeing all serious and sensitive MP investigations. The CF Provost Marshal will also produce an annual report on the status of military police and investigations within the military, a report which will be</p>	<p>Completed</p>

	made public. The first annual report is due in February 1998 to cover the 1997 time period. Producing an annual report will provide added independence to the MP and increase the transparency of the investigative system. Given the changes noted above, the pitfalls of command influence and conflict of interest should be adequately addressed.	
<b>Somalia 40.11:</b> The Director of Military Police be responsible and accountable to the Chief of the Defence Staff for all Military Police purposes, except for the investigation of major disciplinary or criminal misconduct.	As of 1 July 1997, the CF Provost Marshal was removed from the operational chain of command, to be responsible and accountable to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff for standards of military policing within the Department and CF. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is empowered to set the broad strategic framework for policing, but maintains an arm's-length relationship with the CF Provost Marshal as it pertains to ongoing investigations. Given the increased responsibility of the CF Provost Marshal, the introduction of the CF National Investigation Service, the annual report, the new reporting relationship to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and the proposed introduction of the Military Police Complaints Commission, the pitfalls of command influence and conflict of interest have been addressed. Therefore, there is no need to raise the reporting level to a higher office.	Completed
<b>Somalia 40.12:</b>	Powers of Commanding Officers	Completed

<p>Commanding officers have the power to request Military Police to investigate any misconduct, but commanding officers have no power to control the method of the investigation or limit the resources available to Military Police conducting investigations.</p>	<p>have been clarified with the stand up of the National Investigation Service on 1 September 1997. The CF National Investigation Service is an independent investigative unit with its own integral resources. Only the CF Provost Marshal has a role in allocating resources, which eliminates chain-of-command involvement in investigative resource allocation. The personnel, equipment, and infrastructure required to begin operating the CF National Investigation Service is complete, and the investigative policies and standard operating procedures have been prepared. Further, it is proposed that if the members of the CF National Investigation Service or other MP believe that there has been interference in an investigation by the chain of command, they can complain to the Military Police Complaints Commission.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.13:</b> The Director of Military Police and all Military Police under the command of the Director have a system of ranking different from the general Canadian Forces system, so that Military Police are not seen or treated as subordinate to those they are investigating.</p>	<p>The CF National Investigation Service will be staffed by investigators who are either officers or non-commissioned members. Officer investigators will be the lead investigators when conducting investigations of senior personnel. The perception of intimidation flowing from junior ranks investigating more senior personnel will be eliminated through the new authority of CF National Investigation Service members to lay charges, and through the introduction of the proposed Military Police Complaints Commission. Further, to implement a system of ranking different from the general CF system would only serve to divorce the Military Police from the community they serve.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 40.14:</b> Professional police standards and codes of conduct be developed for Military Police.</p>	<p>As of 1 July 1997, a professional standards directorate began operating within the CF Provost Marshal organization. The directorate is responsible for receiving and investigating complaints about the conduct of a MP. A proposed MP code of conduct is also being developed. Further, to improve and maintain the public confidence in the Military Police and the investigative process, a Military Police Complaints Commission is proposed to receive and investigate complaints concerning the conduct of Military Police and any allegations of interference in investigations by the chain of command. This independent civilian review commission would be similar to other civilian police complaints commissions across Canada.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.15:</b> To give effect to these new policing arrangements, Military Police be given adequate resources and training to allow them to perform their tasks.</p>	<p>The CF Provost Marshal is reviewing all Military Police (MP) specification requirements and all MP training standards with the aim to provide a more structured approach to MP training in general and investigations in particular. Consultations with various civilian agencies are occurring. A secondment exchange program is being developed to provide an opportunity for MPs to acquire investigative expertise either with another police agency or by bringing civilian police agencies' expertise to MP units. Investigative resources are currently being allocated to the CF National Investigation Service to ensure that it can fulfill its mandate. A final report cannot be given until the Military Police Occupational Analysis (OA) is concluded, however, interim action</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/10/1999</p>



	<p>has been taken towards its implementation. The OA began on 15 Aug 98, and is scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99. The OA will impact on this recommendation. Once that impact is known, further action will be taken, with a final report to be completed by 31 Oct 99.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> — ongoing — review of all MP spec reqts and MP tg stds. — Interim action has been taken towards its implementation however, it cannot be concluded until the Security Branch (Military Police) Occupational Analysis (OA) is finished. The OA, scheduled to be completed by 28 May 99, will impact on this recommendation, and therefore it will remain ongoing until that impact is known. — completed — secondment/exchange program has been implemented. — completed — investigative resources given to NIS.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 40.16:</b> Adequate numbers of appropriately trained Military Police accompany Canadian Forces deployments.</p>	<p>It is CF policy to deploy adequate Military Police resources on all CF deployments. For example, two investigators from the CF National Investigation Service were deployed to Haiti with a Military Police platoon.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 40.17:</b> In general, the results of investigations into all types of misconduct — minor disciplinary, major disciplinary or criminal — be reported to the commanding officer of the unit or element to which the Canadian Forces member concerned belongs.</p>	<p>It has always been standard practice for Military Police to advise commanding officers of the results of investigations in which their personnel are involved.</p>	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 40.18:</b> Results of investigations of major disciplinary and criminal misconduct be reported to an independent prosecuting authority under the direction of the Director General of Military Legal Services.</p>	<p>Appropriate command authorities, the CF National Investigation Service, and a proposed independent prosecuting authority would be involved in reviewing investigations of all offences of a serious and sensitive nature. As to the Commission's concept of a Director General of Military Legal Services, see Recommendation 40.35, below.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.20:</b> The commanding officer have the right to lay charges for minor disciplinary misconduct.</p>	<p>Commanding officers and designated unit personnel already have the right to lay charges for minor disciplinary matters. They will keep this charge-laying authority.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.21:</b> An independent prosecuting authority decide whether to lay charges for major disciplinary and criminal misconduct and have the responsibility for laying charges.</p>	<p>A modified version of this recommendation is proposed whereby charges in serious and sensitive cases would usually be laid by the CF National Investigation Service after receiving advice and charge approval from an independent Director of Military Prosecutions. The proposed charge-approval procedure would be similar to that in use in a number of civilian criminal jurisdictions in Canada.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.22:</b> The prosecuting authority be independent in determining whether to charge and prosecute. However, guidelines should be developed to assist in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.</p>	<p>The proposed prosecuting authority would be independent in determining whether to charge or prosecute. The interim policy, which currently exists to assist in exercising the prosecutorial discretion, is being reviewed and will be reissued in final form by the Judge Advocate General. For introduction in Parliament. Ongoing: Amendments to the National.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 40.24:</b> Commanding officers have no authority to dismiss charges laid by the independent military prosecutor.</p>	<p>It is proposed to eliminate the authority of commanding officers to dismiss charges.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.25:</b> The independent military prosecutor have authority to lay charges for minor disciplinary offences when the prosecutor deems it useful to prosecute multiple acts of misconduct, including minor disciplinary misconduct, at the same trial.</p>	<p>It is proposed that independent prosecutors be able to refer charges in these circumstances.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.26:</b> An accused person has a right to counsel when prosecuted for major disciplinary or criminal misconduct.</p>	<p>An accused person at a court martial already has the right to be represented by counsel.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.27:</b> The standard of proof at a trial for major disciplinary or criminal misconduct be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>	<p>The current standard of proof for any service offence at both summary trials and courts martial is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.28:</b> There be no right to counsel in respect of minor disciplinary misconduct, since detention, dismissal or imprisonment would not be a possibility, but the right to counsel may be permitted at the discretion of the commanding officer.</p>	<p>An accused person may be permitted representation by legal counsel at a summary trial, at the discretion of the officer conducting the summary trial.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.31:</b> Punishments such as fine options, community service and conditional sentences, which have been made available in the civilian criminal process, be available within the military for minor and major disciplinary and criminal misconduct.</p>	<p>A study was completed regarding the integration of civilian criminal punishment options into the military justice system. A number of possible alternate forms of punishments including discharges, fine option programs, conditional sentences and intermittent sentences were considered. It was determined that</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 01/09/2001</p>

	<p>many existing military punishments such as "extra work and drill" could be employed to achieve the same objectives as civilian punishments. The changes to legislation which made minor punishments available at court martial added considerable sentencing flexibility. It was determined, however, that there was a requirement to educate presiding officers on the application of many military punishments to obtain the same sentencing goals as contemplated by civilian punishments. The next review of the Manual on Military Justice at the Summary Trial level will include an amendment of Chapter 14 (sentencing) to provide additional guidance to presiding officers. There are no "discharge" provisions presently available under military law. This matter has been referred for inclusion in the ongoing five year review of the National Defence Act mandated in Bill C-25. This review will also include an assessment of the restitution order provisions of the Criminal Code in comparison to those provisions presently available under military law.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 40.32:</b> Formal rules be established to permit appeals of summary trials of minor disciplinary misconduct by way of redress of grievance.</p>	<p>A formal administrative review mechanism for summary trial convictions will be established which will be similar to, but distinct from, the grievance process.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 40.34:</b> The Queen's Regulations and Orders be amended so that the Minister of National Defence has no adjudicative role in redress of grievance matters.</p>	<p>The Minister has directed that action be undertaken to amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders so that the Minister has no adjudicative role in grievance matters.</p>	Completed

**Somalia 40.35:**

The National Defence Act be amended to: 1. Replace the office of the Judge Advocate General with two independent institutions: a. the office of the Chief Military Judge, to assume the judicial functions now performed by the office of the Judge Advocate General; and b. the office of the Director General of Military Legal Services, to assume the prosecution, defence and legal advisory roles now performed by the office of the Judge Advocate General; 2. Specify that the office of the Director General of Military Legal Services consists of three branches: a Directorate of Prosecutions, a Directorate of Advisory Services, and a Directorate of Legal Defence; 3. provide that the Director General of Military Legal Services report to the Minister of National Defence; 4. provide that the Chief Military Judge and all other judges be civilians appointed under the federal Judges Act; and 5. state that judges trying serious disciplinary and criminal misconduct are totally independent of the military chain of command.

It is proposed that the role and functions of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) be set out in statute in order to eliminate potential internal conflicts of interest and to strengthen the institutional independence of its constituent parts. The JAG is and has been for many years organized as recommended by the Commission. The JAG's responsibility to the Minister was recently articulated in a Ministerial Organization Order for the JAG. The Office of the Chief Military Justice has been established as a separate and independent unit. The title of JAG, which is in common use in many foreign militaries that share our military history and traditions (the US service JAGs are the nearest examples), will be retained. One of the strengths of the military justice system, as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of *Généreux*, lies in using military judges with service experience who are familiar with the values and needs of the military community. The Supreme Court considered that neither the CF nor the accused would benefit from the loss of such an asset. Further, the deployability of the military judges, as members of the CF, is a definite asset. The Special Advisory Group (SAG), which recommended that the Minister of National Defence retain the authority to appoint military judges for fixed terms, made that recommendation after concluding that there is no reason to doubt the independence or impartiality of military trial judges. The SAG recommended strengthening further the independence of military judges by making the Chief Military Judge a

Completed



	separate unit. Doing so will reinforce the present independence from the chain of command of military judges while performing their judicial duties.	
<p><b>Somalia 40.39:</b> To the extent that the regulations and orders contained in the Queen's Regulations and Orders and Canadian Forces Administrative Orders can be made public without compromising overriding interests such as national security, the Queen's Regulations and Orders and Canadian Forces Administrative Orders be published in the Canada Gazette.</p>	<p>Queen's Regulations and Orders are currently available in public libraries, court libraries and some university libraries. Copies of Queen's Regulations and Orders may also be purchased from Canada Communications Group. In addition, publication of Queen's Regulations and Orders on the National Defence Internet site is currently being considered. They are not currently required to be published in the Canada Gazette, but consideration is being given to publishing Queen's Regulations and Orders in the Canada Gazette, along with other federal regulations. Canadian Forces Administrative Orders, on the other hand, are orders internal to the CF issued by or under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff. They are not regulations and are analogous to other government policy direction, such as Treasury Board Directives. Canadian Forces Administrative Orders are available to the public on request and, as with Queen's Regulations and Orders, consideration is currently being given to their publication on the National Defence Internet site.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 40.40:</b> Adequate numbers of legal officers be deployed with units to allow them to perform their respective functions — prosecution, defence, advisory — without putting them in situations of conflict of interest.</p>	<p>As a matter of CF policy, legal officers always participate in major deployments. If they are placed in a conflict or perceived conflict situation, then other legal officers are sent to assist.</p>	Completed



<p><b>Somalia 40.41:</b> Legal officers receive increased training in matters of international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict.</p>	<p>Additional resources were allocated to Training in LOAC both for CF as a whole as well as for legal officers. The Office of the Judge Advocate General conducted 4 one week LOAC courses including the first LOAC course in French. Legal officers also attended LOAC/operational law courses conducted by the US Army, Navy and Air Force. Officers also attended international courses at the University of Liverpool, UK and the International Humanitarian Institute in San Remo Italy. Three LOAC Manuals (The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, the CF Code of Conduct and Treaties on the Conduct of Hostilities) were produced for legal officers and the CF as a whole. Training in LOAC will continue as part of the Legal Officer Basic Training and the Legal Officer Intermediate Training programs. The Office of the Judge Advocate General is developing an Operational Law doctrine manual and Operational Law course to be held in 2000.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/10/2000</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.42:</b> Legal officers providing advisory services be deployed on training missions as well as actual operations.</p>	<p>The Judge Advocate General sends legal officers on training missions.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 40.43:</b> Legal officers providing advisory services guide commanding officers and troops on legal issues arising from all aspects of operations, including Rules of Engagement, the Law of Armed Conflict, Canadian Forces Organization Orders and Ministerial Organization Orders.</p>	<p>Legal officers already provide these services.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 40.44:</b> Legal officers providing advisory services educate Canadian Forces members before and during deployment on local law, the Law of Armed Conflict, and Rules of Engagement.</p>	<p>Legal officers participate in all pre-deployment training for both formed units and individual augmentees. Legal officers provide instruction on LOAC and operational law at the Peace Support Training Center. Upon designation as a mission/operation legal advisor, legal officers participate in pre-deployment training as well as provide instruction on ROE, LOAC and operational law. Training in these areas continues throughout the mission.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 40.45:</b> A Law of Armed Conflict section of legal officers be established and staffed as soon as possible within the Office of the Judge Advocate general and moved to the office of the Director General of Military Legal Services once that office is established.</p>	<p>The Directorate of Law/Operations already provides advice on law of armed conflict issues within the Office of the Judge Advocate General.</p>	Completed

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## CHAPTER 6

# OPERATIONAL ISSUES

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Most of the recommendations deemed by the *Monitoring Committee* be "Operational" stem from the Somalia Commission of Inquiry. That Commission, established to investigate misconduct in the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group in Somalia in 1992, focussed on reforms it thought necessary in pre-mission preparation and mission deployment. The *Monitoring Committee* has now had the opportunity to study those changes in CF operations called for by the Somalia Commission and by the former Minister of National Defence, the Hon. Douglas Young, in his March 1997 report to the Prime Minister. This *Committee* has taken a two-part approach to this study. First, we examined changes made in doctrine, in practice, in procedures and in orders regarding mission preparation and deployment. Second, we studied mission preparation, organization and deployment in the field. The latter involved investigative visits to: CFB Gagetown in November 1998 for Exercise Royal Lion (final mission training for ROTO 4 of CCSFOR); CFB Edmonton in June 1999, to investigate preparation and procedures used to mount Canada's original contribution to KFOR; CCSFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in September 1999 to examine the deployment of ROTO 5 and to study pre-deployment preparation.

The *Monitoring Committee's* investigations have led to a conclusion that the great majority of the operational recommendations flowing from the Young and Somalia reports which fall under the purview of the Canadian Forces have been fully implemented. Extensive examinations of DND and CF documentation, backed up by the field visits mentioned above, lead the *Committee* to conclude that many of those recommendations have now become standard CF doctrine and practice.

From September 5 to 10, 1999, *Monitoring Committee* members visited the Canadian Area of Responsibility (AOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina to study the implementation of operational recommendations by ROTO 5 of CCSFOR. The *Committee's* original intention had been to visit the AOR in early April 1999, to follow ROTO 4 from its final pre-deployment training in Exercise Royal Lion into theatre. The air war against Yugoslavia interfered with those plans, forcing the *Committee* to visit ROTO 5 instead. The visit to the AOR was somewhat handicapped by the fact that ROTO 5 had only been deployed a month prior to the visit date, but the difficulties which arose from that situation were largely overcome for two reasons.

The first relates to the fact that both ROTO 4 and ROTO 5 had been trained by 5 CMBG. The second stems from the extra efforts made by the Commander, CCSFOR, and subordinate unit commanders to provide the *Committee* with documentation bearing on pre-deployment training, the screening of personnel, instructions re: chain of command, in-mission training schedules and other important information. The *Committee* is grateful to CCSFOR for the efforts made in this regard.

Observations in this section of the *Final Report* are based primarily on evidence encountered during the September 1999 visit as well as what was observed regarding the CF participation in KFOR as reported in the *Monitoring Committee's 1999 Interim Report*.

Aside from the observations in our *Interim Reports* and this *Final Report* pertaining to the implementation of decisions related to CF operations, the *Committee* has arrived at some conclusion about the overall state of procedures and practices in this area.

The *Committee* found the ROTO 5 contingent to be disciplined, well-ordered, professional, and thorough in carrying out its assigned mission. Rigorous pre-deployment screening of personnel no doubt contributed to this high state of competence, as did both the mission-specific training and the general combat training that preceded it. There were, nonetheless, some areas where strict adherence to the recommendations may have produced inefficiencies in training.

For example, pre-deployment training now is perhaps too lengthy, especially when contrasted with the much shorter package given to augmentees at the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston. It is likely that strict adherence to the letter of the recommendations has led to this situation. It may well be time to revisit and rationalize these procedures. Among subjects which should be addressed are: repetition in training; the emphasis placed on soldierly skills for non-combatants; organization; the tendency to concentrate on 'checklist' activity at the expense of more relevant tasks; and, perhaps most importantly, the identification of training objectives as they relate to desired operational outcomes.

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## Command Structure (Som 17.1-17.5, 25.11, 25.12)

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### Decisions

In his response to the Somalia Report in October 1997, the Minister clarified several aspects of policies relating to the command structure employed by the Department and the Canadian Forces:

- The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is responsible to confirm in doctrine and in orders that the chain of command is the sole mechanism for transmitting orders and directions to the Canadian Forces. The CDS also ensures that staff officers are never part of the chain of command and have no authority to issue orders other than those executed in the name of their respective commanders. Furthermore, the CDS is responsible for the

ongoing improvement of mechanisms for review, confirmation and publishing of the chain of command.

- The integrity of the chain of command is also maintained by the CDS who assures that technical networks, such as legal, medical or engineering specialist networks, are not part of the chain of command.
- The CDS is responsible for the promulgation of guiding principles and concepts for the command of CF contingents on international operations. These guidelines are an inherent part of training for commanders and are used in preparing orders for commanders of specific missions.
- The CDS ensures that CF contingent commanders possess clear orders clarifying the chain of command within the contingent, between the CF contingent and allied commanders, and between the contingent and other elements of the CF.
- National joint staff training would be enhanced and exercised routinely to test and evaluate the performance and integrity of the national chain of command in potential or planned operational scenarios. Exercises would highlight staff procedures, doctrine, planning and the role of staff officers at NDHQ and in the chain of command.
- The recording and management of information would be improved and standardized to track decisions made by senior officers during all stages of planning and operations.

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## DND Status Report

### Recommendation

### Activity

### Status

#### Somalia 17.1:

The Chief of the Defence Staff:

1. confirm in doctrine and in orders that the chain of command is the sole mechanism for transmitting orders and directions to the Canadian Forces; 2. confirm in doctrine and in orders that staff officers are never part of the chain of command and have no authority to issue orders except in the name of their respective commanders; and 3. in the case of a specific operation, improve existing mechanisms for reviewing, confirming and publishing the chain of command.

The Canadian Forces Operations Manual, keystone operational doctrine for the CF, was approved by the Armed Forces Council in June 1997. It includes specific references to the chain of command in operations. Chapter 2 specifically states that "the Chief of the Defence Staff issues orders and instructions to the CF through the chain of command." Furthermore, article 203.4 states that "the commander at each level responds to orders and direction received from a higher authority and, in turn, issues orders and direction to subordinates." Additionally, the CF Force Employment Manual provides strategic level direction on the issuance of orders to the Canadian Forces. Chapter 7 of the Canadian Forces Operations

Completed



Manual states that the "staff must never interfere with or impede the relationship between a senior and subordinate commander." Article 206 of The Canadian Forces Operations Manual requires that the command-and-control arrangements, method of command and level of command authority, be determined in the planning process and provided as part of the strategic guidance and direction given to a Task Force commander.

### **Somalia 17.2:**

The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that technical networks, such as legal, medical or engineering specialist networks, do not interfere with or confuse the chain of command between commanders.

Technical support networks are necessary to facilitate the distribution of specialist advice. Action has been taken to ensure that technical networks do not interfere with the chain of command and are only used to pass technical information. For example, within the Land Force, Branch advisor roles have been clarified in an April 1997 Commander Land Staff directive, which states that "these appointments are advisory only with respect to the chain of command."

Completed

### **Somalia 17.3:**

The Chief of the Defence Staff establish general concepts and principles for the command of Canadian Forces contingents on international operations. These concepts and principles should then be instilled through training and used to frame particular orders for commanders of specific missions.

These concepts are included in Chapter 8 of The Canadian Forces Operations Manual. In addition, all existing instructions to Commanders of deployed operations have been updated. These instructions, as well as a number of new ones, have been consolidated in DCDS Instructions to Commanders of Canadian Forces Deployed Operations. This manual encompasses all vital command, accountability and support concepts and principles related specifically to deployed operations. This manual will be the

Completed

basis for the formulation of orders by the Joint Staff and, as such, will be routinely used in staff training. Approval in Mar 98.

**Somalia 17.4:**

For greater clarity, and to remedy deficiencies in existing practices the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all commanders of Canadian Forces contingents destined for international operations are given operations orders concerning the chain of command: 1. within the contingent; 2. between the Canadian Forces contingent and allied commanders; and 3. between the deployed contingent and the Chief of the Defence Staff or subordinate commanders.

A chain of command is outlined for every operation. The Canadian Forces Operations Manual outlines overall doctrine, the CF Force Employment Manual provides specific direction and each commander's terms of reference set out his/her specific relationships.

Completed

**Somalia 17.5:**

The Chief of the Defence Staff conduct national training exercises routinely to test and evaluate the Canadian Forces chain of command in likely or planned operational settings.

A newly published plan provides direction on national joint staff training. In conjunction with National Defence Headquarter's annual joint staff orientation briefings in the fall of 1997, senior departmental and CF leadership will participate in EXERCISE STRATEGIC STAR to test responsibilities and duties in planning and conducting operations. Continuity training will take place through periodic crisis-management exercises. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff's National Lessons Learned Cell will monitor and evaluate these training activities.

Completed

**Somalia 25.11:**

The Chief of the Defence Staff conduct training and evaluation exercises to prepare and test staff procedures, doctrine, planning and staff officers in National Defence Headquarters and in the chain of command.

A strategic-level training exercise will be conducted annually at National Defence Headquarters as part of the National Joint Training Plan. This exercise is designed to test Departmental and CF senior leadership and mid-level staff officers with the operational planning and staff procedures necessary for effective staff planning. Additional continuity training and evaluation of the operational planning process will take place for all joint staff training activities and operations.

Completed

**Somalia 25.12:**

The Chief of the Defence Staff establish a uniform system for recording decisions taken by senior officers during all stages of planning for operations. The records maintained under this system should include a summary of the actions and decisions of officers and identify them by rank and position. The records should include important documents related to the history of the operation, including such things as estimates, reconnaissance reports, central discussions, orders, and casualty and incident reports.

At the strategic level, procedures have been implemented as part of the review of Headquarters Defence Plan 900, to ensure that the National Defence Operations Centre is established as the central information-tracking agency. This process will be facilitated by the implementation of the Joint Command Control and Intelligence System. Operational commanders have been given direction, in the DCDS Instruction to Commanders of CF Deployed Operations, on the nature of documentation that has to be maintained. As for specific war-diary requirements, they are contained in CF Administrative Order 71.7, and amplifying instructions will be given in operations orders.

Completed

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**Observations**

The *Committee's* September 1999 visit to Bosnia verified our observations in the 1999 *Interim Report* that the ministerial decisions in this area have been implemented appropriately.

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**Accepting the Mission** (Som 24.3, .4, .6, .7, 25.13-25.16)

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**Decisions**

In October 1997, the Minister made decisions and clarified policy relating to how military advice is gathered and used in the decision-making process leading up to the acceptance of a proposed mission. The Department of National Defence, through the Minister, provides a comprehensive statement of how peace support operations guidelines and criteria apply to a proposed operation. Furthermore:

- If possible, the CF carries out a detailed reconnaissance for every new mission.
- Canadian participation in United Nations peace support operations is contingent upon a mission analysis based on several military requirements.
- The Government of Canada advocates reform of United Nations operational procedures and planning.
- The CDS and DND in general maintain established guidelines relating to defining missions and matching force requirements to those missions and objectives before committing to them.

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**DND Status Report**

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Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 24.3:</b> In briefings or advice to the Government relating to participation in a peace support operation, the Government of Canada requires a comprehensive statement of how the peace support operations guidelines and criteria apply to the proposed operation.	In the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Government identified a number of key guidelines which it noted should be reflected in the design of all missions. These guidelines are referred to in the Minister's advice to the Government when seeking approval for operations. In addition, references to the Chief of the Defence Staff's military advice are now clearly highlighted in all such submissions.	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 24.4:</b> Whenever circumstances permit, it is standard practice for the CF to carry out a detailed reconnaissance for every new mission. This requirement has been emphasized in the CF Operations Process.</p>	<p>The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff has developed and promulgated doctrine to guide the planning, participation, and conduct of peace-support operations. This doctrine is approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff through the Armed Forces Council, and appears in the Canadian Forces Operations Manual. In addition, work has begun on developing additional Peace Support Operations Doctrine. The CF Operations Process Manual is being updated to reflect lessons learned. Instructions to commanders are being modified to cover all CF operations, not just peace support operations. The lessons learned process is being improved for more timely analysis and application.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 24.6:</b> The Government of Canada adopt the policy that Canadian participation in United Nations peace support operations is contingent upon: 1. Completion of a detailed mission analysis by the Chief of the Defence Staff each time Canada is asked to participate in a peace support operation; and 2. inclusion in the mission analysis of the following elements: a determination of troop strengths, unit configuration, resource requirements, and weapons and other capabilities.</p>	<p>It is current policy to send an assessment team, either by including Canadian officers within a UN reconnaissance team or by sending a national contingent to the mission theatre, every time Canada considers participating in a peace support operation. The assessment team evaluates the situation in theatre so that the planning staff can develop a mission analysis. This document includes a risk and threat analysis, as well as analysis of what are the best options regarding Canada's participation, including determination of troop strength, unit configuration, resource requirements and other needed capabilities.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

**Somalia 24.7:**

The Government of Canada, as part of its foreign and defence policy, advocate reform within the United Nations, particularly in the following areas: 1. development of a process to ensure that the mandates of United Nations operations, as adopted by the United Nations Security Council, are clear, enforceable and capable of achieving the goals of the mission; and 2. Development of a process to enhance the current planning structure at the United Nations in order to improve co-ordination of peace support operations through proper development of concepts of operations and strategic planning.

Canada is a leader in advocating reform in the United Nations (UN). Canada has been at the forefront of nations advocating that Security Council mandates are clear, enforceable, and capable of achieving the goals of a mission. Considerable peacekeeping expertise has been used to advise the UN Secretariat and the Security Council on what is sufficient, enforceable, and achievable. Moreover, when the United Nations failed to take into consideration DND concerns when renewing the mandate for Rwanda in December 1995, the government declined to participate. Canada will continue to work for reform with respect to both the substance of UN mandates and the process by which they are developed. With respect to planning, the Canadian government tabled a report at the 50th UN General Assembly in September 1995, entitled Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. This report include a recommendation on creating a rapidly deployable mission headquarters. This headquarters would strengthen the current planning structure at the UN by doing strategic planning between deployments. To assist the UN directly, Canada also provides, on a secondment basis, CF officers to the UN Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As employees of the UN, these officers provide knowledge and expertise, and assist the UN Secretariat in developing appropriate military advice in the formation of peacekeeping-related processes.

Completed



<p><b>Somalia 25.13:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff or the Chief of the Defence Staff's designated commander identify and clarify the mission goals and objectives before commencing calculation of the force estimate.</p>	<p>This requirement is now covered in the CF Force Employment Manual, which indicates that mission goals and objectives will be clarified before finalizing the force estimate.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.14:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff base the force estimate for a given mission on the capacity of the Canadian Forces to fulfil the demands of the operation, as determined after a mission analysis has been completed and before recommending that Canadian Forces be committed for deployment.</p>	<p>The force estimate process uses a capability-based approach, which identifies the ability to meet the mission objectives and highlights any areas of risk.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.15:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop a formal process to review force requirements once any Canadian Forces unit or element arrives in an operational theatre.</p>	<p>A process already exists and has been formalized in the DCDS Instructions to Commanders of Deployed Operations, which specifically state that staff inspection visits will be conducted to identify or resolve functional problems that are beyond the purview of the deployed force. Normally, these visits will take place six weeks after the contingent's arrival in theatre; however, the force commander may bring specific problem areas to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff's attention at any time.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.16:</b> To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, before committing forces</p>	<p>A clear military mission with defined tasks, as well as a military estimate, are required elements of</p>	<p>Completed</p>

to an international operation, commanders should: 1. clearly establish the military mission as well as the tasks necessary to achieve the mission; 2. return to the practice of preparing military estimates before developing the organization and composition of forces to be employed in operational theatres; 3. be required to undertake a thorough reconnaissance of the specific area where the forces are to deploy; and 4. accept that in the interests of deploying a force that is appropriate, well balanced and durable, proper estimates of the requirements be completed before forces are committed and personnel ceilings are imposed.

the CF Force Employment Manual. Furthermore, a contingent commander can address deficiencies at any time but must present a formal report on any deficiencies within 90 days. Whenever circumstances permit, it is standard practice for the CF to carry out a detailed reconnaissance for every new mission. The CF will not commit to deployment of forces that are insufficient or inadequate to carry out the proposed mission. Proper estimates are always completed before forces are committed and personnel ceilings are imposed.

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## Observations

The *Committee's* visit to Bosnia confirms that most of the activity detailed in the status report is now standard practice. The *Committee* is not convinced, however, that sufficient attention is always given to mission analysis in the preparation of military advice and estimates for new missions.

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## Operational Planning (Som 25.1, .2, .8, .9, .17-.19, .22-.26)

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### Decisions

The Minister's response to the Somalia Report dealt with the Somalia Inquiry's concerns and recommendations involving operational planning. The Minister indicated that the CDS would reinforce the primary importance of battle procedure (the process used by commanders to select, warn, organize and deploy troops for missions) as the proper basis for operational training at all levels. This principle, the Minister stated, would be emphasized in staff training. Furthermore, where differences exist between Canadian principles of planning, commanding and conducting operations and those that may come into force when the CF deploys on an international operation, the CDS must clarify which are to be followed. To further this reasoned and rational basis for operational planning, and accountability therein, all plans are to be evaluated at all levels before deployment. Plans and procedures and, ultimately, conduct of operational deployment, are to be based on standing operating procedures, as determined by

the CDS.

Recognizing the distinction between requirements for combat operations and peace support operations, the Minister decided to develop mission-specific doctrine to guide the intelligence-gathering process for each case. The CDS is responsible to ensure that an appropriate number of intelligence personnel and intelligence support personnel is determined as part of planning doctrine. Of some significance, the Government of Canada decided to lobby the United Nations to expand its peacekeeping planning division to include an intelligence organization to support peace support operations.

The Minister also addressed logistical issues. The CDS is responsible for ensuring that logistical requirements for a mission are determined only after the size and composition of the CF force are finalized, and a reconnaissance of the ground is complete. Any changes to the site of a given mission must be based on military considerations. Finally, a National Support Element, essentially an integrated support unit, is established as a separate unit of every CF force deployed on a mission.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 25.1:</b> To redress the planning problems earmarked by the Somalia mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff reinforce the importance of battle procedure (the process commanders use to select, warn, organize, and deploy troops for missions) as the proper foundation for operational planning at all levels of the Canadian Forces, and that the importance of systematic planning based on battle procedure be emphasized in staff training courses.	The Canadian Forces Operations Process Manual has just been totally revised and will be reissued by spring of 1998. This document clearly establishes the steps and sequence to be followed for operational planning, and is the basis for instruction at CF staff training institutions.	Completed
<b>Somalia 25.2:</b> Contrary to recent experience, the	Planning factors have been consolidated in the Canadian Forces	Completed

<p>Chief of the Defence Staff enunciate the principles that apply to planning, commanding and conducting operations by the Canadian Forces in each international operation where these differ from national principles of planning, commanding and conducting operations.</p>	<p>Operations Process Manual, presently under final review and to be reissued by spring of 1998. Notwithstanding, each operation brings its own unique planning circumstances which must be assessed when preparing individual estimates.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 25.8:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all plans for the employment of the Canadian Forces be subject to operational evaluations at all levels before operational deployment. The CF Operations Process used by all levels of Headquarters provides an operations plan for every deployment.</p>	<p>In parallel, operational training before deployment ensures that troops arrive in theatre prepared for their assigned mission. Operational evaluations are conducted before every operational deployment of CF elements and periodically for contingency plans, except when circumstances absolutely preclude an evaluation taking place. In cases where operational evaluations may have to be cancelled, commanders at all levels are to consider the level of training achieved and assess the risks before approving the deployment.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.9:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish standing operating procedures for 1. planning, testing and deploying Canadian Forces in domestic or international operations; and 2. the conduct of operations by the Canadian Forces in domestic or international operations.</p>	<p>The National Defence Headquarters Plan (HQDP 900) authorizes and describes the staffing of operations in National Defence Headquarters which apply to day-to-day operations as well as to crisis, emergencies short of war and war situations. This plan is being replaced to provide National Defence Headquarters with improved standard operating procedures for planning and conducting operations. The first draft of Volume 2 of Joint Staff Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) completed September 1999 and covers processes, activities and Joint Staff procedures. Volume 1 will be completed December 1999 and will cover authority,</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/12/1999</p>

	responsibility, concept of ops and general organization. Volume 3 is under development and will cover staff orientation and training. These Joint Staff SOPS complement the new Canadian Forces Operations Manual (B-GG-005-004/AF-000) and the Canadian Forces Force Employment Manual (B-GG-005-004/AF-004). Operational plans will be used as the basis for training activities, thus achieving a considerable degree of validation.	
<p><b>Somalia 25.17:</b></p> <p>Intelligence-gathering process for all peace support operations, to be separate and distinct from the doctrine covering intelligence gathering for combat. This doctrine should include: 1. a statement confirming the purpose and principles of intelligence gathering for all peace support operations, from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Where required, a differentiation would be made between the strategic stage, the decision-making stage, and the operational planning stage of the operation; 2. a statement confirming the sources of information appropriate for use in the intelligence-gathering process; 3. a section outlining anticipated use of intelligence in peace support operations, during both the decision-making stage and the operational planning stage; 4. a section outlining the intelligence planning process during the various stages of planning, establishing what needs to be done and by whom, including any procedures required to develop an intelligence plan for the mission or intelligence support for the training of troops; and 5. a section</p>	<p>The government recognized the inadequacies in 1992 of intelligence doctrine relating to peace-support operations, and the process of implementing improvements is well underway. Canadian Forces Publication (CFP 315-002), Land Force Intelligence, provisionally issued in June 1997, has incorporated a chapter on intelligence support to peace support operations. This new doctrine addresses most of the proposals in Recommendation 25.17.</p>	Completed



describing the dissemination process for all stages, including the manner of dissemination.		
<p><b>Somalia 25.18:</b> The Government of Canada urge the United Nations to expand its peacekeeping planning division to include an intelligence organization within the secretariat that would serve to co-ordinate the intelligence required for peace support operations, including maintenance of an information base on unstable regions available for use by troop-contributing countries.</p>	<p>The United Nations Situation Centre, which includes an information coordination section, supports the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations and continues to receive information from nations, including Canada. Although the United Nations (UN) still has no integral intelligence capability and must rely solely upon contributing nations for intelligence support, the new Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters being formed at the UN, a result of Canada's UN Rapid Reaction Study initiative, will include a senior intelligence officer on permanent staff.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 25.19:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that planning doctrine includes appropriate assessment methodology to determine sufficient numbers of intelligence personnel and intelligence support personnel (interpreters) for the operation. In accordance with existing doctrine, the presence of intelligence personnel in the advance party should be ensured.</p>	<p>Each peace-support mission has different intelligence support requirements. During the planning process, the Director General Intelligence convenes a contingency planning staff, including all participating agencies, to determine the intelligence requirements for that specific mission. These requirements are then submitted to the Joint Staff and appropriate commanders for approval. Ultimately, the size of the intelligence element will depend on the mission and associated force-structure considerations. The need to include intelligence personnel in an advance party is recognized and included in the mission plan.</p>	Completed



<p><b>Somalia 25.22:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff review the organization and process for intelligence planning to ensure maximum communication and efficiency in the intelligence-gathering and dissemination processes.</p>	<p>The CF has developed a comprehensive information technology program to ensure adequate electronic receipt and distribution of intelligence. Computer networks already link National Defence Headquarters with all CF operational headquarters, deployed forces, selected Allies, and NATO. These networks facilitate the timely exchange of intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This is a very dynamic process, with constant upgrades and refinements to improve the networks and their capabilities.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.23:</b> To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that logistical planning is finalized only after the mission concept is developed, the size and composition of the Canadian contingent is estimated, and a full reconnaissance of the area of operations has been undertaken.</p>	<p>Recent financial and material initiatives, as well as changes to the CF Force Employment Manual, have resulted in logistics planning being better tailored to the mission. More specifically, the revised CF Force Employment Manual directs that the concept of operations, including service support, be developed simultaneously at the strategic and operational-planning levels. This "concept of operations" includes an estimate of the size and composition of the contingent to be deployed and is usually completed after a full reconnaissance has been completed. An operations order is developed from the concept and released; following this, an administrative order or logistics plan is developed and released.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 25.24:</b></p> <p>The Chief of the Defence Staff provide guidelines stipulating that sufficient time be taken to assess any changes in areas of operation. Such guidelines should include the stipulation that military considerations are paramount in decisions to change the proposed mission site after materiel has been packed and logistics planning completed for the original site.</p>	<p>Further to Recommendation 25.23 above, the revised CF Operations Process Manual also directs that operations officers develop a review process which includes identifying the plan's major premises so that, should they change, the planning process would start over again. Changes in areas of operations and in missions are two aspects which would trigger a review. Resource limitations reinforce the need for national oversight of changes in missions and areas of operations. Details will be published in the new manual, DCDS Instructions to Commanders of Canadian Forces Deployed Operations, to be issued by November 1997.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.25:</b></p> <p>When a change in mission is contemplated, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that new logistical contingency plans are completed before the new mission is undertaken.</p>	<p>See Recommendation 25.23 and 25.24 above. The revised CF Operations Process Manual will ensure that new logistical contingency plans are completed as required.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.26:</b></p> <p>The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that a National Support Element (that is, an integrated logistics support unit) is included as a separate unit at the commencement of every mission undertaken by the Canadian Forces.</p>	<p>This recommendation has been incorporated into CF doctrine, which states: "The National Support Element will be an independent command within a Canadian Forces contingent when the Canadian Forces commitment to a Multi-National Force is unit-size or greater." This has been the practice since Somalia, as demonstrated by the existence of National Support Elements in CF contingents deployed to Bosnia and Haiti.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

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### Observations

In its 1999 *Interim Report* the *Committee* noted its satisfaction that CF doctrine met the requirements of operational planning decisions. The *Committee* has not encountered sufficient evidence to confirm that all objectives under the purview of the CDS have been met in the areas of:

- establishment of standard operating procedures for planning, testing and deploying the CF;
- the gathering of intelligence for peace support operations;
- the paramouncy of military considerations in decisions to change mission sites; and
- preparation of logistical contingency plans before undertaking new missions.

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### Operational Chain of Command (Som 25.3-25.7, 25.10)

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#### Decisions

In October 1997, the Minister confirmed that Canadian military standards and criteria are the basis for national, full and operational commands in the CF. When deployed, mission commanders are provided concrete orders and terms of reference by the CDS, which are related to mission statement, terms of employment, the chain of command and how support elements fit into the mission. The Minister also stated that the CDS would clarify the DCDS's place in the chain of command, and relevant duties and responsibilities as they apply. To address the concerns of the Somalia Inquiry, the Minister announced that the CDS would establish better control and administration of the CF, in keeping with a responsibility already outlined in the *National Defence Act*. The CDS would also be responsible for supplying deployed commanders with "precise orders and unambiguous reporting requirements and lines to ensure that Canadian laws and norms are respected." The Minister emphasized that the CDS is already responsible for setting out the criteria for the selection, employment and terms of reference for CF contingent commanders.

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
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<p><b>Somalia 25.3:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all states of command, such as national command, full command and operational command, are defined on the basis of Canadian military standards and criteria.</p>	<p>These definitions originate from agreed NATO terminology and are clearly defined in Chapter 2 of the Canadian Forces Operations Manual. These definitions are the basis of command relationships in multinational operations, are well understood and are taught in professional education institutions. They are considered as fully meeting Canada's military standards and criteria. The specific aspect raised in Chapter 25 of the Somalia Commission's report deals with the commander's responsibilities for national command. It is standard practice for the Chief of the Defence Staff to provide the national commander with terms of reference which delineate the relationship between the national commander and the multinational commander.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.4:</b> For each international operation, the Chief of the Defence Staff issue clear and concrete orders and terms of reference to guide commanders of Canadian Forces units and elements deployed on those operations. These should address, among other things, the mission statement, terms of employment, command relationships, and support relationships.</p>	<p>The Chief of the Defence Staff issues terms of reference to commanders of CF deployed operations which address the recommended areas. Under current doctrine, supplemental guidance may be provided separately, as this was the case during the recent municipal elections in Bosnia.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.5:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and, in particular, identify precisely when the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is or is not in the chain of command.</p>	<p>The Chief of the Defence Staff exercises command and control of all CF deployed operations. Terms of reference for the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff are clarified in the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability document which gives the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff the "responsibility to</p>	<p>Completed</p>

	<p>coordinate on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff, strategic-level operational planning and Chief of the Defence Staff operational direction to the Commander in the field."<sup>2</sup> Specifically related to the chain of command, the document also indicates that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for exercising command and control of non-routine and contingency operations on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 25.6:</b> In light of the Somalia experience, the Chief of the Defence Staff assert the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff under the National Defence Act, to establish better "control and administration" of the Canadian Forces, taking appropriate steps to ensure that the Chief of the Defence Staff has adequate staff assistance to carry out this duty.</p>	<p>Measures that will improve the command, control, and administration of the CF in response to supporting operational missions have been underway for sometime. In addition to the recent clarification of individual responsibilities in the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability document, the activities of the Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT) during the past three years have focused on creating a more efficient and effective command and control structure, with the resources and staff necessary to support CF activity. Directly related to this activity, the Chief of the Maritime, Land and Air Staffs are now collocated in National Defence Headquarters. This leads to better co-ordination, which will significantly enhance all activities related to supporting deployed forces.</p>	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 25.7:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff provide commanders deployed on operations with precise orders and unambiguous reporting requirements and lines to ensure that Canadian laws and norms are respected.</p>	<p>Section 6 of Chapter 3 of the DCDS Instruction to Commanders of Canadian Forces Deployed Operations specifies clearly those reports and returns that must be provided. Chapter 1 further outlines the code of conduct for CF personnel, which states that all personnel "are legally bound by a national Code of Conduct, based on the Criminal Code of Canada and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 25.10:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish principles, criteria and policies governing the selection, employment and terms of reference for commanders appointed to command Canadian Forces units or elements in domestic or international operations.</p>	<p>As described in Chapter 3 of the DCDS Instructions to Commanders of Canadian Forces Deployed Operations, the Contingent commander is normally the senior officer in theatre and is appointed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, who considers the nature of the mission and the qualifications of nominated personnel in deciding who should be selected. Additionally, it is now standard operating procedure to issue terms of reference to commanders of contingents deployed on CF operations. With respect to the selection of commanders appointed to command Canadian Forces units, a new formal selection process is now in place. The new process is intended to ensure leaders have the appropriate experience, education and training, and that only the best are selected for command and senior leadership.</p>	<p>Completed</p>



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**Observations**

The *Committee* is satisfied that ministerial decisions relating to operational chain of command have been implemented appropriately both in doctrine and in practice.

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**Pre-Deployment Training and Operational Readiness** (Som 21.1-21.18; 23.1-23.10)

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**Decisions**

In October 1997, the Minister announced a number of decisions related to the standardization of pre-deployment training for peace support operations. These initiatives include mission-specific training, the allocation of sufficient time for such training and the systematic compilation and dissemination of lessons learned into doctrine and practice. Pre-deployment training is also to be carried out on the basis of a clearly defined mission and statement of tasks. The Minister also stated that, while not accepting a recommendation of the Somalia Inquiry that the CDS submit a formal declaration to the Government regarding the readiness of specific units to undertake given missions, the objectives of the recommendation would be achieved by other means. In addressing the concerns of the Somalia Inquiry, the Minister stated that the CDS would develop a protocol to ensure the appropriate participation of intelligence staff in cultural training programs for deploying units.

Environmental Chiefs of Staff, for instance, must declare units operationally ready before being deployed by the CDS, who is accountable to the Minister for such decisions. The Minister also verified that the CDS has a staff which conducts spot-checks of selected commands, units and sub-units of the CF.

The CDS is responsible for the standardization of format, information and directions involved in declarations of operational readiness. These, in turn, must be signed-off by commanders. Measurements for the various components of 'operational readiness' evaluations were also to be established by the CDS, in conjunction with replacing the Operational Readiness Evaluation System by a "more reliable and efficient process." This new process would give senior commanders and staff officers a "real-time" picture of the operational readiness of major CF units as related to their assigned tasks. The reporting system would measure and evaluate the degrees of effectiveness of given units (i.e., high, medium, low), in order to determine readiness for a given mission.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>Somalia 21.1:</b> The Canadian Forces training philosophy be recast to recognize that a core of non-traditional military training designed specifically for peace support operations (and referred to as generic peacekeeping training) must be provided along with general purpose combat training to prepare Canadian Forces personnel adequately for all operational missions and tasks.</p>	<p>Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic training for peace-support operations, along with general-purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs and ethics. These changes are part of the MND's report recommendations and the work already underway focuses on the following: reviewing the Canadian Forces College (CFC) curricula to ensure proper emphasis is placed on operations in the spectrum of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war; extending basic training from 8 to 10 weeks to ensure new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent; formalizing pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of all candidates is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, environmental stewardship, employment equity and ethics; and placing greater emphasis on training in the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement for all officers through the Officer Professional Development Program and related examinations, courses offered by CFC and instruction at environmental training institutions.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/2000</p>

<p><b>Somalia 21.2:</b></p> <p>Generic peacekeeping training become an integral part of all Canadian Forces training at both the individual (basic, occupational and leadership) and collective levels, with appropriate allocations of resources in terms of funding, people and time.</p>	<p>Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic training for peace-support operations, along with general-purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs and ethics. These changes are part of the MND's report recommendations and the work already underway focuses on the following: reviewing the Canadian Forces College (CFC) curricula to ensure proper emphasis is placed on operations in the spectrum of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war; extending basic training from 8 to 10 weeks to ensure new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent; formalizing pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of all candidates is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, environmental stewardship, employment equity and ethics; and placing greater emphasis on training in the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement for all officers through the Officer Professional Development Program and related examinations, courses offered by CFC and instruction at environmental training institutions.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/2000</p>
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<p><b>Somalia 21.3:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff order a study to determine how best to integrate the full range of knowledge, skills, attitudes and values required for peace support operations at all stages of individual and collective training for both officers and non-commissioned members.</p>	<p>Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic training for peace-support operations, along with general-purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs and ethics. These changes are part of the MND's report recommendations and the work already underway focuses on the following: reviewing the Canadian Forces College (CFC) curricula to ensure proper emphasis is placed on operations in the spectrum of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war; extending basic training from 8 to 10 weeks to ensure new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent; formalizing pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of all candidates is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, environmental stewardship, employment equity and ethics; and placing greater emphasis on training in the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement for all officers through the Officer Professional Development Program and related examinations, courses offered by CFC and instruction at environmental training institutions.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/2000</p>
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<p><b>Somalia 21.4:</b></p> <p>The Canadian Forces recognize, in doctrine and practice, that peace support operations require mental preparation and conditioning that differ from what is required for conventional warfare, and that the training of Canadian Forces members must provide for the early and continuous development of the values, attitudes and orientation necessary to perform all operational missions, including peace support operations.</p>	<p>Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic training for peace-support operations, along with general-purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs and ethics. These changes are part of the MND's report recommendations and the work already underway focuses on the following: reviewing the Canadian Forces College (CFC) curricula to ensure proper emphasis is placed on operations in the spectrum of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war; extending basic training from 8 to 10 weeks to ensure new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent; formalizing pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of all candidates is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, environmental stewardship, employment equity and ethics; and placing greater emphasis on training in the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement for all officers through the Officer Professional Development Program and related examinations, courses offered by CFC and instruction at environmental training institutions.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/1999</p>
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<p><b>Somalia 21.5:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the development of comprehensive training policies and programs for peace support operations makes greater use of a broad range of sources, including peacekeeping training guidelines and policies developed by the UN and member states, and the training provided by police forces and international aid organizations.</p>	<p>In addition to support provided by the recently opened Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the Joint Doctrine and Training Staff at National Defence Headquarters also maintains contact with the United Nations (UN) Training Division. UN and member states were consulted while developing the training standards for peace-support operations. Selected CF personnel attend a variety of international peacekeeping courses and fora to determine if different nations have better concepts or methods that may benefit Canada. Examples include participation in the annual peacekeeping training exercise in Camberly, United Kingdom (UK) and joint conferences with the UN, USA, UK, France, etc. on the development of peacekeeping doctrine. A Memorandum of Understanding has been signed with CARE Canada for the attachment of an officer, commencing in late 1997. Each officer will be posted for a six-month period. The aim of this agreement is to enhance military and civilian collaboration in responding to international humanitarian emergencies.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 21.6:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff order that the mandates of all Canadian Forces institutions and programs involved in education and training be reviewed with a view to enhancing and formalizing peace support operations training objectives.</p>	<p>Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic peacekeeping training along with general-purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs and ethics. These changes are part of the MND</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 30/09/2000</p>



	<p>report recommendations and the work already underway focuses on the following: reviewing of the Canadian Forces College (CFC) curricula to ensure proper emphasis on operations in the spectrum of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war; extending basic training from 8 to 10 weeks to ensure new recruits better understand the ethics, responsibilities, traditions and values to which they are expected to subscribe and which, as Canadians in uniform, they represent; formalizing pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of all candidates is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, environmental stewardship, employment equity and ethics; and placing greater emphasis on training in the laws of armed conflict and rules of Engagement for all officers through the Officer Professional Development Program and related examinations, courses offered by CFC and instruction at environmental training institutions.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (1):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: 1. Continuing development of doctrine respecting the planning, organization, conduct and evaluation of peace support operations training;</p>	<p>The Canadian Forces Operations Manual (B-GG-005-004/AF-000) and the Canadian Forces Force Employment Manual (B-GG-005-004/AF-004) provide general guidelines. Work is in progress to create a strategic manual on peace support doctrine, as recently authorized by the CF Doctrine Board. To provide an interim solution, CF educational institutions will be issued A Guide to Peace Support Operations, developed by the Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/11/1999</p>

	International Studies at Brown University. This publication is in use in the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands.	
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (2):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions:</p> <p>2. Development of comprehensive and detailed training standards and standardized training packages for all components of peace support operations training;</p>	In December 1996, new peace-support training standards were published to promote effective, focussed training for peace-support operations. These standards address, for example, issues such as intervention between hostile factions, monitoring for violations, application of force and conduct of investigations.	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (3):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: 3. Timely distribution of current doctrine and training materials to all personnel tasked with planning and implementing peace support operations training, and to all units warned for peace support operations duty;</p>	All CF units hold existing doctrine manuals within their unit libraries. New or amended doctrine manuals are distributed electronically to command doctrine staff who, in turn, distribute them to units and formations under their control. This ensures that current doctrine is available before the formal publication and distribution process. Doctrine will also be placed on the Defence Intranet, as well as the Internet, for public access.	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (4):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: 4. Timely development and distribution of mission-specific information and materials for use in pre-deployment</p>	Staffs currently make every effort, within the time constraints of each mission, to develop and distribute the necessary information. However, this task can sometimes be complicated by a decision to deploy into areas where little or no familiarity exists. In these cases, the CF must rely on external agencies for information.	Completed

training;		
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (5):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: 5. Systematic compilation and analysis of lessons learned, and updating of doctrine and training materials in that light;</p>	<p>Lessons Learned Cells are standard practice in the sea, land and air environments. In addition, at the strategic level in National Defence Headquarters, a Lessons Learned Cell was established in May 1996 as part of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff doctrine and training organization, to ensure that operational lessons learned can be quickly transferred into doctrine and training.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (6):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: 6. Systematic monitoring and evaluation of training to ensure that it is conducted in accordance with established doctrine and standards; and</p>	<p>The Chiefs of the Maritime, Land and Air Staffs, as part of their declaration of operational readiness, must consider the level of training as a key factor. As a fundamental principle, training is based on doctrine.</p>	Completed
<p><b>Somalia 21.7 (7):</b> Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: 7. Provision of specialist assistance as required by units in their pre-deployment preparations.</p>	<p>The Peace Support Training Centre opened in July 1996 as the centre of excellence for pre-deployment training for all peace-support missions. The Centre conducts provides advice and assistance to formations and units in conducting pre-deployment training at the tactical level. Some of the topics covered by the Centre are land-mine awareness, cultural awareness, investigation techniques, negotiation, mediation, and some language training. The National Defence Headquarters rules of engagement team, with specialist staff assistance, conducts</p>	Completed

	visits to units before deployment.	
<b>Somalia 21.8:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff oversee the development of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training in the Law of Armed Conflict and the Rules of Engagement, and in intercultural and intergroup relations, negotiation and conflict resolution; and ensure continuing training in these skills for all members of the Canadian Forces.	A training package is being developed to implement these recommendations. DND has adopted Law of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, intercultural and intergroup relations, negotiation and conflict resolution as important subject areas for the professional development of personnel. Some interim training has already taken place and progress is being made in clearly defining the needs of CF personnel in these areas.	Expected completion date: 01/09/2000
<b>Somalia 21.9:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the time and resources necessary for training a unit to a state of operational readiness be assessed before committing that unit's participation in a peace support operation.	The length of the training period depends on mission requirements, a military risk assessment, the state of assigned forces, training and the availability of resources. For example, as a general rule, the Land Force uses three months as a guideline for meeting training requirements. However, there are circumstances where the humanitarian considerations outweigh time constraints. Decisions to shorten the optimal training requirements or to conduct remedial training are made at the appropriate level in the chain of command.	Completed
<b>Somalia 21.10:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff integrate a minimum standard period of time for pre-deployment	When the urgency of a situation requires that training time be compressed, a command decision on what training is necessary and a	Completed

<p>training into the planning process.</p> <p>In exceptional cases, where it may be necessary to deploy with a training period shorter than the standard minimum, the senior officers responsible should prepare a risk analysis for approval by the Chief of the Defence Staff. In addition, a plan should be developed to compensate for the foreshortened training period, such as making provision for the enhanced supervision of pre-deployment training activities, a lengthened acclimatization period, and supplementary in-theatre training.</p>	<p>review of the risk associated with its omission is made and endorsed by the chain of command. The Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for approving mission deployment, after carefully analyzing the risks involved. Alternative arrangements to compensate for the reduced training are also considered and incorporated whenever possible.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 21.11:</b></p> <p>The Chief of the Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and policy the recognition of sufficient and appropriate training as a key aspect of operational readiness.</p>	<p>This recommendation has been implemented in Chapter 6 of the Canadian Forces Operations Manual: "Training and exercises, conducted in accordance with Canadian Forces' doctrine and procedures, are essential to adequately prepare CF elements for their roles in support of Canadian national policy". Commanders are specifically directed in NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96 to ensure that personnel have completed prerequisite training to the prescribed standard. Departmental guidance on readiness is contained in the document, Defence Planning Guidance, which includes training as a component of operational readiness.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 21.12:</b></p> <p>Contrary to experience with the Somalia deployment, where general</p>	<p>Although general-purpose combat training provides the structural foundation on which operational</p>	<p>Completed</p>



<p>purpose combat training was emphasized, the Chief of the Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and policy that the pre-deployment period, from warning order to deployment, should be devoted primarily to mission-specific training.</p>	<p>effectiveness is based, effective participation in peace-support operations requires unique skills. NDHQ Instruction 5/96, "Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations," outlines 15 requirements which must be completed before deployment. These include such items as operation and maintenance of equipment specific to the mission, intervention between hostile factions and application of force. In addition, the Canadian Forces Operations Manual allows for commanders to direct the inclusion of any additional mission-specific training requirements as part of the deployment preparations.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 21.13:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that to facilitate pre-deployment training focused on mission-specific requirements, units preparing for peace support operations be provided, on a timely basis, with:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. a clearly defined mission and statement of tasks;</li> <li>2. up-to-date and accurate intelligence as a basis for forecasting the conditions likely to be encountered in theatre;</li> <li>3. Mission-specific Rules of Engagement and Standing Operating Procedures;</li> <li>and 4. a sufficient quantity of vehicles and equipment, in operational condition, to meet training needs.</li> </ol>	<p>Chapter 2 of the Canadian Forces Force Employment Manual addresses this requirement. Intelligence is fundamental to mission planning and every effort is made to provide up-to-date and accurate intelligence. Available intelligence is passed to commanders in applicable operational orders. In addition, contingent commanders now receive personal intelligence briefings as soon as possible after being appointed and throughout their mission. Permanently assigned rules-of-engagement planners have been incorporated into the Strategic Planning and Operations Directorate in National Defence Headquarters since May 1996. These officers begin formulating rules of engagement as soon as the planning process is initiated and also provide assistance to contingent commanders in the form of briefings and training advice. Contingent commanders can address or request rules of</p>	<p>Completed</p>



	<p>engagement advice or changes through planning and staff co-ordination conferences and staff assistance visits. The principle of meeting training needs has always been an accepted norm. In a resource-limited force there are always trade-offs; however, these are catered for by the Chiefs of the Maritime, Land and Air Staffs to the degree possible, considering the level of overall operational commitments at the time. Any difficulties in meeting these training requirements are usually raised at the first planning conference so that they can be addressed. As part of the overall training system within Land Force Areas, equipment pools are now maintained on an Area basis. These pools provide an immediately accessible source of serviceable equipment that can be used to supplement unit holdings.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 21.14:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish mechanisms to ensure that all members of units preparing for deployment on peace support operations receive sufficient and appropriate training on the local culture, history, and politics of the theatre of operations, together with refresher training on negotiation and conflict resolution and the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as basic language training if necessary.</p>	<p>The Peace Support Training Centre provides individual pre-deployment training, advice and assistance to formations and units in conducting individual pre-deployment training at the tactical level. Some of the topics covered by the Centre are rules of engagement, land-mine awareness, cultural awareness, investigation techniques, negotiation, mediation and some language training. For personnel of formed sub-units and units, the staff travels to the unit to provide this training.</p>	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 21.15:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that no unit be declared operationally ready unless all its members have received sufficient and appropriate training on mission-specific Rules of Engagement and steps have been taken to establish that the Rules of Engagement are fully understood.</p>	<p>This requirement is specified in NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96, "Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations."</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 21.16:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that training standards and programs provide that training in the Law of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, cross-cultural relations, and negotiation and conflict resolution be scenario-based and integrated into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism for confirming that instructions have been fully understood.</p>	<p>The Peace Support Training Centre has developed a series of specific performance objectives which require the successful, practical application by the individual. This requirement has been incorporated into recent exercises and is a fundamental part of pre-deployment training. The Chiefs of the Maritime, Land and Air Staffs also validate operational readiness by training and testing units in mission-specific scenarios.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 21.17:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that an in-theatre training plan be developed for any unit deploying on a peace support operation. The plan should provide for ongoing refresher training and remedial training in areas where deficiencies were noted before deployment and be modified as required to meet changing or unexpected conditions in theatre.</p>	<p>The DCDS Instruction for Commanders of Canadian Forces Deployed Operations requires that any training not done before deployment be completed in theatre. It also directs that refresher training be conducted throughout the duration of the deployment.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 21.18:</b></p> <p>Canadian Forces doctrine recognize the personal supervision of training by all commanders, including the most senior, as an irreducible responsibility and an essential expression of good leadership. Canadian Forces doctrine should also recognize that training provides the best opportunity, short of operations, for commanders to assess the attitude of troops and gauge the readiness of a unit and affords a unique occasion for commanders to impress upon their troops, through their presence, the standards expected of them, as well as their own commitment to the mission on which the troops are about to be sent.</p>	<p>Personal supervision of training has long been recognized as a basic leadership responsibility in the CF. This principle is highlighted in several Canadian Forces doctrine manuals. For example, a new CF publication, Canada's Army specifically states that an officer is responsible for taking a hands-on approach to training.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 23.1:</b></p> <p>The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that standards for evaluating individuals, units and elements of the Canadian Forces for operational tasks call for the assessment of two necessary elements, operational effectiveness and operational preparedness, and that both criteria be satisfied before a unit is declared operationally ready for any mission.</p>	<p>Defence Planning Guidance and the Land Force Command Strategic Operations and Resource Plan assign a variety of tasks to units. Battle-task standards and ongoing collective training ensure that the unit is capable of conducting these tasks. Once assigned a specific task, the unit will be organized and equipped to achieve the optimum capability for the assigned mission, and mission-specific training and preparations will then occur to ensure that the unit is ready to begin the mission. Every formation and unit which undertakes mission-specific training will have consulted the Lessons Learned Centre. Thus, it is ensured that the unit is capable of carrying out its assigned mission (operational effectiveness) and is ready to begin that mission (operational preparedness). Before deployment, the commander responsible to mount the mission ascertains the operational readiness of the unit, usually by conducting a validation exercise.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p><b>Somalia 23.2:</b> To avoid confusion between readiness for employment and readiness for deployment on a particular mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff adopt and ensure adherence to the following definitions throughout the Canadian Forces: Operational effectiveness is a measure of the capability of a force to carry out its assigned mission. Operational preparedness is a measure of the degree to which a unit is ready to begin that mission. Operational readiness of any unit or element, therefore, should be defined as the sum of its operational effectiveness and preparedness.</p>	<p>Defence Planning Guidance and the Land Force Command Strategic Operations and Resource Plan assign a variety of tasks to units. Battle-task standards and ongoing collective training ensure that the unit is capable of conducting these tasks. Once assigned a specific task, the unit will be organized and equipped to achieve the optimum capability for the assigned mission, and mission-specific training and preparations will then occur to ensure that the unit is ready to begin the mission. Every formation and unit which undertakes mission-specific training will have consulted the Lessons Learned Centre. Thus, it is ensured that the unit is capable of carrying out its assigned mission (operational effectiveness) and is ready to begin that mission (operational preparedness). Before deployment, the commander responsible to mount the mission ascertains the operational readiness of the unit, usually by conducting a validation exercise.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 23.3:</b> Contrary to the experience of the Somalia mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure, before any Canadian Forces unit or element of any significant size is deployed on active service or international operations, that a formal declaration is made to the government regarding the readiness of that unit to undertake the mission effectively.</p>	<p>The Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible and accountable for reporting to the Minister of National Defence on the readiness of the CF to undertake missions assigned by the Government. Notwithstanding government approval for the CF to participate in a particular mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff will only deploy units of the CF once they have been declared operationally ready by their relevant Environmental Chief of Staff.</p>	<p>Not Accepted</p>

<p><b>Somalia 23.4:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish a staff, under CDS authority, to conduct no-notice tests and evaluations of the operational effectiveness and preparedness of selected commands, units and sub-units of the Canadian Forces.</p>	<p>No-notice tests and evaluations are currently conducted for such units as Joint Task Force 2, search-and-rescue units, and nuclear, biological, and chemical emergency response teams because of their immediate-response requirements. No-notice tests and evaluations are not conducted on most other units, since specific missions are not assigned and because of the cyclical nature of training. However, as part of their respective training requirements, operational formations do evaluate operational preparedness on a cyclical basis or as part of pre-deployment training. Readiness will be evaluated on an ongoing basis through the Readiness and Capability reporting system, the successor process to the Operational Readiness Effectiveness System.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 23.5:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff order that national and command operational orders issued to Canadian Forces units tasked for active service or international operations state precisely the standards and degrees of operational effectiveness and operational preparedness demanded of individuals, sub-units, units, and commanders.</p>	<p>Peace Support Operational Standards and Operational Readiness criteria already exist in NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96, "Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations," issued in December 1996.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 23.6:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff standardize format, information, and directions concerning declarations of operational readiness and require such declarations to be signed by commanders.</p>	<p>The process for confirming a unit's operational readiness has been strengthened and now culminates in a formal declaration of readiness from the appropriate Environmental Chief of Staff to the Chief of the Defence Staff, as part of the transfer of command</p>	<p>Completed</p>



	authority process.	
<p><b>Somalia 23.7:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish clear, workable and standard measurements of operational effectiveness and preparedness for individuals, sub-units, units, and commanders in units and formations of the Canadian Forces.</p>	<p>The Environmental Chiefs of Staff are responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff for the overall operational effectiveness and preparedness of their Commands. Each of the environmental Commands has internal battle task standards and operational readiness requirements, the effectiveness of which are monitored by test exercises and deployments on an ongoing basis. The operational effectiveness and preparedness measurements are generated as part of the yearly planning cycle and direction reflected in the Defence Planning Guidance. The Strategic Planning Staff Action Team was established to develop a Performance Measurement Framework within the DND/CF and is working on the issue of further standardizing the measurement of operational effectiveness and preparedness CF wide as a part of this process.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/10/1999</p>
<p><b>Somalia 23.8:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff replace the Operational Readiness Evaluation System with a more reliable and efficient process aimed at collecting information about the effectiveness and preparedness of major units of the Canadian Forces for assigned operational missions.</p>	<p>The Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System (ORES) was designed primarily as a macro reporting and planning tool for the use of Senior Management and was not meant to measure to the individual or sub-unit level; that authority rests with the Environmental Chiefs of Staff, who report upward as part of the normal chain of command. The recent work done by the Strategic Planning Staff Action Team (SPSAT) working group towards establishing a DND/CF wide Performance Measurement (PM) Framework has engendered a philosophical change in overall PM</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/10/1999</p>



	<p>methodology within the Department. As a result, the original ORES concept was overtaken by events, no longer meeting the requirements of the organization, and is being replaced by operational readiness reporting within the larger PM framework. The first stage of this has been the creation of an Operational Status display to monitor readiness levels of specific high readiness "Vanguard" elements within the CF.</p>	
<p><b>Somalia 23.9:</b> The new readiness reporting system be capable of giving the Chief of the Defence Staff, senior commanders and staff officers a real-time picture of the effectiveness and preparedness of major operational units of the Canadian Forces for their assigned tasks.</p>	<p>The Operational Status display was developed as the first stage of the new readiness reporting system, in order to provide near real time reporting on high readiness operational elements (such as Vanguard and DART) within the CF. The new operational readiness reporting system is still to be implemented within the larger PM Framework.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/10/1999</p>
<p><b>Somalia 23.10:</b> The new operational readiness reporting system identify operational units as being in certain degrees of effectiveness and preparedness, such as high, medium and low, and in certain states of readiness, such as standby-ready and deployment-ready.</p>	<p>The Operational Status display was developed as the first stage of the new readiness reporting system, in order to provide near real time reporting on high readiness operational elements (such as Vanguard and DART) within the CF. The new operational readiness reporting system is still to be implemented within the larger PM Framework.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/10/1999</p>

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**Observations**

Ministerial decisions concerning pre-deployment training and operational readiness have, for the most part, been fully implemented. The *Committee* urges the CDS to complete the training package for professional development in the law of armed conflict, Rules of Engagement, intercultural and intergroup relations and related subjects. Furthermore, implementation of the new Operational Readiness Reporting System is long overdue, and efforts should be made to bring this to completion as soon as possible.

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**Rules of Engagement (ROEs) (Som 22.1-22.7)**

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**Decisions**

In his response to the Somalia Report, the Minister announced that the CDS would set out a framework for the development of ROEs. The Minister also stated that "generic" Rules of Engagement would be produced based on international and domestic law, law of armed conflict, domestic foreign policy and operational requirements. Furthermore, he made various commitments concerning the ROEs:

- The establishment of a database of other nations' ROEs.
- Improved training in ROEs, including that done in-theatre in response to changes to ROEs.
- A system, under the responsibility of the CDS, to ensure that ROEs are monitored and that they are disseminated to and understood by all ranks.
- Verification and testing for mission-specific ROEs be incorporated into the process for declaring a unit operationally ready for deployment.

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**DND Status Report**

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Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 22.1:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff create a general framework for the development of Rules of Engagement to establish the policies and protocols governing the production of such rules.	A two-part manual, The Use of Force in Canadian Forces Operations, was approved and issued in October 1996 to ensure that rules of engagement are consistent with the concept of operations, the mandate and domestic and international law. The first part of the manual sets	Completed

	out clear definitions and principles governing the use of force in the CF. The second part is a list of specific rules of engagement that will enable a specialized team at National Defence Headquarters to promptly devise appropriate rules of engagement for a given mission, and to amend them as the situation warrants.	
<b>Somalia 22.2:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and promulgate generic Rules of Engagement based on international and domestic law, including the Law of Armed Conflict, domestic foreign policy, and operational considerations.	Volume II of The Use of Force in Canadian Forces Operations, approved and issued in October 1996, contains generic rules of engagement.	Completed
<b>Somalia 22.3:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff establish and implement policies for the timely development of mission-specific Rules of Engagement and ensure that a verification and testing process for the Rules of Engagement is incorporated in the process for declaring a unit operationally ready for deployment.	As noted in the MND report to the Prime Minister, all CF units scheduled for deployment now receive detailed mission-specific briefings on rules of engagement and laws of armed conflict. In addition, specific direction to contingent commanders for rules of engagement training has been included in the DCDS Instructions to Commanders of Deployed Operations.	Completed
<b>Somalia 22.4:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the Canadian Forces maintain a data bank of Rules of Engagement from other countries, as well as Rules of Engagement and after-action reports from previous Canadian missions, as a basis for devising and evaluating future Rules of Engagement.	The Joint Plans and Operations Directorate currently holds allied rules-of-engagement data, as well as past Canadian rules of engagement, to help commanders and staff evaluate future requirements. In addition, after-action reports are maintained by a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Lessons Learned Cell.	Completed

<p><b>Somalia 22.5:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop standards for scenario-based, context-informed training on Rules of Engagement, both before a mission and in theatre, with provision for additional training whenever there is confusion or misunderstanding.</p>	<p>Standards have been developed and are included in the performance objectives used by the Peace Support Training Centre. For larger contingents, it is now standard practice to use scenario-driven exercises to confirm that rules of engagement have been understood and are correctly applied before declaring the contingent operationally ready to deploy.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 22.6:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and put in place a system for monitoring the transmission, interpretation and application of the Rules of Engagement, to ensure that all ranks understand them, and develop an adjustment mechanism to permit quick changes that are monitored to comply with the intent of the Chief of the Defence Staff.</p>	<p>Operational commanders constantly monitor operational rules of engagement to ensure that they match the mission requirements. The rules-of-engagement planning cell evaluates any proposed changes, and sends recommended changes to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) for approval. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that all ranks understand modifications to rules of engagement as directed in Volume I of the Use of Force in Canadian Forces Operations and in the mission's rules-of-engagement document signed by the CDS.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>Somalia 22.7:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that any change in the Rules of Engagement, once disseminated, result in further training.</p>	<p>In the mission's rules-of-engagement document, which is signed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, deployed contingent commanders are directed to ensure that personnel under their command receive periodic training and are thoroughly briefed and exercised on any changes to the rules of engagement.</p>	<p>Completed</p>

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**Observations**

The *Committee* has verified that most of these decisions have been addressed and are operational. However, the *Monitoring Committee* suggests that ROE refresher training in-theatre be made more robust. In addition, there appears to be some confusion regarding the involvement of JAG officers in ROE training, which should be the responsibility of the operational chain of command. This matter merits some attention.

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**Disciplinary Standards During Deployment (MND 43-45; Som 25.20)**

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**Decisions**

In March 1997, the Minister announced three decisions related to the use of alcohol by deployed CF contingents. Alcohol would be restricted in terms of its location, count and timing. During emergencies or other periods of heightened tension, the commander would order total abstinence. The commander would also have to seek NDHQ approval for in-theatre alcohol policies prior to deployment, which would improve the consistency of such policies for similar missions.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 43:</b> Restrict the location, amount and timing of alcohol consumption.	Issue specific direction and guidance on alcohol consumption in operational theatres.	Completed
	A review of the R&R policies regarding consumption of alcohol by deployed forces has resulted in general guidance to all levels of leadership being provided in "DCDS Direction to Commanders on Deployed Operations (June 1998)". Additional tailored instruction is promulgated by the DCDS for each operation prior to deployment in order to accommodate the unique operational environment, local	Completed

	customs and policies.	
<b>MND 44:</b> Provide for periods of total abstinence during emergencies or periods of concentrated operations.	Issue specific direction and guidance on alcohol consumption in operational theatres.	Completed
<b>MND 45:</b> Require contingent commanders to seek national headquarters approval of proposed in-theatre alcohol policy prior to deployment, so as to ensure that similar standards will apply to comparable missions.	Issue specific direction and guidance on alcohol consumption in operational theatres.	Completed
<b>Somalia 25.20:</b> The Chief of the Defence Staff develop guidelines and procedures for ensuring that cultural training programs are appropriately supported by the intelligence staff by providing adequate and appropriate resources for the intelligence staff well in advance of the operation.	This recommendation has been incorporated in the second draft of CF Publication 315-002, Security and Intelligence (Vol 2), "Intelligence in the Field," and will also be included in strategic joint intelligence doctrine.	Completed

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### Observations

Alcohol-related policies are in place, and the *Committee* is satisfied that these are being applied. The *Committee* is concerned, however, that cultural awareness training remains insufficient and is not adequately supported by intelligence staff. This is especially true in the area of language training, where there is a pressing need for Canadian Army interpreters or intensive language training for selected contingent members.

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### Other Training (MND 39, 40, 41, 42)

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#### Decisions

The Minister undertook to implement a National Joint Training Plan to improve and expand joint tri-service training. Along those lines, he made a commitment to devote more resources to training above the unit level (battle group, air squadron, naval task group), and to place



more emphasis on joint and combined operations.

Two specific training areas were also addressed. The Minister decided to issue a CF-wide instruction to improve training in the handling of detainees and prisoners of war, interrogation and conduct after capture. Training in the laws of armed conflict and ROEs would also be improved through the CF's educational and development programs.

#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 39:</b> Implement this year a National Joint Training Plan to improve and expand joint training by naval, land and air forces.	Implement 1997/1998 National Joint Training Plan.	Completed
	Conduct joint exercises.	Completed
<b>MND 40:</b> Devote more resources to training above the unit level (battle group, air squadron, naval task group) and place more emphasis on joint and combined operations.	Update the National Joint Training Plan for 1998/1999 to reflect increased emphasis on joint and combined operations above unit level.	Completed
<b>MND 41:</b> Issue shortly a Canadian Forces-wide instruction to improve training in the handling of detainees and prisoners of war, interrogation and conduct after capture.	Issue directives for handling of detainees and POWs, interrogation and conduct after capture.	Completed
<b>MND 42:</b> Place greater emphasis on training in the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement for all officers through the Officer Professional Development Program and related examinations, staff college courses and instruction at environmental training institutions.	Recommend LOAC training needs for all ranks levels by JAG.	Completed
	ADM(HR Mil) Confirm training requirements.	Completed
	Integrate training into all necessary courses.	Expected completion date: 01/09/2000

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**Operational Records** (Som 39.1, 39.2)

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**Decisions**

In his response to the Somalia Inquiry, the Minister announced that National Defence Operations Centre (NDOC) logs would adhere to the use of standard operating procedures, quality control and secure data systems. He also announced a series of measures to improve the archiving of in-theatre operational records.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia 39.1:</b> The Department of National Defence ensure that the National Defence Operations Centre logs are properly maintained, by implementing the following: 1. an audit procedure to ensure that standing operating procedures provide clear and sufficient guidelines on the type of information to be entered and how the information is to be entered; 2. an adequate data base system, which includes software controls to ensure accurate data entry in each field and appropriate training for operators and users of this system; and 3. increased system security to an acceptable standard compatible with the objective of national security, including restricting access to authorized persons using only their own accounts and passwords and extending the use of secure (hidden) fields to identify persons entering or deleting data.	The National Defence Operations Centre (NDOC) has always kept an operations log. However, since November 1996, the NDOC has been equipped with a secure, non-erasable electronic log and each entry can be traced to the originator. All personnel assigned to the NDOC receive formal training on its use. Guidance to NDOC personnel is provided in a document entitled NDOC Instructions. With respect to the audit procedure described in the recommendations, it is a supervisory function presently conducted by the Senior Staff Officer within NDOC. NDOC standard operating procedures are constantly reviewed and continue to be improved as lessons are learned.	Completed

**Somalia 39.2:**

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces take steps to ensure that an adequate record of in-theatre operations is created and preserved thereafter by: 1. establishing better systems and procedures to ensure a more complete and permanent record of events, including the recording of each day's activity or inactivity, so that every date is accounted for, to avoid the appearance of non-reporting or deleted records; 2. training soldiers to appreciate the importance of the log and diary and their responsibility to follow proper procedures in creating, maintaining, and protecting the record; 3. providing better procedures for supervising the maintenance of records in theatre to ensure adherence to established procedures; 4. improving the integration of secure data collection and storage systems to ensure the integrity of records created; and 5. ensuring that data banks are sufficient and include accurate information concerning individual taskings, the start and finish dates of each log and diary; and the location of records.

The DND/CF policy governing the retention and destruction of documents lacks clarity and is open to broad interpretation. The policy divides records into broad subject headings and in many instances does not list retention or destruction schedules for certain types of documents. For example, the DND/CF policy gives little specific direction about which operational logs need to be kept and for how long. Consequently, the department is revising its policy with the National Archives of Canada to correct these deficiencies and improve the way it manages paper-based and electronic records holdings both in and outside of theatres of operation. Efforts will also continue to better educate DND/CF personnel about their obligation to create, retain, store and dispose of records in accordance with government policy to ensure that accurate and complete records are retained for historical purposes. In April 1996, the Minister approved a project to procure an electronic document and records management system for DND/CF. Further, the Department is participating in a Treasury Board-shared initiative, entitled "Record Document Information Management System (RDIMS)." Fifteen sites have been selected to pilot the RDIMS solution, and work is well underway. Procurement of these electronic tools, in conjunction with other measures, will ensure compliance with the legislated requirements for document and records management. The project staff will investigate the practicality of using the RDIMS in operational

Completed

	headquarters.	
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## CHAPTER 7

# RESERVES AND CADETS ISSUES

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The *Monitoring Committee* and the Department have had different perspectives on the meaning of the Minister's decisions with respect to Reserve restructure, administration and conditions of service. The *Committee's* views have been described at length in previous reports and in Part One of this report. From the *Committee's* point of view, ministerial decisions on these issues can not be implemented or monitored in isolation. They affect a distinct component of the CF, rather than a policy, practice or procedure that enables the CF to do its job, which is the case with other areas of the reform program. The reconstituted *Monitoring Committee* will continue to follow progress in this area until the Fall of 2000.

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### Augmenting the Regular Force (SCRR 1, 2)

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#### Decisions

The Minister accepted SCRR recommendations which call for Area commanders to task Militia units to provide formed platoons and/or sections for incorporation into Regular Force units deploying for peacekeeping duties. Furthermore, where practical, junior Militia officers were to be employed in command positions, rather than in liaison or staff roles, when assigned to United Nations and other operations.

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#### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>SCRR 1:</b> Militia units selected by Area Comd be tasked to provide formed platoons/sections for peacekeeping duties.	Implement as resources, warning, and prep time permits. Amendment to related instructions required.	Completed
<b>SCRR 2:</b> Militia officers, where practical, be employed in comd of troops on UN and other ops, rather than as LOs or staff officers.	Agreed in principle however final decision rests with unit CO. Amend related instructions by Jan 98.	Completed

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## The Basis for Mobilization (SCRR 4, 5)

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### Decisions

The 1994 Defence White Paper outlined a new, four-stage framework for mobilization planning. The structure provides for "a graduated and orderly transition from routine peacetime operations to higher levels of involvement, which ultimately could include the total mobilization of the nation." The four-stages are as follows: force generation, force enhancement, force expansion and national mobilization.

The Minister directed the Department of National Defence to draft and implement a national mobilization plan "with all dispatch." The Minister also decided that the definition of stages three and four in the four phase mobilization scheme set out in the 1994 White Paper should be amended immediately to reflect clearly defined roles for the Reserve Force, and especially the Militia, as the basis for recruitment, training and the provision of formed units required in the event of a major conflict.

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### DND Status Report



Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>SCRR 4:</b> A national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch.</p>	<p>The CDS tabled a draft Mobilization Planning Framework to SCONDVA on 8 Dec 98. This draft has been reviewed at the Command and Group Principal level and was issued by the VCDS as direction in March, 1999. Mobilization planning will be an ongoing and continuous process in the Headquarters with the Mobilization Planning Framework in place as the key doctrinal document. Mobilization planning and related force development have commenced in earnest, particularly on the Land Staff. This item is considered implemented.</p>	Completed
<p><b>SCRR 5:</b> The definition of stages 3 and 4 of mobilization be amended immediately to clearly define Res F roles especially the Militia, as a basis for recruitment, training and provision of formed units.</p>	<p>The Mobilization Planning Framework includes detailed definitions and broad scope for Reserve Component roles throughout Stages 1 to 4 of mobilization. Detailed unit roles and tasks, particularly in the Militia, will be determined through the force development process and the Land Force Reserve Restructure. Ultimately, the Mobilization Planning Framework provides a sound doctrinal basis for the role of the Reserve Component and will have considerable impact upon selecting the most appropriate Reserve Component structure. This item is considered implemented.</p>	Completed

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**Restructuring the Militia (SCRR 6-16)**

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**Decisions**

In order to address chronic administrative and command deficiencies, the Minister decided in October 1996 to restructure the Militia. The restructuring process is multi-tiered and complex, and has been altered by decisions subsequent to the SCRR Report. Between November 1995 and March 1996, the Department reviewed that Report, recommendations from the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCNDVA) and the Senate Sub-Committee on Veterans Affairs and the Director General (Program Evaluation) Report E2/94 on implementation of the Total Force concept within the CF.

Restructuring is to occur along the following lines:

- elimination of Districts to be replaced by seven Militia Brigade Groups (presently increased to ten), commanded by an officer of the rank of colonel;
- retention of four existing Area Headquarters, but reorganized as and renamed Divisional Headquarters;
- assessment of the viability of Militia units to be the basis of restructuring, and to be based on the following factors: operational requirements; capacity to recruit and retain effective strength; capacity to train individually and collectively; regular force support; cost effectiveness; historical performance and battle honours, and footprint and link to the community;
- implementation of Total Army Establishments (TAE) (i.e., a common rank structure in place for Militia and Regular Force units);
- Land Force Command to develop a restructuring plan;
- command and control over recreated Militia field signals units be returned to Land Force Command as early as possible;
- new Contingency Support Wing (CSW) units to be reviewed so that redundant Militia units can be considered for CSW roles; and
- a force of 18,500 Primary Reserves (with the capacity to expand to 20,500).

The Minister acknowledged that it would also be necessary to assess the allocation and control of Militia funding. The Minister accepted four recommendations in that area. First, he decided that every Militia unit would be guaranteed funding of four training days per month for each of its effective members for the September-May period. The units, for their part, must devote the money entirely and directly to training their members. Second, he directed that the level of funding necessary to exercise command, control and administration of units be quantified, and that units be funded accordingly. Third, he stated that any delegation of tasks (such as collective training) to units must be accompanied by the necessary funds. Finally, he determined that increased authority and flexibility should be delegated to Reserve units to manage the operations and maintenance costs of their units and their infrastructure.

**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>SCRR 6:</b> Districts be eliminated and replaced by Militia Bde Gps.	14 x Districts replaced by 10 x Bde Gps in 97. Reduce to 9 x Bde Gps in Nov 99. CFOOs in draft.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 7:</b> The 4 existing Area HQs be retained but reorganized as and renamed Div HQs.	Area HQs retained with no change in name or structure. Consider basis for Div HQs at stage 4 mobilization.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 8:</b> The viability of all Militia units should be assessed as basis for restructure.	Unit viability evaluation is ongoing. Interim unit assessments are completed at the Area level. Final evaluations will be completed Nov 00.	Expected completion date: —/11/1999
<b>SCRR 9:</b> Total army establishments (TAE) be put in place.	TAE implementation is ongoing. LFRR process is bringing into effect new establishments based on Army establishments.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 10:</b> LFC to develop a restructuring plan.	Restructure plan will follow from the LFRR process and will remain ongoing until completed. Structure requirement will be in SORD 00 due out in Jun 99. Implementation to commence Apr 00.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 11:</b> Every Militia unit should be guaranteed funding of 4 days per month for each effective member during the period Sep-May.	The new funding model currently being developed and tested has been designed to ensure that every unit and soldier are adequately funded for the task they have been assigned. The number of days allocated may be different	Expected completion date: —/03/2000

	depending on the mission as determined by the new LFRR structure.	
<b>SCRR 12:</b> The level of funding necessary to exercise command, control and admin of units be quantified and units funded accordingly.	As part of the funding model, establishments have been developed to ensure that the appropriate mix of command and control, administration, support and mission elements are attained. Each unit will receive the funding to carry out the tasks assigned.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 13:</b> Any delegation of tasks to units be accompanied by the funds necessary to execute the task.	All tasks will come with necessary funds based on the new funding model.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 14:</b> Increased authority and flexibility be delegated to units to manage the O&M costs of their units and infrastructure.	More flexibility and authority to manage O&M funds will be derived with the implementation of the new funding model.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 15:</b> The establishment of new CSW units in AirCom be reviewed so that redundant Militia units can be considered for these roles.	This item is ongoing with no decision contemplated until completion of the LFRR process.	Expected completion date: —/03/2000
<b>SCRR 16:</b> Command and control over Militia field signals units be returned to LFC.	Field signals will remain with DISO with CLS funding Militia support needs. CLS as chair of the Command Consultative Working Group recommended no change in current command and control.	Completed

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**Supplementary Reserves, the Cadets and the Canadian Rangers (SCRR 18-23)**

The **Canadian Cadet Organizations** comprise youth between the ages of 12 and 18 who undertake training to develop physical and mental skills and learn about the Sea, Land and Air elements of the CF.

The **Canadian Rangers** provide a military presence in remote and isolated communities where there is no permanent CF presence.

The **Bold Eagle Program** originated in Saskatchewan and was later extended throughout the Prairie provinces. It represents an attempt to recruit Aboriginal Canadians into the CF Reserve.

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## Decisions

The Minister did not accept the recommendation that CF retirees, both officers and NCMs, automatically be enrolled in the Supplementary Reserves. He did, however, announce that personnel honourably released from the Canadian Forces would retain their service uniform. He also decided to continue and enhance the Canadian Rangers Program, and to continue the Bold Eagle Program for two years, at which point a decision would be made on its continuance. The Minister decided that the Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) would remain a component of the Reserve Force, and to consider seriously including an NCM component in the CIC. He also decided that the modest increase in financial support for the Cadet Program indicated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence should remain departmental policy, and to review the overall command and control of the Cadet Program.

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## DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>SCRR 18:</b> Personnel honourably released from the CF retain their service uniform.	NDHQ D Sup 3020 211600Z May 97 auth to retain basic kit issue on trans to SRR.	Completed
<b>SCRR 19:</b> Canadian Ranger Program be continued and enhanced.	—	Completed
<b>SCRR 20:</b> A decision on continuance of Bold Eagle be made in 98. If discontinued expand the Cdn Ranger program to absorb Bold Eagle.	LFC to review/update in process. Recommendations to be forwarded in Jan 98.	Completed

<b>SCRR 21:</b> CIC remain a sub component of the Res F and consideration be given to including an NCM component.	CIC will remain part of Res F. Requirement for NCM component in CIC not supported.	Completed
<b>SCRR 22:</b> The increase in financial support to cadets indicated in the 94 White Paper remain Departmental policy.	—	Completed
<b>SCRR 23:</b> The command and control of the cadet program be reviewed.	C Res & Cdts will continue to exercise central policy and budget control.	Completed

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## Total Force Administration of the Reserves (SCRR 25-30, 32)

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### Decisions

The Minister decided to adopt a number of policies to solidify the place of Reservists in the Total Force structure. The Regular Force would first attempt to meet its specialist needs by considering Reservists, and contract directly with civilians only once it was determined that the appropriate persons could not be found in the Reserves. The Minister also agreed to take all necessary steps to assist Reserve units to recruit specialists as required, and to harmonize civilian and military qualifications. To streamline administration of the Reserves, he extended Operation Red Tape, a Regular Force efficiency program, to the Reserves. In terms of training and equipment, he decided to make courses more accessible to Reservists by carving them into two to three-week segments, where possible. To further integrate Regulars and Reservists, he decided that they should serve in each other's formations; that Regular officers, at some point in their career, should serve with the Reserves; and that staff colleges should provide places for Reservists, in addition to an appropriate curriculum which deals with Reserve and mobilization matters. He also decided to make the administrative membrane that divides the Regular and Reserve Force more permeable, in order to allow consecutive and uninterrupted service between the Regular and Reserve components of the CF. Finally, the Minister directed the Department and the CF to identify equipment required for training, and to make pooling arrangements so that units could access that equipment on a regular basis.

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### DND Status Report



Recommendation	Activity	Status
<p><b>SCRR 25:</b> Reg F should meet requirements for individuals with specialist qualifications by first considering Res F members.</p>	<p>IM/IT type application needed to provide capability to identify Res members with specialist skills and qualifications. Res Force pers will not be included in People Soft pers data management programme until 1999-2000. Once Res Force is fully on line and functional with this programme, DND will be able to readily identify Reserve pers with specialist qualifications.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> The identification of funds for training (which includes milpay required for Res personnel while ongoing training) for each role out as the Res F is brought on-line in Peoplesoft, must be dealt with through the Op Enterprise Project.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/01/2003</p>
<p><b>SCRR 26:</b> Assist Res units to recruit specialists and maximize the harmonization of civilian and military qualifications.</p>	<p>On direction of IT&amp;E Mgt Committee, the trial has been cancelled and work is focussing on implementation of program. Policy and guidance documents being written and automated database for accreditation of equivalencies being created.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>SCRR 27:</b> Op Red Tape be extended to the Primary Res.</p>	<p>ATAC addresses total force needs of CF.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>SCRR 28:</b> Training courses be made accessible to reservists by structuring them into blocks of 2 to 3 weeks.</p>	<p>Naval Res has some computer based training available at unit level. Courses have been reorganized in 2 and 3 week blocks wherever possible. As a result of the meeting between the Army Training Authority and Senior Army Reservists in Aug 98, a Militia Training Review Board is being established by Director Army</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/04/2000</p>

	<p>Training to review all Army Reserve courses. The work of this Board is expected to carry on into the spring of 1999. The Air Force has achieved common standards and common training for Air Force controlled training. Where feasible modularized courses have been established. The new Basic and advanced Aerospace Ops Courses still need to be modularized. Comm Res C&amp;E MOC training currently meets the requirement of this recommendation. DIMOD 4 continues to ensure this access through active implementation and is working with CFSCE/CFRETS to maintain the accessibility to training for reservists.</p>	
<p><b>SCRR 29:</b> Res F and Reg F personnel should cross posted to permit service in each other's units and formations.</p>	—	Completed
<p><b>SCRR 30:</b> Eqpt required for Res training be identified and pooling arrangements be made to ensure access to eqpt on a regular basis.</p>	<p>Naval reservists are coursed through Total Force Fleet Schools and utilize equipment designed and acquired for specific Nav Res tasks. CBT terminals have been purchased for installation in each NRD and each NRD has been provided with an operational diesel engine for D Mech training. The Army review of training is part of the LF Restructure and thus progress will mirror LFRR timelines, ie: completion of review by Nov 99 and implementation thereafter. Militia Training Centres continue in all Areas. All Air Force units by design are Total Force. Reserve and Regular personnel share equally in the use of all available training equipment. Due to the operational employment of the Comm Res eqpt requirements continue to be addressed by both</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/11/1999</p>

	<p>DISO and LFC where eqpt for the purpose of operations and training are included in overall purchasing and distribution of eqpt to units.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> CMS action complete. CAS action complete. Equipment tables for the Militia will be based on the new LF Res structure with equipment designated for mission elements.</p>	
<p><b>SCRR 32:</b></p> <p>The admin membrane that divides Reg and Res F be made more permeable to allow consecutive and uninterrupted service between these components.</p>	<p>Improvements to component transfer procedure. Common pers management info system is essential. This includes revisions to numerous personnel policies to make them seamless between Reg and Res Force. Peoplesoft pers mgmt programme will have to incorporate Reserve units, including terminals on armoury floors.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> The disposition and ownership of various CFAOs governing personnel policy within ADM HR Mil Group is under review. Once responsibilities for the policies has been assigned the necessary revisions will be undertaken. In order to implement any revised "seamless" personnel policies dealing with movement of personnel between components and sub-components of the CF it will be necessary to have the personnel information of all sub-components of the Reserve managed through Peoplesoft.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/03/2003</p>

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**Conditions of Service** (SCRR 3, 34-40)

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### Decisions

The Minister made several decisions regarding the conditions of service, or 'people needs' of reservists. These policies include:

- benefits identical or equivalent to the Regular Force;
- establishment of a pay rate at 85 percent of the Regular Force rate at all ranks;
- Class C Reservists on service within Canada should not serve or be paid less than their Reserve rank when filling a position commensurate with their rank;
- a requirement for RETP (Reserve Entry Training Program) graduates to serve five years in the Primary Reserve within the first ten years of their graduation;
- immediate implementation of a revised pay system, the cost of which is not to be taken from the Reserve budget;
- continuation of the revised pay system in parallel with the RIIP (Reserves Integrated Information Project) pay system until proven satisfactory; and
- the total integration of Reserve and Regular Forces pay and personnel systems.

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### DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>SCRR 3:</b> Reservists returning from overseas service be entitled to an immediate 2 weeks disembarkation leave followed by 6 weeks employment and screening with the unit with which they served.	Two weeks leave not supported. Post tour employment & med entitlement being staffed. QR&O 34.07 under revision. QOL project is further working on initiatives regarding care of injured and family support for Reservists. <b>Additional remarks:</b> Draft revisions to QR&O 34.07 are being reviewed. Quality of Life Project Care of the Injured and Family Support Teams have requested ECS comments on draft DAODs which will enhance follow up care for reservists on return from SDAs.	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999
<b>SCRR 34:</b> Res F personnel should receive identical or equivalent benefits as Reg F personnel, everything else being equal.	Severance package approved by TB Sep 97 as RFRG. Remaining issues under review/development.	Expected completion date: 31/12/1999

<p><b>SCRR 35:</b> Take immediate steps to establish Res F pay at a minimum of 85% of Reg F pay for each rank.</p>	<p>Res F pay estb at 85% of Reg F pay as approved by TB 4 Dec 97.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>SCRR 36:</b> Reservists on CIC service within Canada should not serve or be paid less than their Res rank when filling a position commensurate with their rank.</p>	<p>Draft policy being developed by ADM(HR-Mil) staff. QR&amp;O amendments have been prepared as part of an omnibus submission to be staffed by DGCB, including seeking TB approval.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: 31/12/1999</p>
<p><b>SCRR 37:</b> RETP graduates be required to serve 5 years in the Pri Res within the first 10 years after graduation.</p>	<p>Policy under review as part of overall officer production requirements. Revised CFAO/DAOD required. <b>Additional remarks:</b> The initial phase of the overall officer production review did not include Res F officer production. The RETP positions are in the process of being transferred from the NDHQ PRL to the ECS PRLs. To date four candidates have been enrolled for academic year 99/00. Issues related to long term retention of officers following graduation from RMC is the subject of ongoing discussions.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/01/2000</p>
<p><b>SCRR 38:</b> Immediately implement a revised pay system.</p>	<p>RPSR to replace IRRPS in all Res units.</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p><b>SCRR 39:</b> Continue the revised pay system in parallel with the RIIP pay system until proven satisfactory.</p>	<p>This recommendation has been overtaken by events. With the redefinition of RIIP, Op Enterprise will be assuming responsibility for provision of pers data needed by CCPS-Re to process Res F pay and allowances. CCPS-Re came on-line on 1 Sep 1999. Considerable work needs to be done on CCPS-Re and PeopleSoft to integrate Reserve pay. The work on CCPS-Re cannot</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/01/2004</p>

	<p>be initiated prior to Y2K because of other more urgent priorities and won't be completed before year 2004. The transition to CCPS-Re should be done only once transparent to the member. Now that RPSR provides timely and accurate pay to the reservist, a regression in pay services, even temporary, would be unacceptable.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> This recommendation has been overtaken by events. With the redefinition of RIIP, Op Enterprise will be assuming responsibility for provision of pers data needed by CCPS-Re to process Res F pay and allowances. It is anticipated that Reg F will come on-line at the start the 1999 tax year with the Res F coming on-line in the 2000 tax year. Rather than switching pay systems part way through a tax year with the attendant complications of two separate systems tracking pay and tax related information, the current plan is to achieve the change over at the start of a taxation year. Due to the possible implications of Y2K, it is likely the switch over for Res F may not occur until Jan 2001.</p>	
<p><b>SCRR 40:</b> Consider the total integration of Reg and Res F pay and personnel systems.</p>	<p>With the cancellation of RIIP this is now the objective with one common departmental and CF wide system through Op Enterprise.</p> <p><b>Additional remarks:</b> The activities required to create one departmental system for personnel information management are ongoing. The end-state integrated system will not be on-line until after 2000 given the current priority to ensure that all essential systems are Y2K compliant and the issue of funding for the inclusion of the Res F capability in Peoplesoft.</p>	<p>Expected completion date: —/01/2000</p>



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## CHAPTER 8

### OTHER ISSUES

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#### Defence Policy (MND 1, 2, 3)

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##### Decisions

In March 1997, the Minister reaffirmed, as part of his effort to improve the leadership and management of the Armed Forces, that the Department would maintain the direction set out in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. He also confirmed that force levels of 60,000 Regulars and 30,000 Primary Reservists would be achieved and maintained. In a related decision, the Minister announced that the provision of stable and predictable funding levels to the Canadian Forces would thereafter be Government policy.

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#### DND Status Report

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Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 1:</b> Maintain the direction set out in the 1994 Defence White Paper.	Government policy.	Completed
<b>MND 2:</b> Confirm force levels of 60,000 regulars and 30,000 primary reservists.	Data extracted from the Central Computerized Pay System (CCPS) in December 98 indicated a paid strength of 60,219, including approximately 550 Class C Reservists. From an establishment point of view, the projected Regular Force structure on 31 Mar 99 is now slightly less than 60,000. There will always be	Completed

	monthly fluctuations to this number due to the effects of recruiting, and the number of personnel on the Basic and Advanced Training Lists. The 60,000 Regulars target being achieved, this recommendation is considered half implemented due to the fact that the 30,000 Primary reservists target has yet to be confirmed.	
<b>MND 3:</b> Provide the Canadian Forces with stable and predictable funding levels.	Government policy.	Completed

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### Observations

The *Committee* continues to urge the Department and the CF to maintain Regular Force strength at 60,000 personnel and to reach the target level of 30,000 for the Reserve Force. These force levels are required for Canada's defence capability.

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### Rank Structure (MND 32, 33a, 33b, 34, 35)

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#### Decisions

The Minister made the following announcements regarding changes to the rank structure of the CF:

- By 1998, organizational changes would be completed which would further reduce the number of general and flag officers to fewer than 65.
  - The rank of Army area commanders would be reduced to brigadier-general, and that of brigade group commanders to colonel.
  - In order to ensure a unified Army approach to developing the Army of the future while training the Army of today, a new major-general position would be established in Kingston to oversee Army training and doctrinal development.
  - The Department would undertake a study of rank inflation to improve the ratios of officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers to Non-Commissioned Members.
  - To review the pay and allowance system to ensure fair compensation — for skill and knowledge independent of rank.
-

## DND Status Report

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 32:</b> Make more organizational changes by 1998 to allow for a further reduction in the number of general and flag officers to fewer than 65.	Methodology is now in place to describe/account for senior positions (Col/Capt(N)and above). An annual review of the number of Generals and Flag Officers is carried out as part of the Succession Planning process. Currently there are 61 Generals and Flag Officers in command and staff positions essential to the direction of the CF and the efficient management of DND. In response to the need for temporary secondments to other government departments, international command and staff positions assigned to Canada, and professional development of the General and Flag Officers, there are currently 10 officers assigned to those requirements.	Completed
	VCDS Complete review of senior positions in NDHQ.	Completed
<b>MND 33a):</b> Reduce the rank of army area commanders to brigadier-general and that of brigade group commanders to colonel.	Implement Commander LFC's plan to reduce ranks at Areas and Brigades — LFWA and LFAA in 1997 — LFCA and SQFT in 1998.	Completed
<b>MND 33b):</b> Establish a new major-general position in Kingston.	Develop Terms of Reference and provide appropriate staff support.	Completed
	Establish position to command existing army elements in Kingston including 1 Canadian Division, to provide oversight on all army individual and collective training policies/activities.	Completed

<b>MND 34:</b> Undertake a study of rank inflation to improve the ratios of officers and senior non-commissioned officers to non-commissioned members.	Implement approved plan.	Not Started
	AFC of 19/4/99 has directed implementation of specific options.	Completed
	Identify factors driving rank ratios.	Completed
<b>MND 35:</b> Conduct a review of the pay and allowance system to ensure fair compensation for skill and knowledge rather than tying it solely to rank.	Implementation will not proceed until adequate linkages have been made with the ongoing and much broader Federal Government Unified Classification Standard currently being developed. Further DND guidance must be provided to developmental staff before this project can progress further.	Not started
	Maintain overwatch of UCS developments and await further guidance from DND/VCDS as to how to best proceed with this project.	Expected completion date: 31/12/2000
	Define requirements, including reviewing and analyzing Sparling Study and PMO TASK recommendations.	Completed

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### Observations

The Office of the VCDS is currently conducting a Military Occupation Structure (MOS) Review. This review will determine future officer-NCM ratios. In addition, Armed Forces Council has directed further reviews and employment options related to officer-NCM roles, professional development and tasks specific to each service.

Personnel and unit shrinkage has no doubt affected traditional views within DND and the CF of officer-NCM ratios. The *Committee* is aware that work is ongoing within NDHQ to rationalize core/non-core capabilities and personnel strength to maintain and deploy the Main Contingency and Vanguard Forces. Within the mandated force levels of 60,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reservists, the latter of which has not yet been met, current strategic thinking should be supported and embraced by the Department and the CF in their efforts to meet the requirements of the 1994 White Paper.

The *Committee* continues to be supportive of the reconstituted Army structure in Kingston. It

is proving to be a flexible and forward-looking organization that embodies many of the principles we have identified as being important to the future operational effectiveness of the CF.

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## **Quality of Life** (MND 46, 47, 48)

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### **Decisions**

Quality of life (QOL) has been a major subject of concern in the CF for some time. In March 1997, prior to SCONDVA's inquiry into the problem which began later that year, the Minister took several steps to improve the conditions of service for CF members. They are:

- To establish, on April 1, 1997, a Disability Compensation Information Advisory Cell, which would provide information and assistance to CF members who are released, or imminently to be released, for reasons of disability.
- To establish, by the summer of 1997, a program wherein military personnel injured while on special duty (such as on UN missions) would be given priority for employment in the public service of Canada.
- To implement a pay adjustment for CF members in April 1997.

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### **DND Status Report**

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Status</b>
<b>MND 46:</b> Establish on April 1st, 1997 a Disability Compensation Information Advisory Cell to provide information and assistance to Canadian Forces members who are released, or about to be released, for reasons of disability.	Hiring of full-time staff member.	Completed
	The CF QOL project office will set up a Care of Injured Personnel section by 15 Mar 99 which, inter alia, will monitor the situation/status of personnel released or about to be released from the CF for disability reasons. This is being coordinated with DVA. OPI is Col Hardie, ph 992 8236.	Completed
	Establish information cell.	Completed



	Develop aide-mémoire to provide information on cell to individuals/agencies.	Completed
	Carry out comprehensive communications effort to inform all Canadian Forces' personnel.	Completed
<b>MND 47:</b> Have in place by summer 1997 a program allowing for military personnel injured while on special duty (such as on UN missions) to be given a priority for employment in the public service of Canada.	Implement regulation for priority placement of military personnel injured in special duty areas.	Completed
	Develop Public Service "Special Measures Inventory" for military personnel injured in special duty areas.	Completed
<b>MND 48:</b> Provide all Canadian Forces personnel with a further pay adjustment in April 1997. Details will be released shortly.	Implement first increment of pay comparability package.	Completed
	Continue efforts to eliminate pay disparity between public service and Canadian Forces.	Completed

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## Observations

The *Monitoring Committee* notes that the Department released its first interim report on Quality of Life initiatives in December 1999, and commends the work done in this area.

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## The Regimental System (MND 36, 37, 38)

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### Decisions

In March 1997, the Minister made three decisions affecting regimental affiliation in the Army. He decided to take steps to ensure that all Army personnel properly appreciate the balance between loyalty to one's regiment and the necessary broader loyalty to the CF as a whole. He also directed the Army to end regimental affiliations for CF officers at the rank of colonel and above, and to remove regimental affiliations from all Army battle schools.

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>MND 36:</b> Ensure that all army personnel have a proper appreciation of the relationship between loyalty to the regiment and the necessary broader loyalty to the Canadian Forces as a whole.	Enunciate a policy of one Army, one Voice, one Standard within a CF context. Reflect this vision in all Army communications and activities.	Completed
<b>MND 37:</b> End regimental affiliations above the rank of lieutenant-colonel.	Issue directives to end regimental affiliation above rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.	Completed
<b>MND 38:</b> Remove regimental affiliations from all army battle schools.	Convert Infantry Regimental Battle Schools to Army Training Centres.	Completed

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**Other Recommendations** (Som Concl. 1, 3)
 

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**DND Status Report**

Recommendation	Activity	Status
<b>Somalia Conclusion 1:</b> Conclusion 1. The Minister of National Defence report to Parliament by June 30, 1998 on all actions taken in response to the recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry.	The MND supports this recommendation and intends to go further in achieving the objectives. More specifically, the MND will be establishing a Monitoring Committee on Change in the CF and DND, comprised of Canadians from wide-ranging backgrounds, that will report to the MND and prepare semi-annual reports that	Ongoing

	will be released to the public.	
<b>Somalia Conclusion 3:</b> Conclusion 3. Save for those individuals who have been disciplined for actions in relation to the deployment, all members of the Canadian Forces who served in Somalia receive a special medal designed and designated for that purpose.	This recommendation invites a review of approximately two million pages of documents provided by DND and two years of oral testimony contained in the transcript of record. It would require assessing the credibility of each witness who testified and making findings of fact about the attitudes and actions of each witness. Given the manner in which testimony was received, the type of testimony received (hearsay, opinion, circumstantial, etc.), the inability to determine conclusively from the record what testimony the Commission believed or disbelieved and why, what documentary evidence (including the papers they published) they believed or disbelieved and why, the fact that there may well be further evidence that would or could have been received by the Commission, which evidence could or would affect assessments, and the highly subjective nature of the issues requested to be addressed, it would be impractical to attempt to implement the recommendation under the circumstances. The Commission was in the best position to assess credibility.	Completed

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## ANNEX 1 — TERMS OF REFERENCE



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Defence

Défense  
nationale

### BACKGROUNDER DOCUMENTATION

BG-97.029

October 14, 1997

#### THE MINISTER'S MONITORING COMMITTEE ON CHANGE

The Minister of National Defence has established a committee of prominent Canadians to monitor the change initiatives, the process of implementation for these changes, and to evaluate their effectiveness at the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) on such issues as the military justice system; values and ethics; leadership; the command and rank structure; operational missions; terms and conditions of service; the national headquarters; and relations with the Canadian public. Their findings, observations, and recommendations will be reported directly to the Minister of National Defence semi-annually, and will be made available to Canadians.

#### **Terms of reference**

The Minister's Monitoring Committee will:

- receive reports on the implementation of the recommendations contained in:
  - ⇒ the Defence Minister's March 25, 1997, *Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces*;
  - ⇒ the *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services*;
  - ⇒ the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia; and
  - ⇒ other change initiatives across the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces;
- have access to all documentation the Committee considers relevant to its mandate;
- visit any CF site the committee considers relevant to its mandate;
- observe and document the rate of progress, experiences, and conditions under which change is being implemented at DND and the CF; and
- report to the Minister of National Defence its findings and observations at regular intervals, and present semi-annual written reports with recommendations.

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For information: (813) 990-2353/54  
After hours: (813) 990-7811  
World Wide Web: <http://www.dnd.ca>

Pour renseignements (813) 906-2284/53  
Après les heures de travail (813) 906-7211  
Site Internet : <http://www.dnd.ca>

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## ANNEX 2 — BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

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### **The Honourable John A. Fraser**

John Allen Fraser, P.C., O.C., O.B.C., C.D., Q.C., was born December 15, 1931, in Japan and raised and educated in British Columbia. He was called to the Bar in 1954 and practiced law until his election to the House of Commons in 1972. He was re-elected in 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1988. In opposition he served as critic on Environment, Labour, Post Office, Solicitor General and Fisheries matters. He was Minister of Environment and Postmaster General (1979-80), and then Minister of Fisheries (1984-85).

In 1986, Mr. Fraser became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot by members of parliament. He served as Speaker until February 1994. His accomplishments as Speaker include the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Parliamentary Cooperation Program; the creation of the House of Commons Public Information Office; and the establishment of the House of Commons environmental program, Greening the Hill. In 1986, he established a House of Commons Task Force on the Disabled and Handicapped to ensure access and employment opportunities on Parliament Hill for the disadvantaged. He also commissioned the recent publication, *The House of Commons at Work*.

Over the years, Mr. Fraser has had a continuing interest in resource matters including fisheries and forestry and has demonstrated a profound commitment to environmental causes both as a lawyer and a parliamentarian. He has received a variety of national awards for his valuable contributions and tireless efforts in the area of sustainable development. In addition to these many awards, he has been active with a number of boards and foundations, and was awarded an honorary professorship from the Beijing Medical University (China) in 1992.

In 1994, Mr. Fraser was appointed Canada's Ambassador for the Environment, a position held until September 1998. In 1995, in recognition of his many contributions to Canada, he was awarded the Order of Canada. He is also a member of the Order of British Columbia and holds the Canadian Forces Decoration. He continues to be active in environmental protection and resource conservation and was appointed Chair of the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council in September 1998.

Mr. Fraser has been associated with the Canadian Forces since 1950, when he first enlisted as a private soldier with the West Coast Signal Regiment. After two years with Canadian Officer Training Corps, he was commissioned as an infantry officer and posted to Germany in 1953

with the First Canadian Highland Battalion of the 27th Brigade. From 1954 to 1962, he served as an officer in both the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment. Mr. Fraser was appointed Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, in 1994 and is currently the Regiment's Honorary Colonel.

In October 1997, Mr. Fraser was appointed a member of the National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. He is currently Chair.

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### **David Bercuson, Ph.D.**

David Bercuson was born in Montreal in August 1945. He attended Sir George Williams University, graduating in June 1966 with Honours in History and winning the Lieutenant-Governor's Silver Medal for the highest standing in history. Dr. Bercuson pursued graduate studies at the University of Toronto, earning an MA in history in 1967 and a Ph.D. in 1971.

Dr. Bercuson has published widely in academic and popular publications on a wide range of topics. He specializes in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history. He has written, coauthored, or edited over 25 popular and academic books and does political commentary for CBC and CTV television. He has written regular columns for the *Globe & Mail*, the *Financial Post* and other newspapers.

In 1988, Dr. Bercuson was elected to the Royal Society of Canada and in May, 1989, he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at The University of Calgary. Since January 1997 he has been Director of the Strategic Studies Program at the University of Calgary.

His book, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, won the Wilfred Eggleston Award for nonfiction at the Alberta Book Awards in May 1997. Another recent book, *Deadly Seas: The Story of the St. Croix, U305 and the Battle of the Atlantic*, coauthored with Dr. Holger Herwig, was on the *Maclean's* Bestseller list for several weeks. His most recent book *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* was published in September 1999.

Dr. Bercuson was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence on the Future of the Canadian Forces from January to April 1997.

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### **D. Bevis Dewar**

Bevis Dewar was born in Kenmore, Ontario in August 1932. He studied at Queen's University where he obtained an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in history, economics and political science in 1953, following which he pursued postgraduate studies in Canadian history also at Queen's.

In 1954, he joined the Public Service of Canada and was appointed to the Cabinet Secretariat in the Privy Council Office where he was secretary to Cabinet committees dealing with matters of interdepartmental liaison and policy development, mainly regarding external affairs and defence.

In 1963, he became a program analyst in the Treasury Board Secretariat. His duties consisted of program and expenditure budget analysis and of presenting recommendations dealing with defence production, industrial development, foreign affairs and defence. In 1968, he was named Assistant Secretary of the Program Branch at the Treasury Board Secretariat, responsible for analyzing and making recommendations on expenditure budgets of all federal departments. The following year he became Deputy Secretary of the same Branch.

Mr. Dewar was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada in September 1973. From September 1975 to August 1979, he served as Assistant Secretary for the Government Branch of Science and Technology Canada, responsible for the International Division, the Government Projects Division, and the Project Review and Assessment Division.

In August 1979, Mr. Dewar was appointed Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) in the Privy Council Office. He was responsible for secretariats on economic policy, government operations, foreign affairs and defence, native and social affairs, communications, emergency planning, labour relations, and legislation and House planning. From November 1982 to May 1989, Mr. Dewar served as Deputy Minister of National Defence. He was appointed Associate Secretary of the Cabinet and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council in May 1989. In October 1990, he was named Principal of the Canadian Centre for Management Development.

Mr. Dewar retired from public service in August 1992. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute on Governance and served as its Chairman from 1992 to 1997.

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### **Brigadier-General (ret'd) Sheila Hellstrom, CD**

BGen Hellstrom is a native of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. She graduated from Lunenburg County Academy in 1953 and attended Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick where she received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology and chemistry. While at Mount Allison she enrolled as a flight cadet in the Royal Canadian Air Force University Reserve Training Plan. She received her commission in 1956 and transferred to the Regular Force in the personnel administration branch. She is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff College, Toronto and of the National Defence College in Kingston. In 1989, she received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Mount Allison University.

BGen Hellstrom's career included administrative appointments at military establishments in Gimli, Winnipeg and Rivers, Manitoba, Senneterre and Montreal, Quebec, North Bay and Toronto, Ontario as well as Baden-Soellingen, Germany and Metz, France. From 1980 to 1985, she was Deputy Director and then Director Women Personnel at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, followed by a term as acting Director General — Conditions of Service.

In 1987 she became the first woman in the Canadian Forces to achieve general officer rank and was appointed Director General Personnel Careers Officers. At the same time, she chaired the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, a group of senior officers from the NATO nations concerned with the effective utilization of women in the armed forces of the Alliance.

Now retired from the Canadian Forces, Brigadier-General Hellstrom resides in Ottawa where she serves on the Board of Ottawa Division Canadian Corps of Commissionaires and is a member of a number of defence-related organizations. She has also served on the Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces and the Ottawa Police Services Board's Advisory Committee on Race Relations and Employment Equity.

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### **Laurier LaPierre, O.C.**

Laurier LaPierre is a well-known Canadian broadcaster, academic, writer, journalist and communications advisor. He is currently President of Frog Productions de la Grenouille Inc. He obtained a Bachelor of Arts from St. Michael's College in Toronto, following which he pursued his Master's degree and Ph.D. in History at the University of Toronto. He is Chair of Telefilm Canada, Chair and Spokesperson for the Heritage Fairs for the CRB Foundation and just recently was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of Canadian Heritage on the future direction of the National Archives of Canada and the National Library of Canada.

From 1959 to 1978, LaPierre was a Professor in the History Departments of the University of Western Ontario, Loyola College and McGill University. At McGill he was General Secretary and Director of the French Canadian Studies Program.

From 1962 to 1978 he was host and writer for such CBC television programs as *This Hour has Seven Days*, *Inquiry* and *Midnight*. In 1990/91 he was the Function Head of the Moderator's Program, Production Designer and Host for the electronic town hall meetings, *Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future*.

Among his many publications are: *Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Romance of Canada* (1996); *Canada My Canada: What Happened* (1992); *1759: The Battle for Canada* (1990); *To Herald a Child: The Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Education of the Young Child* (Ontario Teachers' Federation, 1982); *Québec Hier et Aujourd'hui* (editor, 1966); "The Sixties", for *The Canadians: 1867-1967*, (eds. J.M.S. Careless and R.C. Brown, 1966); *The Apprenticeship: Canada 1867-1914*, (CBC International Services; History of Canada, no. 3, Montreal 1967); *Genesis of a Nation, British North America; 1776-1867* (CBC International Services, History of Canada, no. 2, Montreal, 1966). He has new books scheduled for release in 1999 and 2000.

In addition to authoring these books and articles, Mr. LaPierre has written many articles for *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, *Canadian Forum*, the *International Review* and the *Financial Post*.

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### **Carole Lafrance**

Prior to September 1994, Ms. Lafrance was President-Owner of Cala H.R.C. Ltd., which she founded in 1978. Cala was the first all Canadian-owned company specializing in human resources communications, with offices in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, and affiliates in the United-States and Europe. Ms. Lafrance is now the President

of C.M. Lafrance and Associates.

Ms. Lafrance was the first Canadian to be invited to become a member of the prestigious Committee of 200, an international association of prominent business women. She is also a member of the World Presidents' Organization.

In 1988 and 1991, she was named "Woman of the Year" for business and entrepreneurship in Quebec. Her company also won the 1990 Mercure prize for small-and medium-sized businesses, and was chosen as one of 50 of Canada's best managed, privately-owned companies. In 1996, she was named "Personnalité de la semaine" (Personality of the Week) by Montreal's *La Presse*. Ms. Lafrance was on *Maclean's* 11th Honor Roll. She was also featured in the television documentary "*Canadian Heroes*".

In 1991, the National Film Board made a television documentary entitled "Québec et Associés" about four successful Quebec business women. Ms. Lafrance was one of them.

She was the first woman to be named an officer of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and became first female Chair in September of 1996. In June 1999, she received an Honorary Doctorate of Education from Nipissing University in North Bay, Ontario. She also serves on the boards of many other business and academic committees and organizations. In October 1997, Ms. Lafrance was appointed to the Minister's Monitoring Committee.

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## John Rankin

John Rankin has enjoyed a distinguished career in human resources, general management and academia. He obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in 1966 and his M.B.A. degree in 1971 from McMaster University.

He is currently Senior Vice-President of Dealer Relations at Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited. In this role, he has management accountability for the selection and development of Dealers and for providing support for in-store retail strategy implementation.

Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited — the country's largest hardgoods retailer — offers a unique mix of products and services through three distinct, yet inter-related businesses. Canadian Tire Retail and the Associate Dealers together form one of Canada's best-known and most successful retailers.

Rankin joined Canadian Tire in 1995 after serving as President of George Brown College, Senior Vice-President and General Manager of Mitel Corporation, and Vice-President of Human Resources at Northern Telecom.

Rankin is actively involved in both business organizations and the community. He is a member of International Mass Retail Association (IMRA) and the Canadian Education Association. He also sits on the advisory boards of the University of Toronto School of Continuing Studies, Royal Roads University, MBA (Human Resource Management), and The Banff Centre for Management.



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## ANNEX 3 — LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
AMSC	Advanced Military Studies Course
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ATI	<i>Access to Information Act</i>
BOG	Board of Governors
CAR	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CCSFOR	Canadian Contingent Stabilization Force
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFAO	<i>Canadian Forces Administrative Order</i>
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CFPAS	Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System
CFPM	Canadian Forces Provost Marshal
CHAP	Cadet Harassment and Abuse Prevention
CIC	Cadet Instructor Cadre
CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CO	Commanding Officer
CRB	Career Review Board
CSW	Contingency Support Wing
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DDC	Defence Diversity Council
DDCS	Director of Defence Council Services

DM	Deputy Minister
DMP	Director of Military Prosecution
DND	Department of National Defence
DTP	Diversity Training Program
EE	Employment Equity
HR	Human Resources
JAG	Judge Advocate General
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MND	Minister of National Defence
MOC	Military Occupation Classification
MOS	Military Occupation Structure
MPCC	Military Police Complaints Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO/NCM	Non-Commissioned Officers/Non-Commissioned Members
NDA	<i>National Defence Act</i>
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NDOC	National Defence Operations Centre
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSSC	National Security Studies Course
OGD	Other Government Departments
PCO	Privy Council Office
PER	Personnel Evaluation Report
QOL	Quality of Life
QR&O	<i>Queen's Regulations and Orders</i>
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RETP	Reserves Education Training Program
RIIP	Reserve Integrated Information Project
RMC	Royal Military College
ROE	Rules of Engagement

ROTP	Regular Officer Training Plan
SCONDVA	Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
SCRR	Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves
SHARP	Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention
SOM	Somalia Commission of Inquiry
TAE	Total Army Establishment
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

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# **MINISTER'S MONITORING COMMITTEE ON CHANGE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE CANADIAN FORCES**

**Chairman**

Hon. John A. Fraser

**Committee Members**

Dr. David J. Bercuson

Mr. D. Bev Dewar

BGen Sheila A. Hellstrom (Ret'd)

Ms. Carole M. Lafrance

Mr. Laurier L. LaPierre

Mr. John J. Rankin

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The *Committee* wishes to recognize the valuable contribution made to its work by the following individuals:

Executive Director

Sheila-Marie Cook

Director of Research

Dr. Peter M. Archambault

Research Analysts

Linda Cameron  
Rhonda Cameron  
Isabelle Dumas  
Robert LeBlond  
Boris StipernitzInformation  
ManagementDennis Brook  
Neil Blaney

Administration

Maurice Lacasse  
Manon Demers

## Consultants

Acart

Thomas K. Gussman (T.K. Gussman Associates Inc.)

InfoLink Consultants Inc.

Hélène Langlois

Lexi-tech International

Lise Maisonneuve (Carroll, Wallace &amp; Maisonneuve)

Lowell Thomas

Katherine K. Fletcher (Specialized Communications  
Incorporated)

Bill Milliken (Temple Scott Associates)

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